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This study takes its point of departure on the mechanisms and effects of globalisation. The focus 
is set on the relations between EU and the developing countries. The central problem that this 
study seeks to examine is whether the EU policies on agriculture and development as well as 
their respective policy processes are attributing factors to the negative effects of globalisation 
that several developing countries experience due to contradictions in EU policies and EU policy 
processes. In order to conduct these examinations the analyses of the EU policies on agriculture 
and development are based on the official treaty establishing the European Community. The 
analyses on policy processes are based on academic works on EU policy processes. The exami-
nation of the consequences for the developing countries is based on analyses of case studies that 
together represent the situation in developing countries. The theoretical frameworks for conduct-
ing the analyses of EU policies are based on traditional economic trade and development theories 
that allow a theoretical categorisation of the policies. In order to analyse the various policy proc-
esses a multi-dimensional approach of policy analysis is applied. The analyses of the conse-
quences that EU policies and policy processes have for the developing countries are analysed on 
the basis of an abductive approach consisting of theoretical and empirical examinations.  
 
The classifications of the two policy areas conclude that contradictions exist between the theo-
retical approaches to EU policy on agriculture and EU policy on development. The contradic-
tions lie in the different theoretical notions about how to generate economic growth, the effects 
of a liberal world economy, and the consequences of capitalism. Furthermore the categorisation 
of the two policies finds that contradictions exist within the two policies: classic liberalism theo-
retically contradicts protectionism in agricultural policy in terms of understandings of effects of 
free trade and liberal economies. In parallel development policy’s Modernisation theory and neo-
Liberalism contradict post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism on the basis of the effects imperialism, 
micro and macro economic focuses, and the relation between the developed and the developing 
countries. 
 
The multi-dimensional approach to policy analysis enables conclusions on differences in policy 
processes in terms of different policy natures with different policy processes resulting in first and 
second policy priorities. Another reason is the different policy instruments that are used to attain 
the objectives set in the policies. Due to the different policy priorities policy instruments are 
clearly defined in the agricultural policy but lack in the development policy. Furthermore the 
different policy processes allow for the inclusion of other policy actors than the EU institutions; 
These actors are able to influence the policy processes in a direction that favours the actors’ eco-
nomic and political interests. In contrast, the development policy processes are not subject to 
influential actors to the same extent. The layout of the official EU decision procedures implies 
different policy settings for decision making in the two policy areas: EU agricultural policy is 
decided on in a supranational forum, whereas development policy decision takes place in an in-
tergovernmental forum. 
 
The contradictions in EU policies and policy processes lead to consequences where EU’s devel-
opment programmes are undermined by the effects of the agricultural policy. Furthermore, inter-
nal inconsistencies in the development policy prevent the general situation in the developing 
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1. Introduction  
Globalisation  
An increased call for political action at a supranational level, which is out of reach for the na-
tional states, has given potentials for generating development towards a more equal world, but 
the supranational institutions that should provide the means for doing so are lacking and thereby 
creating a governance vacuum.1 The effects of globalisation are not unambiguous for the devel-
oping countries; globalisation creates larger economic growth that would not have otherwise 
occurred. (E.g. the development in South East Asia is an example of the fact that also poor coun-
tries can achieve economic growth).  On the other hand some developing countries are affected 
less fortunate by globalisation than the rich developed countries.2 Further the differences are 
made more rigorous by the asymmetric market liberalisations in favour of the developed coun-
tries. 
 
The meanings of and attitudes towards the phenomenon of globalisation are many, as are the 
efforts to identify the complex processes. 3 The suggestions to identify the scope of the concept 
associate it either with opportunity, prosperity and the spread of democracy, or with inequality, 
uncertainty and corporate hegemony.4 There seems to be consensus on, though that the processes 
of globalisation are inevitable and irreversible. The wheels of the world are spinning faster and 
to stop it is not an option. The citizens of the world are left with the opportunities to try and get 
the best out of it.  
 
Unequal consequences  
However, these opportunities are not equally accessible to all, and the globalisation processes are 
evolving asymmetrically in the world society. Stronger and wealthier nations use their political 
and economic strength to ensure their own interests via trade unions or trade agreements, and 
often these agreements are made at the expense of countries standing outside these coalitions.  
This means that the economic development described above is a truth with modifications which 
mainly covers the situation in the developed part of the world. There is a gap between the rich 
                                                 
1 Erle: 2006 
2 Ibid 




and developed countries that have the power to ensure their own interests, and the developing 
countries that, on the other hand, are kept in poverty and at a slower pace of development. Thus, 
the otherwise overall, positive development in the world covers huge inequalities; the numbers 
cover an uneven development in favour of the developed countries.  
Globalisation is said to cause closer interaction between the countries of the world, hereunder 
communication and trade. The worlds' political and trade institutions are trying to control these 
connections by regulating the trade between countries. The institutions are results of years of 
historic interdependence, negotiation, agreements, and political traditions, and are further based 
on an internal consensus of self-protectiveness between the involved actors. This may cause the 
associations to sometimes appear conservative towards a development perspective.  
Cases 
One of the persons, who feel the consequences of standing outside the exclusive club of the 
world's wealthiest and strongest political powers, is Rodolpho Fiche from the Dominican Repub-
lic. From 1994 to 2001 he participated in the EU initiated development project PROLINO which 
objectives, among others, were to improve the farmers' skills and techniques. Fiche benefited 
from the programme and at the height of his carrier he had 120 dairy cows. However, today the 
number is down to 70 and his economic situation is still worsening.  
One of the major reasons is that Fiche has nowhere to sell the milk he produces. Fresh milk has 
almost been forced out of the market for milk in the Dominican Republic by milk powder im-
ported from Europe. Fiche cannot compete against the millions of cans of dried milk powder that 
take up the shelves in the shops. The producer is Europe's biggest dairy, Arla and the price for 
the imported powder milk is lower than Fiche can produce the fresh milk for. Fiche is facing the 
same destiny as many other Latin American dairy farmers, he is forced to give up his dairy pro-
duction and slaughter his cows. The cheap milk powder makes it impossible for him to sell the 
fresh milk and this means that he cannot afford to buy feed for them - or food and clothes for his 
family for that matter. He is left with little options but to sell or slaughter his cows and join the 
thousands of other former farmers in the search for another way to support his family.  
Another farmer, who feels the effects of the unequal development, is the South African farmer 
Ed Granham. He has worked hard to establish a sugar and candy production on his farm. But in 
spite of a production price of 325 EUR per tonne of sugar produced in South Africa, towards 650 
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EUR for a Danish produced ton of sugar,5 he cannot compete with the price of the export subsi-
dised European sugar and candy products overflowing the South African shops. As a result, 
Granham has been forced to reduce his group of staff from 16 to four, and he sees the day com-
ing closer, where he must fire the last four, and shut down the production. Some of the European 
sugar ends up in South Africa, where it is sold at prices below market prices. The South African 
sugar farmers cannot compete with these prices, and the consequence for many of them is similar 
to Granham's; they must leave the sugar industry and their farms and production facilities.  
The examples illustrate some of the consequences of the globalising world as it is today. As 
mentioned, globalisation can enhance the uneven development of countries in the world, but 
some strong actors in the international society enhance this tendency even further.  
The European Union is a significant actor in the globalisation process with its now 459.5 million 
citizens6 and strong currency. The increasing cooperation between the EU member states in areas 
like production and trade have led to integration on policy, and forms a strong threshold towards 
non-EU states.  
In spite of the EU's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, it seems that EU actions 
on especially agricultural and trade areas are contributing to an increase in poverty, unemploy-
ment and hunger in some countries outside the EU. The uneven access to the world trade scene 
contributes to maintaining the poorest countries in their sad status. The examples from the Do-
minican Republic and South Africa are not new or revolutionary in any way. There are thou-
sands of stories like Fiche's and Granham's from all over the developing world. Examples of how 
EU initiates and funds development projects to help farmers and local communities establish a 
sustainable living, just to witness the projects fail when they face the reality of the hard condi-
tions that reign on the international markets.  
The international society  
The EU may play a role in keeping the poorest countries away from taking part in the world 
market place but other international institutions are playing major parts as well. Examples of 
                                                 




promoters of the developed world's allegedly free trade policy towards developing countries in-
clude the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the G8 countries.7  
They have all signed the 8 UN Millennium Development Goals, a set of time bound and measur-
able goals that involve support from the developed world in the form of aid, trade, debt relief and 
investment.8 By signing the resolution the international society has agreed on working together 
towards a common goal to help third world countries in the struggle to get out of poverty and 
debt.9  
From the EU's perspective The Commission headed by Romani Prodi (2000-2004) took actions 
to renew and strengthen EU's development policy, and it succeeded in introducing some remark-
able initiatives - at least at a symbolic level.10 But with the above examples in mind, it seems to 
be a long way yet, before the intentions and promises lead to actions that will benefit the poor 
countries.  
EU  
How is it possible that these contradicting elements exist alongside each other? What is EU's 
position in this and what is it in the EU system that allows for the self-contradictions? It seems 
like the success or failure of EU development projects and agreements depends on the economic 
and political interests of the communities and institutions within the European Union. Further-
more, it seems that the policy processes in the field are blurred. When even a former EU Devel-
opment Commissioner, Poul Nielsson, claims that he cannot see through the policy jungle of EU 
development (and trade) policies - then who can?11  
The dominating international institutions' actions in the world society have a great deal of influ-
ence on the world order and on the developing countries' chances to find their stance on the 
world's political and economic scene. This is also the case for the EU, and as it increases in size 
and influence it is becoming a bigger and more important actor on the global political stage. The 
negotiations of political and economic interaction with other organisations and states are central 
                                                 
7 The Group of Eight (G8) is an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission is also represented at the meetings. 
8 www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html 
9 Jensen: 2004 
10 http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm 
11 Midé & Heilbuth: 2004 
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in the world agenda - and have negative consequences for the countries that are left with little or 
no chances to influence that agenda.  
Further, negotiations within the EU have consequences that reach beyond the borders of the 
European Union. For that reason it is interesting to take a closer look at the internal processes in 
the EU in order to study the policy procedures and the underlying factors. The aim of this study 
is, thus, not only to examine the major institutional negotiations, but also to consider the ‘day to 
day’ functioning of the EU as a polity and the processes and actors that are involved in these 
processes. The overall focus of this project is thus on EU's internal policy processes, how they 
work and how they affect the development activities.  
The problem statement is outlined in the following:  
  
1.1 Problem statement 
In the light of the tendencies of unequal development that globalisation seems to bring along and 
the important role that political institutions such as the EU play in this context, this thesis at-
tempts to examine in what way EU as an international political actor influences this develop-
ment. The focus is therefore on examining first of all which mechanisms that are influencing the 
development and secondly how these mechanisms are influencing the development situation. 
Finally, the thesis will examine how the mechanisms influence the situation for the developing 
countries.  
 
The starting point of this thesis is based on an assumption that contradictions exist within EU 
policies on agriculture and development, and that these contradictions influence the development 
situation. This leads to a basis for the problem statement focusing on policy contradictions, rea-
sons for policy contradictions and consequences of these policy contradictions. Hence, the prob-
lem statement is defined as follows: 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what policy contradictions exist between the EU 




these contradictions in policies exist and finally what consequences these policy contradic-
tions have for the developing countries. 
 
This problem statement points to several different elements of EU policy processes and contra-
dictions in these processes as a source of analysis in order to explain some of the reasons behind 
the development situation as described in the introduction. The term contradictions as it is used 
in this context relates to the hypothesis that EU agricultural and development policies in some 
cases might be in direct confrontation with each other and that this lack of coherence could be 
one of the reasons for the present development situation. The two policies will naturally focus on 
two very different areas, but nevertheless policies within the same political institutions should to 
a certain extent point in a common direction and not in opposite directions. Whether or not the 
two policies collide, and if so, the reasons behind this are examined in this thesis and on the basis 




2. Definition of terms 
This section introduces some of the central terms that are used in this thesis. Some terms are de-
fined by theoretical or political approach to the specific field and therefore it is crucial that such 
terms are defined in order to either reject or acknowledge these approaches. In the following the 
definitions of the terms developing and developed countries are discussed on the basis of differ-
ent views on categorisations of the world. Secondly, the term development is discussed accord-
ing to the two main schools of thinking that forms the basis for development theory. Finally, the 
term policy is discussed on the basis of different approaches to policy analysis. 
 
2.1 Definition of developing and developed countries 
In the various literature on development and development studies, different definitions are used 
to categorise the countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia that are considered to be in need 
for development. The definitions depend on the general worldview. Some scholars have divided 
the world into three different worlds, where the first world countries are Western Europe and 
North American, the second world consists of the former Soviet Union and the former commu-
nist Eastern Europe and finally the third world is defined by Africa, Asia and Latin America.12 In 
relation to development research this division presents some general problems first of all because 
the Soviet Union does no longer exist and the Eastern European countries are more or less inte-
grated with the Western Europe in the EU.13 Also the fact that Asian countries like Japan, Tai-
wan and North Korea can in development perspective be considered to belong to the first world. 
From a political and economic perspective the three-world division does no longer seem to be 
valid, however, the term third world countries are still used today to describe countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia with low economic, social and political development rates. In this thesis 
we will not apply the three-world division approach, but instead turn to another definition, which 
is more accurate in its wording, but also has some flaws in terms of a diffuse definition of devel-
opment. 
 
The term developing countries is the definition that is used through this thesis to describe the 
countries that are considered in need of economic, social and political development. The term 
                                                 




does not relate to geography in any way. Developing countries can in principle be found every-
where as long as they are considered to lack economic, social and political development.  
 
This definition of the developing countries and need for development is based on the fact that 
this is what the other group of countries is not: the developed countries or the industrialised 
countries do not lack economic, social and political development.14 They might lack one of the 
aspects, but not all of them at the same time. Therefore this definition can seem rather vague 
since countries are grouped on the basis of what they not are in relation to what other countries 
are. Nevertheless, the terms developing and developed countries seem to be the most neutral for 
conducting development research since the elements of economic, social and political develop-
ment are crucial and not different geographical and political sectors of the world. By using this 
definition we also acknowledge that modern development research not only includes economic 
growth, but also social, political, cultural and historic aspects.15 This also means that the group of 
developing countries cannot be considered to be homogenous and the same goes for the devel-
oped countries. In the context of this thesis this means that the definition developing countries is 
used to describe the group of countries that is considered to lack economic, social and political 
development compared to the developed countries, but that the different developing countries 
can have very different needs of how to introduce this development.16 Since the purpose of this 
thesis does not concern elaboration of any form of development strategy, the term developing 
countries seem to be the most relevant to apply. 
 
2.2 Definition of development 
Scholars of development theory have through the years introduced and discussed several defini-
tions of the term development. According to a research conducted in the mid 1990’s the plurality 
of definitions of development consisted of more than 70 interpretations of the term. An exhaus-
tive list of these definitions will serve no purpose; however a short overview of the different 
main categories of definitions can be useful in order to conclude on a specific definition for de-
velopment, which will be used through out this thesis.  
 






The different definitions of development depend on which school of thinking the scholars con-
sider themselves to belong to. Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to place EU develop-
ment within a theoretical frame and thus conduct analyses on what consequences a certain theo-
retical approach to development has on the developing countries, a broad perspective of devel-
opment theories are introduced in this thesis. This also calls for a need for inclusion of different 
definitions of development since these depend on the schools of thinking.  
 
The first definition of development relates to development as economic growth. From the begin-
ning of the 1950s most scholars considered development to equal economic growth. The devel-
oping countries needed economic growth and therefore theories of this period such as Moderni-
sation theory considered economic growth as development.17 However, there was a lack of defi-
nition of what economic growth was, and therefore some general economic measurements such 
as mediocre income pr. capita were used, mostly because scholars had very little knowledge 
about the developing countries. Many scholars saw a need for a more useful definition of eco-
nomic growth and this generated a general view among the scholars of the 1950s about economic 
growth as increasing production, increased consumption, increased employment and better living 
standard.18 The idea was that these aspects would be noticeable on the state financials. However, 
as the scholars gained more insight in the conditions in the developing countries, they became 
more interested in the division of income and wealth. This change of focus was mainly caused by 
a realisation that economic growth rarely benefited the lower social levels.19 
 
This new focus on social welfare gave birth to a new definition of development where economic 
growth was not the only factor, but also increases of welfare. Unlike the previous definition of 
economic growth, where development was measured by income statistics, the scholars who be-
lieved that development was increase of welfare argued that economic growth does not necessar-
ily have to result in increase of welfare: They were crucial premises for development, but not 
sufficient premises.20 This argument was primarily seen among neo-Marxist scholars from the 
1970s an onwards. Another argument stated by neo-Marxist scholars relates to development as 
elimination of dependency. In relation to the developing countries some neo-Marxist scholars 
believed that development also included real national independency and self-centred economic 
                                                 






growth.21 This meant that the developing countries needed to be set free of the world system 
dominated by western developed countries and also focus on the relation between the developing 
countries and their own resources.22 In other words, developing countries need to develop in a 
way that correspond with their own wishes and possibilities and not be dependent and dominated 
by the developed countries. Scholars of the Dependency Theory supported this argument.  
 
This leads to a complex definition of development as being economic growth in terms of in-
crease in production, consumption, employment and welfare. However, the increase of welfare is 
not development when it only considers higher social levels, but also need to be increase of wel-
fare among the general population. Furthermore, the aspect of western dominance in the devel-
oping countries by focusing on development that is in line with the developing countries’ wishes, 
possibilities and future progress are also needed in order to generate economic and social devel-
opment that will benefit the developing countries. This socio-economic definition based on 
Modernisation and neo-Marxist schools of thinking is the basis for the definition of development 
used in this thesis. 
 
2.3 Definition of policy and policy analysis 
Policy and policy analysis are central aspects of this thesis; therefore it seems useful to introduce 
some definitions of the terms which form the basis for the analyses in this thesis. First of all, the 
term policy can to some seem quite diffuse and undistinguishable from terms such as politics and 
polity. Where the term politics refers to the overall apparatus of parliaments, political parties, 
political opinions and government and polity refers to form or the process of government, policy 
can in its simplest sense be considered to relate to a decision about of course of action supposed 
to represent a set of decisions that are interrelated and consistent with others.23 However, this 
definition calls for a further elaboration. Policy is a definite course or method of selected actions 
in e.g. governments, institutions or groups. These courses or methods set out the frame for fur-
ther decisions.24 This means that policy is a framework set up by the members in a specific group 
with the intensions to decide within this framework in future matters.  This policy framework 
                                                 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
23 Spicker: 2006 
24 Munger: 2000 
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contains a set of guidelines for how to approach different matters according to values, desires, 
missions, visions and aims defined by the group. Policy can in principle be about anything. Indi-
vidual people can have policies about how to deal with certain situations, corporations can have 
policies in order to guide its employees to act according to corporate values, and naturally politi-
cal institutions can have policies that set out the framework for the society they wish to establish 
or maintain. In relation to this thesis the latter sort of policy is the one that is dealt with.  
 
In the context of political institutions this means that policy contains elements that have a sig-
nificant impact on all citizens’ daily lives in forms of regulations, taxes, public services and etc. 
In other words the policies of the political institutions are the basis that forms the laws and trea-
ties we as national and international citizens are subjects to.25 
 
If policy in terms of this thesis is defined as the framework or guidelines for decision making in 
political institutions then policy analysis must obviously be the analysis of this framework. This 
is true, but policy analysis can be considered to be somewhat more complex that this. Policy 
analysis consists not only of analysis of the framework behind the political decisions, but also of 
the analysis of other influential actors, which can affect the personal decision making.26 This 
means that policy analysis includes analysis of the many different processes that influence politi-
cal decision making such as institutional settings, bargaining and negotiation processes, voting 
procedures and professional as well as economic and personal interests. The complexity and va-
riety of policy processes is the reason why no single literature succeeds in giving a complete 
model or theoretical basis for policy analysis and therefore policy analysis needs to be based on 
different analytical instruments that are capable of analysing the specific processes related to 
specific political institutions. 
                                                 
25 Chari & Kritzinger: 2006 




The following sections present and discuss some reflections concerning the general methodology 
of the thesis, choices of both theoretical and analytical focus, reflections of means of analysis, on 
choices of theory and finally reflections about the collection and analysis of empirical data from 
different case studies.  
 
3.1 Methodological reflections 
The problem formulation mentioned in section 1 brings a focus on the EU institutions and the 
consequences these institutions create for the developing countries. However, the problem of 
negative consequences for the developing countries is not only relevant to EU institutions, but 
also to international institutions and organisations such as WTO, IMF, the World Bank and other 
trade unions such as NAFTA,27 ASEAN,28 APEC,29 and etc. The fact that many of these institu-
tions and organisations are predominantly led by western politics, bringing a western approach to 
economic and social development and international trade, supports the idea that this problem of 
negative consequences for the developing countries due to western politics is at a global and not 
only European level.  
 
3.1.1 Choice of focus 
Our choice to focus on EU and EU institutions and politics is based on the fact that EU in many 
areas has developed into a political supranational institution with common policies for the entire 
union. This means that EU has transformed from being an intergovernmental institution where 
each member state seeks to benefit own interest to being a supranational institution with more 
common policies including policies on foreign issues such as trade, development and interna-
tional relations. However, it must be underlined that some decisions within the EU still are based 
on national interest and not common EU interest. We will come back to this later.  
 
                                                 
27 North American Free Trade Agreement 
28 Association of South East Asian Nations 
29 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
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Since the EU has become an international political power and no longer just an organisation pro-
moting free trade within the organisation, it is also necessary to take on more responsibility for 
the world situation. In contrast, organisations such as NAFTA and APEC are only based on one 
purpose, namely to enhance trade and economic development within the members of the organi-
sation. So the fact that EU is an international economic and political institution with possibility 
to affect the world situation and thereby also have responsibilities for the world situation is the 
reason why we are focusing on EU and EU institutions. 
 
3.1.2 Analytical focus 
The choice of focus on EU policies and EU institutions and the consequences these have for the 
developing countries raise several aspects that need to be analysed further. The first aspect that 
needs to be considered relates to the paragraph in the problem formulation about examining what 
contradictions exist between EU policies on agriculture and EU policies on development. In or-
der to do this examination we need to include EU treaties on these issues. The second aspect of 
the problem formulation concerns an examination of why such contradictions exist within EU 
policies. To be able to conduct this examination we need to analyse policy making processes 
within the EU institutions. Therefore we analyse procedures and actors involved in these proc-
esses. Thirdly, the last part of the problem formulation raises the question of what consequences 
the contradictions in EU policies have for the developing countries. For us to be able to examine 
this aspect, we need two approaches: one that focuses on a theoretical analysis of the results of 
the EU polices on agriculture and development and a second approach with focus on empirical 
evidence of the consequences of these policies; Empirical evidence, which we find in different 
case studies. 
 
3.2 Analytical reflections 
In this section reflections about the analysis used to find conclusions that can answer our ques-
tions stated in the problem formulation are presented. First of all some reflections about the ana-
lytical elements of our thesis and second of all the structure of our analysis are presented. Finally 




3.2.1 Analytical elements 
As mentioned in section 3.1.2 the problem formulation contains three main aspects for analysis: 
EU policies, EU policy making processes and consequences of EU policies. This section elabo-
rates in more detail about the elements that each of these aspects consists of.  
 
In terms of the first aspect concerning the categorisation of EU policies on agriculture and devel-
opment the analysis is based on text analysis of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community. (Enclosed in annex). This treaty is also known as the Treaties 
of Rome, Nice and Amsterdam and states the different policies of the EU. The text analysis of 
the treaty contains an examination and analysis of any sort of indication to what theoretical ap-
proaches that may be considered as background for the given policy. This means that our analy-
sis of the EU policies on agriculture is based on official EU policy stated in the treaty, which the 
member states have agreed on. In order to examine what kind of theoretical framework to place 
the policies within, we need to analyse what ideas and values lie behind the words of the official 
text. By looking at the text in retrospect the analysis is able to deduct some general approaches 
that can indicate a theoretical framework of the policy. The approach for categorising EU devel-
opment policy within a theoretical framework is based on the same principles. 
 
The second aspect to analyse is the aspect concerning the policy making processes in the EU that 
might explain why contradictions exist within EU policies. The analytical elements of these as-
pects regard an examination of the actors involved in the policy making processes, their interests, 
and also the political and institutional setting in which the policy making takes place. In other 
words, this means that the analysis of the policy making processes focuses on the forums in 
which agricultural policies and development policies are decided, who are involved in these de-
cision processes and whether the actors involved represent national or common interests. Finally, 
it also means that an examination of the EU systems for policy making includes an analysis of 
different procedures for the three different institutions: the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament is needed. The analysis also looks at what consequences these differences in proce-
dures may have in terms of policy outcome and on the differences between policy actors acting 
according to national interests or according to common interests. These analyses are based on the 
official procedures in the EU institutions concerning policy nature, policy order, formation of 
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policy, policy processes including internal and external policy actors, policy settings and voting 
procedures.  
The last aspect to be analysed concerns the consequences of the contradictions of EU policies. In 
order to be able to examine what these consequences mean for the developing countries the focus 
returns to the economic trade and development theories used to categorise EU agricultural policy 
and EU development policy. However, this analysis does not only use the theories as a frame-
work, but also uses the theories to conclude on what results that can theoretically be deducted 
from the theoretical categorisation of the EU policies. The theoretical deductions about the con-
sequences for the developing countries are conducted as a theoretical analysis of the conse-
quences of the given EU policies on agriculture and development. These results are then com-
pared with the empirical results from the case studied examined in section 9. Hopefully, these 
results support our theoretical findings and thereby allow a conclusion on the general situation 
for the developing countries. 
 
This last part of the analysis takes its point of departure in the conclusions of the two previous 
sections and on this basis tries to explain what direct and indirect consequences contradictions in 
EU policies have for the developing countries. The conclusions made in this section are based on 
a comparison of theoretical and empirical results and used to comment on the present situation 
for the developing countries. This conclusion is then used to outline a perspective of the needs of 
the developing countries and of suggestions of what can be done to meet these needs. 
 
3.2.2 Structure of analysis 
The analytical elements mentioned above are all taken to a further analysis in sections 6 through 
8 based on the theory presented in section 4. The categorisation in section 6 consists of two main 
sections; one categorising the agricultural policy and the other categorising the development pol-
icy. The section ends with a conclusion on these two categorisations. The analysis of EU policy 
processes in section 7 is divided into five main sections. The first section (section 7.1) is an 
analysis of EU policy nature for both agricultural and development policies. Section 7.2 contains 
analysis of EU policy order for both agricultural and development polices. The analysis of EU 
policy formation processes is conducted in section 7.3 and section 7.4 deals with the analysis of 
policy processes in terms of policy setting, shaping and history-making. Section 7.5 analyses the 
EU decision making procedures through the voting system. Finally, the conclusions made from 
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these analyses are brought together and summed up in section 7.6. On the basis of the above 
analyses of the different policy making procedures this section concludes on the reasons for the 
contradictions in EU policies that were found in section 6. The inclusion of several different 
theoretical approaches to policy analysis in terms of policy nature, policy order, policy formation 
and policy processes may result in some repetition of the arguments. The different approaches 
bring light to different aspects of the policy analysis, but since this is focussed around the same 
aspects of the policy analysis, and because of the dualism in the structure of each analysis, con-
taining first agricultural policy then development policy, some of the conclusive arguments will 
inevitably be repeated. 
 
After having examined the contradictions in the policies and the reasons behind these contradic-
tions, sections 8 and 9 examine what consequences these contradictions have for the developing 
countries. Hence section 8 concludes on the basis of the findings in section 6 and focuses on the 
situation of the developing countries based on theoretical analysis of the EU policies’ conse-
quences for the developing countries, whereas section 9 is an analysis of case studies of different 
developing countries. This section supports the theoretical arguments from section 8 by includ-
ing empirical evidence of the situation for some developing countries. All together these sections 
of analysis allow a conclusion on contradictions in EU policies and what consequences these 
policy contradictions have for the developing countries.  
 
Finally, section 10 provides an overall conclusion on the policy contradictions existing within 
the EU, the reasons for these contradictions and the theoretical as well as empirically found con-
sequences of these contradictions in relation to the developing countries. 
 
3.2.3 Limitations of analysis 
As mentioned above the analyses of the EU policies on agriculture and development are based 
on text analysis of The Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity. We are well aware of the fact that there are many pitfalls linked to only looking at the offi-
cial political statements of the treaty because these can express a more normative view of how 
things should be instead of how things actually are. However, since the thesis is only considering 
the texts with the purpose of finding a theoretical framework for the formulations, and not look-
ing at any practical or bureaucratic interpretation of the texts, most of these pitfalls can be 
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avoided. This deductive approach allows a conclusion on the assumptions of the intensions and 
values that lie behind these policies, but not on whether these policies are formed to have a hid-
den agenda, or are meant to be interpreted by the EU institutions in a particular way. Neverthe-
less our analysis can shed light on the general aim and thereby the theoretical framework for the 
policies. 
Another aspect of limitation that requires a comment is the fact that the results drawn concerning 
the consequences for the developing countries on the basis of the theoretical categorisation and 
an analysis of the consequences of these particular theoretical approaches can only be considered 
theoretical results. Furthermore, since the theoretical framework only includes the official texts 
of the treaty and not any form of interpretation of these texts, there is a risk that the results de-
rived from analysing the texts and therefore also the conclusions on the situation for the develop-
ing countries can differ from reality. However, the inclusion of the empirical evidence from dif-
ferent case studies, based on an inductive approach allows us to compare our empirical results 
with our theoretical results. This abductive approach of a melange between deductive and induc-
tive approaches30 allows us to conduct an open research approach and continuously revise our 
analytical expectations. This enables us to base our final conclusion on a broad foundation of 
both theoretical and empirical results.31 
 
3.3 Theoretical reflections 
This section presents an overview of the relevant theoretical field for the thesis. Furthermore it 
introduces and comments on the specific theories, applied for analyses, along with a short pres-
entation of the different scholars behind the theories. The theories applied for analysis are all 
presented in detail in section 4. 
 
3.3.1 Theoretical overview  
Before the introduction and comments on the choice of specific theories applied to analyse the 
different aspects mentioned in the problem formulation, a brief overview is given of the theoreti-
cal field relevant to this thesis; economic trade theory, development theory, and policy analysis. 
 
                                                 
30 Riis: 1996 
31 Collin & Køppe: 1999 
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Economic trade theory 
The theoretical basis for categorising the EU agricultural policy is anchored in an overview of 
the development of economic trade theories starting with Mercantilism and Classic Liberal trade 
theories such as Adam Smith32 and David Ricardo’s33 theories about absolute and comparative 
advantages. Moving on to Modern trade theories such as Staffan Linder’s34 theory about over-
lapping demands, and Raymon Vernon’s35 theory about the product cycle. Finally, the overview 
will contain theories about Protectionism36 and reasons for using Protectionism in world trade. 
Mercantilism, Classic Liberal economic trade theories, Modern economic trade theories and Pro-
tectionism provide a solid foundation for the theoretical categorisation of EU agricultural policy 




The theoretical basis for categorising the EU development policies will also be grounded in an 
overview of the development of different development theories and schools of thinking. The idea 
of the development theories is not to give an exhaustive introduction to the theories, nor is it the 
idea to introduce a meta discussion about the theories. Rather the point of including the theories 
is to give a broad overview of the theoretical field and give a general understanding of the differ-
ent theories, which enables us base some analytical approaches on these theories. This is the rea-
son why the works of Franz J. Schuurman,37 Björn Hettne38 and John Degnbol-Martinussen39 are 
used. These authors present in each their work an overall and broad introduction to the field of 
development theory with a focus on analytical application. The overview contains Modernisation 
theories elaborated by Walt Rostow40, neo-Marxist theories by André Frank41, Payne and Nas-
sar42, Ernesto Laclau, and Emmanuel Wallerstein. Furthermore, it contains neo-Liberal devel-
opment theories by Michel Chossudovsky and what Leslie Sklair, Alain Lipietz, Michel Aglietta, 
                                                 





37 Schuurman: 1993 
38 Hettne: 1995 
39 Degnbol-Martinussen: 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2002 
40 Martinussen: 1993 
41 Schuurman: 1993 
42 Payne & Nassar: 2003 
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and Norman Long refer to as post-Impasse theories. Finally, it also contains post-Imperialist 
theories elaborated by Aafke Komter, Marias Mies and Vandana Shiva.43 
 
Policy analysis 
The theoretical basis for conducting the policy analysis and its influence on policy outcome is 
based on a range of various elements seeking to explain different aspects of the EU policy mak-
ing processes. The first aspect of the analysis is based on Simon Hix’ five fold classification of 
EU policy nature.44 Secondly, Raj Chari and Sylvia Kritzinger’s45 theories about first and second 
order EU policies and their different influence on policy outcome are used for analysis. Next 
Paul Spicker’s46 theory about the policy cycle is used to analyse the processes in the EU con-
cerning policy formation in relation to defining political issues and political instruments. Follow-
ing, theories by John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg47 concerning policy actors, policy nego-
tiation and policy decision will be used to analyse EU agricultural and development policy proc-
esses. Finally, the last section consists of an analysis of different EU voting procedures and their 
influence on policy outcome. This is based on the works of Sevasti Chatzopoulou.48 
 
3.3.2 Choice of theory 
In the attempt to examine what contradictions exist between the EU policy on agriculture and EU 
policy on development, it is necessary to first of all take a closer look at the two policies and try 
to categorise them within a theoretical framework of respectively economic trade theory and 
development theory. 
 
Categorisation of EU policy on agriculture 
The categorisation of the EU agricultural policy is based on economic trade theory. The relation 
between agricultural policy and economic trade theories can seem diffuse, but when dealing with 
agricultural policy and its consequences for third parties, economic trade theories turn out to be 
quite relevant. This is because the focus of this thesis is on external consequences of the agricul-
tural policy, and one way to analyse this is by focusing on the part of agricultural policy that 
                                                 
43 Schuurman: 1993 
44 Hix: 1999 
45 Chari & Kritzinger: 2006 
46 Spicker: 2006 
47 Peterson & Bomberg: 1999 
48 Larsen & al.: 2002 
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concerns external trade with agricultural products. Another link between agricultural policy and 
economic trade theories is that EU agricultural policy regulates production of agricultural goods 
and since the regulation of production in terms of market access, demand and prices have impor-
tant economic impact both in EU and in the developing countries, the economic trade theories 
seem relevant to include. In relation to the categorisation this means that EU agricultural policy 
is placed within a frame of economic trade theory. 
The examination of the EU policy on agriculture is based on a broad approach to economic trade 
theory grounded on a discussion of classic liberal economic trade theories, modern economic 
trade theories and protectionism. The reasons behind this approach lie in the fact that classic lib-
eral economic trade theories and modern economic trade theories, and thus the analysis that these 
theories generate, are based on free trade with no barriers what so ever. This means that the re-
sults from applying any of the classical liberal economic trade theories and modern economic 
trade theories only are relevant in cases of completely free trade. However, since free trade is not 
the only approach to trade, it is necessary to also include trade theory about protectionism. By 
combining the classical liberal trade theories with theories about protectionism it is possible to 
determine to what extent the EU policy on agriculture is predominantly based on liberal ideas or 
on protectionism.  
 
The approach to these economic trade theories is based on Leonard Gomes of International Eco-
nomics at Middlesex University,49 Professor of Economic History and head of the Department of 
Banking and Finance at The City University Business School Forrest H. Capie,50 Professor and 
cand.polit at KVL51 in Copenhagen Søren Kjeldsen-Kragh,52 and finally Henrik Kureer and 
Svend Erik Lundgren both cand.polit and associate professors.53 These authors all present and 
analyse different aspects of the above-mentioned economic trade theories and therefore the 
analysis and categorisation of the policy are based on these authors. 
 
The discussions about classic liberal economic trade theories include Adam Smith’s theory of 
absolute advantages and David Ricardo’s theory of relative advantages. Even though these theo-
ries were developed in the 18th and 19th century the basic ideas of economy and trade are still 
                                                 
49 Gomes: 2003 
50 Capie: 1992 
51 Kongelig Veterinær og Landbohøjskole (Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University) 
52 Kjeldsen-Kragh: 1998 
53 Kureer & Lundgren: 2000 
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relevant, since they are based on explaining the reasons why countries trade with each other and 
how they benefit economically from this trade.  
 
Concerning the discussion of modern economic trade theories it seems relevant to include Staf-
fan Linder’s theory of cultural distance as well as Vernon’s theory about the product cycle. 
These theories are relevant since they aim at explaining how post World War two trade economy 
has developed as a result of globalisation.  
Finally, the discussion about protectionism includes elements of tariffs and duties, import quotas, 
market regulation agreements, technical trade barriers, and state subsidisation. Apart from pre-
senting the different means of protectionism and their effect on global trade economy, the dis-
cussion also includes some reasons for applying protectionist measures. 
 
Categorisation of EU policy on development 
The categorisation of EU policy on development is structured the same way as the categorisation 
of agricultural policy. Again, a broad theoretical approach is taken, which allows an open-
minded view on the EU policy on development. The theories used to categorise the policy are 
based on Frans J. Schuurman, professor at The Third-World Centre at the University of Ni-
jmegen,54 John Degnbol Martinussen professor, dr.scient.pol,55 John Rapley, professor, M.A., 
Ph.D at Department of Government at University of West Indies, Mona,56 and Björn Hettne Pro-
fessor of peace and development research at the University of Gothenburg.57 
 
On the basis on these authors the categorisation of EU policy on development focuses on the 
different approaches to development and thus the different outcomes of the approaches that these 
authors present. The categorisation is based on the following theoretical aspects of development 
theory: Modernisation Theory, neo-Marxist theories such as Dependency Theory, Modes of Pro-
duction Theory and World System Theory, neo-Liberal theories and theories of the Regulation 
School, the Actor Oriented Approach, Gender Studies and Sustainable Development. It is within 
these different theoretical approaches to development that the EU policy on development is cate-
gorised. The reason for choosing this broad theoretical perspective on development including 
theories that are no longer predominant in the discourse of development, is based on the assump-
                                                 
54 Schuurman: 1993 
55 Martinussen: 1993, 2002 
56 Rapley: 2002 
57 Hettne: 1995 
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tion that if there are contradictions within EU policies on agriculture and development, it might 
be due to a less modern approach to development within the EU policy on development. 
 
Policy making processes in the EU 
The second part of the analysis focuses on policy making processes within the EU system. In 
order to be able to explain possible contradictions between policies on agriculture and policies 
on development it is necessary to look at the policy making processes behind these policies. 
Therefore the examination of EU policy making processes includes an analysis of different pol-
icy making aspects. First of all the analysis looks at the different natures of EU policies and what 
processes that are linked to these policy natures. This is based on the works of Simon Hix who is 
lecturer in European Union Politics and Policy at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. He is the author of several publications on EU and EU policy making.58 The next ele-
ment that is analysed is the different preferences/orders concerning EU policies. Based on Raj 
Chari and Sylvia Kritzinger59 an examining of the differences of first and second order policies 
in the EU are conducted and hereby analysing the aspects of supranational policy making and 
intergovernmental policy making. Raj Chari is Director of the Centre for European Studies in 
Trinity College Dublin and lecturer in Political Science. Sylvia Kritzinger is Assistent Professor 
in the Department of Political Science at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. 
 
The analysis of the policy formation processes is based on Paul Spicker’s theory of the policy 
cycle,60 which takes a rational-comprehensive approach to the process of policy making. Paul 
Spicker is professor of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen and is also 
director of the Centre for Public Policy and Management.61 This approach is chosen because it 
allows us to analyse and conclude within a broad perspective. The rational-comprehensive ap-
proach is based on an ideal institutional situation and therefore presents a variety of aspects that 
needs to be taken to a further analysis.62 However, we are aware of the fact that this ideal situa-
tion not always corresponds with reality and that this means that some of the aspects mentioned 
in the policy cycle are not always relevant to include when applying the model of policy making. 
Due to the fact that this thesis looks at policy formation in retrospect and not as a way to create 
                                                 
58 Hix: 1999 
59 Chari & Kritzinger: 2006 
60 Spicker: 2006 
61 Ibid 
62 Hill: 2005 
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new policy, the use of the policy cycle allows us to have a broad perspective on the policy for-
mation process in general and is likely to generate more diverse answers to our questions about 
the reasons for contradictions in EU policies.63  
 
Another consequence of looking at the policy formation process in retrospect is that there are 
some levels of the policy cycle that is not elaborated on in this thesis. These are the levels of the 
policy cycle that deal with coordination, implementation and evaluation. These levels are not 
elaborated on because they all relate to a forward pointing policy formation process. Implemen-
tation and evaluation of policies are not relevant to include in this thesis since we are only look-
ing at the processes of formation of policy and not how it is implemented or how it works. Coor-
dination relates to a process of coordinating policies with bureaucratic institutions. This also falls 
outside of the focus of this thesis. 
 
One alternative to the rational comprehensive approach of the policy cycle is incrementalism, 
where the focus is on the power structures of the policy making processes. This approach could 
also have been useful, however, the answers generated from an analysis of EU policy formation 
processes would only concern the power structures and power balances within the EU system. 
Since this focus is too narrow in the light of the purpose of this thesis, this approach is not ap-
plied. Nevertheless we are well aware of the fact that power structures and power balances are 
important in the policy formation processes in the EU, and therefore this aspect is not ignored, 
but instead included by bringing focus on power structures and balances as an aspect in the sec-
tion about the policy shaping (negotiation stage) in section 7.4. 
 
Another alternative to the policy cycle is the punctuated equilibrium theory. Critics of the ra-
tional choice model have questioned the ability of decision makers to be completely rational and 
argue that they are more likely to be “bounded” rational, meaning that decision on a long-term 
scale changes very little, but occasionally punctuations occur that make decision makers change 
path.64 In relation to the problem formulation, it seems more interesting to look at the variety of 
aspects within a policy making process than to analyse changes and reasons for changes in pol-
icy.  
 
                                                 
63 Howlett & Ramiesh: 1995 
64 Robinson: 2003 
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In the light of this criticism of the different approaches to policy formation analysis, the rational 
comprehensive view is chosen as the approach to policy formation analysis. Another reason for 
choosing this approach is that the policy cycle contains elements that correspond well with Chari 
and Kritzinger’s interpretation of Peterson and Bomberg’s three-stage approach of policy mak-
ing; policy shaping (the initiating stage), policy setting (the negotiation stage) and finally his-
tory-making (decision making).65 These three elements can be placed in the policy cycle and 
thereby allow us to examine whether the policy shaping takes place within a supranational or 
intergovernmental context. Furthermore it enables us to examine what context the policy setting 
takes place in and which actors are involved in this process. Finally, it enables us to examine 
what kinds of procedures are used at the actual decision stage, and how a specific choice of pro-
cedures may have an impact on the final outcome.  
 
Consequences for the developing countries 
The last part of the analysis focuses on the consequences of contradictive EU policies for the 
developing countries. This is done in terms of a theoretical analysis of the agricultural and de-
velopment policies concluded on in the first section of the analysis. Following, this section ex-
amines the results of different case study analyses and compares these results with the theoretical 
results from the analysis. This approach allows us to gain a broad insight in the actual situation 
of the developing countries seen both from a political/theoretical as well as practical/empirical 
viewpoint. 
 
The categorisation of agricultural and development policies in the first section of the analysis 
based on the theories mentioned above, is the starting point for our analysis of the consequences 
for the developing countries. This means that the theoretical categorisation from section 6 is 
taken to a further level, with a focus on analysing what consequences the given theoretical politi-
cal approaches to agricultural and development policies in the EU have for the developing coun-
tries. We are aware of the fact that the conclusions from such an analysis can only be theoretical, 
however, these theoretical conclusions are compared with and analysed in the light of the em-
pirical results from the different case studies.  
 
                                                 
65 Peterson & Bomberg: 1999 
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3.4 Empirical reflections 
This section shortly introduces some of the reflections about the empirical case studies and how 
these studies are conducted. The first section explains the choice of cases. The second section 
presents how the case studies are structured and finally the third section describes how and with 
what purpose the analysis is conducted. 
 
3.4.1 Choice of case studies 
Two of the three cases that have been chosen as the examples for the analysis in section 9 are the 
same cases presented in the introduction to this thesis meaning the case of the Prolino project in 
the Domincan Republi and the sugar case of South Africa. A third case examines the MEDA 
programme involving countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The Prolino project is cho-
sen as a case example because it is a development project conducted by the EU from a central 
hold. In the light of most development cases being conducted by the individual member states, 
the Prolino project is distinguished by the central conduct from EU. The fact that this project is 
run by the EU from a central hold emphasises the inconsistencies between EU agricultural and 
development policies. Unlike a development programme that is conducted by the member states, 
where different national aspects can influence the execution of the programme, the Prolino case 
underlines the direct inconsistencies between EU policies on agriculture and development with-
out the interference of member states interests. In other words the case study of the Prolino case 
is able to show evidence of direct policy contradictions within the EU. 
 
The second case is the case of sugar production in South Africa. In contrast to the Prolino case, 
this is not a development project, but only a case of damaging consequences of the EU agricul-
tural policy. The focus of the case is the devastating consequences EU agricultural subsidies can 
have on the developing countries and their productions. The case analyses the economic and so-
cial impact that EU agricultural policy has on the developing countries and outlines the situation 
for many productions in the developing countries and the direct relation between EU agricultural 
policy and development (or lack of same) in the developing countries. 
 
The third case is about development in the non-EU Mediterranean countries and the establish-
ment of close trade and economic relations between EU and these countries. MEDA is a multi-
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partnership programme that involves a variety of actors ranging from EU’s DG Development to 
national states and national and international development organisations. The case of MEDA is 
chosen because it represents the diversity that exists within the European development field. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis of case studies 
The analyses of the three cases are based on some of the theoretical grounds applied in the policy 
analysis. This does not mean that the same theoretical approaches are applied in the case studies, 
but merely that some of the elements that form the basis for policy analysis also are used in the 
analyses of the cases. These elements relate to examining who the initiator of the projects are, 
the main financing party, the executing actor, the relation of the specific project to EU develop-
ment policy, the development as well as agricultural policy processes that might have influenced 
the projects and the outcome of the project. By using some of the same points of departure in the 
case studies that were used in the policy analysis, this allows us draw some conclusions on the 
empirical evidence of the cases in relation to the policy analysis conducted in section 7. This is 
done with the purpose of being able to conclude on the third part of the problem statement con-
cerning the consequences that EU policies on agriculture and development have for the develop-
ing countries. The findings of the case studies are compared to the findings of section 8 about 
theoretical consequences for the developing countries. The fact that the analysis of the conse-
quences is based on both theoretical and empirical results gives our final results more credibility 
and will also be able to bring focus on specific problems in an otherwise very complex and com-
plicated system of policies, agents, interests, moral, economy, and etc. Furthermore, if both theo-
retical and empirical evidence point in one direction, chances are high that this direction presents 
a realistic picture of the situation for the developing countries. 
 
3.4.3 Limitations of analysis of case studies 
An empirical analysis of three cases cannot provide an exact and precise picture of the situation 
in the developing countries. However, the cases can be seen as an illustration of some of the 
problems that EU policies generate and furthermore as an evidence of the existence of these 
problems. Naturally, there are development projects where there are no direct contradictions be-
tween EU agricultural and development policies, and since the developing countries cannot be 
considered a homogenous group, different structures and different cultures react differently to 
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projects and problems. However, the cases we have chosen to study and the approaches of our 
studies represent a general situation that in one way or another can be related to most developing 
countries.66 
 
Since the analysis is based on case studies from secondary sources the results of the cases are 
presented tentatively with the knowledge that a more in-depth analysis beyond a desk study 
would be necessary to collect enough evidence to make soundly informed statements about the 
consequences of the EU policies. The desk-based impression on these issues, however, illustrates 
a less favourable picture of the impact of the programmes in the developing countries.  
 
                                                 




The following section presents the theories that are applied for analysis in this thesis. In contrast 
to the theoretical discussions in the previous section the theories are here presented in more de-
tails and related to the actual analytical use of the theories. The first part consists of economic 
trade theories starting with a presentation of the origin of economic trade theories and then goes 
on to introduce classic liberal and modern economic trade theories and finally presents protec-
tionist theories and reasons for taking protectionist measures. This part is followed by a presenta-
tion of development theories ranging from modernisation theories, over neo-Marxist and neo-
Liberal theories ending with a presentation of post-Imperialist development theories. The theory 
section ends with a presentation of policy analysis theories in terms of an introduction to the 
concept of policy analysis, presentation of the policy cycle including advantages and critique and 
finally introduces policy analysis in relation to EU policy processes. 
 
4.1 Economic trade theories 
Often eco-political measures directly or indirectly affect a country’s export and import. This 
means that eco-politics influence international trade even though it is not intended to and the 
political measures are not related to trade issues. In order for political measures to be categorised 
as economic trade measures there are two conditions that need to fulfilled: the purpose of the 
measure must be to affect a nation’s international trade of goods or services and it has to be a 
measure that affects the international trade directly generating any form of discrimination be-
tween national and international markets.67 Measures that can influence international trade indi-
rectly, and therefore cannot be categorised as trade policies, are issues related to financial policy, 
monetary policy, currency policy and enterprise policy.68 These different policies all have an 
indirectly influence on the international trade economy, but they do not create any form of dis-
crimination towards the international market, since their purposes are to regulate domestic prob-
lems. The following sections look at theories that only deal with economic trade issues and 
therefore can be considered a basis for many countries’ economic trade policies. 
 
                                                 




4.1.1 Origin of economic trade theories 
In the 15th and 16th century a remarkable increasing growth in global trade took place. This 
growth was the basis of the first economic theories about international trade. There was not one 
common theory, but rather several different thoughts about trade elaborated by different schol-
ars. These thought or theories are referred to as mercantilism.69 Despite the fact that mercantil-
ism was formed by many different theories and scholars there was a general understanding 
among these scholars that the crucial factor for a nation’s wealth was a surplus on the balance of 
trade. It was thought that the wealth of a nation could directly be measured on the amount of 
gold earned from the surplus on the balance of trade.70  In order to achieve maximum surplus on 
the balance of trade, mercantilists focussed on supporting export companies and at the same time 
protecting the national market against foreign products by means of import regulations. This 
means that mercantilists saw international trade as a zero-sum-game, meaning that one nation’s 
benefit necessarily had to mean another nation’s loss. 71 The mercantilist view on trade thus ar-
gues for the use of protectionism in order to benefit from international trade. Even though, many 
scholars have argued for a liberal approach to trade, as presented in the following section, protec-
tionist measures are still seen today. 
 
4.1.2 Classic liberal economic trade theories 
As a reaction to the mercantilist theories about international trade, scholars began in the 18th cen-
tury to argue for liberal approaches to international trade. This wave of liberalism was lead by 
the British scholar Adam Smith. In his book “Wealth of Nations” from 1776, Smith presents a 
general economic theory, which later became the basis of liberal ideology.  Like the mercantil-
ists, Smith focussed on how to increase a nation’s wealth, but in contrast to mercantilism he fo-
cussed on specialisation of the nation. This means that instead of one person producing goods 
from start to end, the production should be divided into several specialised processes, which ac-
cording to Smith would increase efficiency and thereby give an absolute advantage.72 This is the 
reason that this theory is called Smith’s theory of absolute advantage. The absolute advantage 
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can appear in different forms: for some nations cheap labour is the absolute advantage, others 
have easy access to natural resources and others again have the necessary technology.73 
Smith’s theory means that trade does not necessarily have to be a zero-sum-game, but instead it 
can be a positive-sum-game for the parties involved if they possess an absolute advantage in 
production. This means that productions that are not globally competitive should be stopped and 
instead focussed on productions with an absolute advantage. On a global scale nations should 
engage in trade in order to buy the products, where they do not have an absolute production ad-
vantage themselves, and at the same time they should be able to sell the products where they 
have an absolute production advantage. This means that global production and thereby global 
trade increases, which again increases the wealth of nations involved in global trade.74 However, 
Smith’s theory only applies to countries that have an absolute production advantage. This is why 
another British scholar David Ricardo in 1816 elaborated the theory about the comparative ad-
vantage. Ricardo’s theory is based on the same ideas as Smith, but instead of explaining nations’ 
trade by absolute advantages, he argued that even though a nation has no absolute advantage it 
could still benefit from global trade due to its comparative advantages. Ricardo’s idea of com-
parative advantages means that a nation’s production of a certain good can be less competitive 
than the productions in the other nations, with which it trades, but nevertheless there will always 
be some productions that are relatively more competitive and due to this comparative advantage, 
the nation will benefit from global trade.75  
 
Both Smith and Ricardo argued that trade is a positive-sum-game, where all the parties involved 
will benefit from the trade and thereby increase their wealth. However, it is important to under-
line that both Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories about advantages are based on a free trading system 
with free competition. If one nation uses any kind of protectionist or monopolist measures, the 
advantages whether absolute or comparative can be eliminated and trade will no longer necessar-
ily benefit all parties involved. Another critique point related to the classic liberal trade theories 
is that the theories explain trade between nations that are not similar in terms of advantages. 
However, it is a fact that most of the world trade takes place between nations that are relatively 
similar.76 
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4.1.3 Modern economic trade theories 
In the light of the critique of the classic liberal economic trade theories scholars presented in the 
period after World War two some trade theories that could explain trade between nations with 
similar production advantages. One of them was the Swedish scholar Staffan Linder who in 1960 
elaborated the so-called overlapping demand theory. Linder was determined to find the reason 
why two nations with practically similar production advantages engage in trade and whether they 
can benefit from it. He introduced the term cultural distance to explain how two nations with low 
cultural distance are likely to have a similar consumption pattern, which can explain why they 
engage in trade with one another even though there might not be absolute or comparative advan-
tages.77 Linder’s theory can explain why most of the global trade takes place between the indus-
trialised countries and not between the industrialised and the developing countries. According to 
Linder similarity of mediate income is one of the most important factors for trade. Nations with 
similar GNP pr. inhabitant are also likely to have similar demands. 
 
On the basis of Linder’s theory of neighbour trade the scholar Raymon Vernon elaborated in 
1966 his theory about the product cycle. Vernon argued that most new products follow a certain 
cycle. In the beginning when the product is new, there is a need for high skilled labour to de-
velop and improve the product, eventually when the product has matured there will be a need for 
capital for marketing and machinery. Finally, when the consumers have accepted the product 
there will be a need for mass production meaning that raw material, capital and cheap labour are 
the most important factors. In this last phase where the production is standardised, the production 
is likely to be moved to countries that have a comparative advantage in terms of production. Ac-
cording to Vernon it is not until this last phase has been initiated that the concept of comparative 
advantages can be applied. However, when it has been initiated, countries with comparative ad-
vantages in terms of easy access to raw material and cheap labour will overtake the production 
and start exporting to countries that previously were producing the goods.78 Vernon thus rejects 
Ricardo’s argument that countries with comparative advantages always will host production, and 
instead argues that production will start in the country where it is developed and then later be 
moved to a country with comparative advantages.79 Vernon’s theory of the product cycle can be 
useful when explaining the globalisation of international trade and economy. 






A final development of the modern economic trade theories is the theory of economy of scale. In 
its origin it is not so much an economic trade theory as it is a pure economic theory, however, it 
is included because it is based on a close relation between production and foreign markets, which 
by definition is international trade. It deals with the idea that production of certain goods is only 
profitable in large scale due to high expenses of development and production of the goods. How-
ever, in order to benefit from economy of scale there is a need for a large market. This means 
that for economy of scale to prove beneficial one need to engage in trade with other nations in 
order to achieve a market that is large enough to create the necessary demand. However, the the-
ory of economy of scale for a great part only concerns trade between relatively similar industrial-
ised countries.80 Nevertheless the theory can successfully be used to explain why the production 
situation for certain goods is characterised by oligarchy, meaning few producers with more or 
less monopolist status. 
 
4.1.4 Protectionist theories 
The section above explains the relations between trade and the increase in wealth of nations. 
However, both the classic liberal and the modern economic trade theories all presuppose that 
trade has to be free, meaning free competition, in order to create a positive-sum-game. Smith and 
Ricardo’s ideas of advantages cannot be applied if the parties involved in trade take any forms of 
protectionist measures. Protectionist measures will eliminate both absolute and comparative ad-
vantages and therefore the theories will prove wrong. The same is the case with Linder’s theory 
about overlapping demands and the theory of economy of scale. If protectionist measures are 
taken, this will influence the import of goods and thereby also have an impact on the demand due 
to e.g. increased prices.81 However, there are different measures of protectionism and thus also 
different results of these measures. The following sections present and explain these different 
measures and what consequences they have in relation to the extent in which they are applied. 
The different measures of protectionism are to be seen as a linear progress where total free trade 
is the one extreme and protectionism is the other. By applying different protectionist measures to 
different extents a nation’s trade policy can be considered more or less protectionist. The follow-
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ing section examines the most common measures of protectionism, which are: duty/tariffs, im-
port quotas, market regulations, technical barriers and state subsidisation.82 
 
Duty and tariffs 
Duty is the oldest and the most common protectionist measure and it is used by almost every 
nation in attempt to regulate import. Duty or tariffs means putting a tax on imported goods in 
order to increase the price of the goods. The general purpose is to favour national production by 
improving their competitiveness through an increase in the price of the imported goods.83 This 
means that national products become cheaper than imported products and thereby one can secure 
that capital stay inside the nation and increase national growth instead of buying foreign products 
and thereby transfer capital from the home country to the exporting countries. Another purpose 
of this use of duty is to protect new national industries or industries that are important for a na-
tion in case of war.84 This is the reason why this very common use of duty is referred to as pro-
tective tariffs.  
 
However, there are different forms of duty that each has different specific purposes. One form of 
duty is called financial duty. The purpose of this kind of duty is not so much to protect national 
industries, as it is a means of public finance. Since the purpose of this kind of duty is to make 
money to the state, it is only used on necessary products that consumers purchase regardless of 
price – the so-called inelastic products.85  
 
Another form of duty is anti-dumping duty. Anti-dumping duty is used when foreign products 
priced considerably lower than what is considered to be the global market price invade a national 
market. A such invasion of cheap products is very harmful to the national production and there-
fore countries often protect themselves against this by putting a duty on these products so they 
reach the same price level as the national products or even become more expensive.86 WTO does 
not allow dumping, however dumping can still be seen on the global market especially for elec-
tronics. This is the reason why WTO has allowed the use of antidumping duty even though WTO 
is generally against an increase in duty levels. However, the problem of anti-dumping duty is that 
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it is very difficult to prove when products are being dumped because the global market price can 
vary a lot due to different local and international circumstances.87 
 
A third form of duty is called compensatory duty. It is similar to anti-dumping duty with the one 
difference that this kind of duty only is applied when products are sold below the global market 
prices due to state subsidisation. Like dumping, this is also considered to be unfair competition 
and therefore WTO also allows that this kind of duty is used in special circumstances to protect 
national markets from cheap products. 
 
Import quotas 
Like duties import quotas are a means of controlling the import of goods. However, where duty 
and tariffs have a more indirect effect on import due to increasing prices, import quotas have a 
direct influence on import through a decision of the maximum amount of imported goods. In the 
1930s and 1940s import quotas were very common, but after the Second World War GATT (the 
present WTO) worked intensely on abandoning quotas. This is why quotas as a political means 
of regulating trade nationally are rare today, and only used in cases of countries that are not 
members of WTO.88 WTO generally forbids the use of import quotas. 
 
In 1993 when EU introduced the common market, it also introduced a line of common quotas for 
all EU member-states. In other words this means that quotas are used as means of trade regulator 
on a regional basis since EU has the power to decide which member states that are allowed to 
make use of quotas. However, EU has decided to use import quotas against only a few countries 
such as China, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia.89 
 
The reasons for using import quotas are the same as for using other forms of protectionism. It is 
to protect national industries from the competition of foreign cheap products. Quotas are also to 
some extent used as a means of political pressure towards countries, which are considered to be 
out of line with the rest of the world.90 This is why quotas are predominantly used towards coun-
tries that are not members of the WTO. 
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Finally, there is the most extreme version of quotas namely import ban. Most import bans are 
related to products that are illegal such ad drugs and weapons, however, there have been cases 
where the EU has banned products that are not considered illegal with the only purpose of pro-
tecting a member state’s production. This means that if international products threaten a EU pro-
duction, EU has the authority to put a ban on the import of these products.91 
 
Agreements on market regulations 
As mentioned above, WTO has generally forbidden the use of import quotas to regulate global 
trade. Still, for the last ten-twenty years, countries have bypassed these rules by introducing the 
so-called voluntary agreements on market regulations. As the name indicates the agreements are 
voluntary and supposed to regulate trade between two or more nations through a mutual agree-
ment. However, many would argue that these agreements are not voluntary at all. Most market 
regulation agreements are based on pressure from the strongest power, which is often USA or 
EU. Since many nations’ balance of trade depends on the export to either USA or EU they are 
often willing to agree more or less voluntarily to restrict their export to these strong powers in 
order not to loose their exports.92 Countries that have been particularly affected by these agree-
ments are: Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and a number of textile producing developing 
countries. According to WTO regulations these voluntary agreements on market regulations 
must be phased out because of the fact that it is predominantly the strong economies such as 
USA and EU who benefit from these agreements. Nevertheless, agreements on market regula-
tions still exist today.93 
 
Technical trade barriers 
Technical trade barriers relate to technical standards and in its original form the use of technical 
standards are not considered a direct measure of protectionism. Technical standards are a way to 
ensure that imported goods live up to a certain health, environmental or safety regulations. By 
introducing common technical standards one can protect consumers against products that are 
dangerous in one way or another. These issues often concern labelling in the import country’s 
language, correct packaging, or additional documentation for different testing.94 
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However, there seems to be another use of technical barriers, which can be accused of being of a 
more protectionist character. This is the case when for example a country sets technical standards 
that are much more strict than the global standards. Setting high standards will automatically 
have an impact on the import because some producers are not capable of fulfilling these high 
demands.95 This of course means that the producers will have to stop export to the countries with 
high technical standards. When this kind of technical standards, which are stricter than the stan-




A final means of protectionism that will be elaborated on in this section is the use of state subsi-
disation. In contrast to the above-mentioned means of protectionism that all focus on increasing 
prices of imported goods or to regulate the amount of imported goods, state subsidisation regu-
lates the production of national goods. The purpose of state subsidisation is not to regulate im-
port, but to increase national production by subsidising national production and thereby give 
national products a competitive advantage. Subsidising national products results in low prices for 
national products and thereby imported products become more expensive than the national prod-
ucts. This will naturally have an effect on the import of goods, resulting in a decrease or even a 
stop to import of a certain products. Like the other means of protection, state subsidisation is 
meant to protect national industries and especially industries that are considered vital in case of 
war. This is why the most common cases of state subsidisation are concerned with shipyards, 
steel industries, food production, and production of fuels.97 
 
4.1.5 Reasons for protectionism 
As the previous sections have explained there are different reasons why some countries or trade 
regions choose the make use of protectionist measures. Protection of vulnerable industries is 
very common in EU and USA. Both have for a long time protected industries that were not able 
to compete on the global market such as agriculture, steel, shipyards and clothing.98 Even though 
these industries are not competitive, they are protected in order to save work places. The idea is 
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that these industries then have an opportunity to adapt to new market conditions and thus im-
prove production; however this is often not the case as these industries generally remain uncom-
petitive.99 
 
Another reason is the protection of new industries. In the attempt to build competitive industries 
it can often be a good idea to protect these new industries from global competition by means of 
tariffs on import goods until they have established themselves. When the new industries are es-
tablished, the tariffs can be removed and free trade is opened up for.100 This kind of protection 
has been used by South Korea and Taiwan. Other developing countries have without luck tried to 
start an industrialisation process because IMF and the World Bank do not allow developing 
countries to use protectionist measures to protect new industries. A criterion for loaning money 
from IMF and the World Bank is that the country has a liberal trade policy.101 
 
A third reason to introduce protectionist measures can be a respond to a negative balance of 
trade. 
Countries who suddenly experience a decrease on the balance of trade often try to solve this 
problem by hindering import e.g. by tariffs or quotas. In periods of global economic decline this 
kind of protectionism is often seen.102 
 
Political issues are also very common for using protectionist measures. Trade barriers have often 
been used as a political means of pressure towards countries that for one or another reason need 
to be punished. Foreign politics often use trade protectionism such as tariffs, quotas, boycotts 
and etc. to underline political statements. E.g. the trade between USA and the former East-bloc 
was very protectionist on both sides. The purpose of this kind of protectionism is not to protect 
own industries but only to punish “bad behaviour.”103 
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4.2 Development theories 
The following section gives a broad overview of the evolution of development theories from the 
post-World War Two period to the end of the 1990s. Each of the sections present a general un-
derstanding of the development theories of the period as well as some of the general thoughts of 
development and society linked to this period. Furthermore the sections also include references 
to some of the leading scholars behind the theories or other scholars who influenced the period. 
The section is meant to give on the one hand a broad overview of different schools of thinking 
and at the same time show the interconnection and the chronology of the different theories. 
 
4.2.1 Modernisation theories 
The first school of theory to be presented in this section is the Modernisation theory. The Mod-
ernisation theories were elaborated in the period just after World War Two and cannot be con-
sidered a common theory, but more a set of ideas related to development and the developing 
world. The basic concept of Modernisation theories takes it point of departure in a comparison 
between the modern industrialised countries versus traditional developing countries.104 Accord-
ing to leading modernist scholars such as Walt Rostow the developing countries were to become 
more and more like the industrialised countries. In the light of this Rostow developed a theory of 
growth and phase; A theory that showed the phases which developing countries needed to go 
through in order to become more industrialised.105  
 
The general idea of developing countries slowly transforming into industrialised countries 
brought a focus on how traditional life values, opinions, actions and structures are replaced by 
modern values, which are more or less copied from the industrialised countries. The fact that 
modernist scholars saw development as practically a copy-paste procedure of western values and 
norms is based on a general positive interpretation of imperialism.106 According to modernist 
scholars western colonisation of e.g. Africa had a positive influence on the development, and 
started the industrialisation process for some African countries. Since modernists considered the 
industrialised countries as superior to the developing countries in terms of culture, they were 
                                                 





therefore obligated to spread their religion, values, norms and life style and thus bring civilisa-
tion to the developing world.107 On the basis of this positive approach to imperialism, Moderni-
sation theory argues that the economic and commercial relations are profitable for the developing 
countries. Impulses for economic changes and progress originate from these interrelations.108 
 
4.2.2 Neo-Marxist theories 
Neo-Marxism disagrees with the modernists’ historical progressive role of imperialism and capi-
talism; instead they believe that imperialism led to underdevelopment in the developing coun-
tries and not development and that modern economic imperialism harms the developing coun-
tries.109 Neo-Marxists also see other potential revolutionary actors apart from workers, namely 
peasants.110 Neo-Marxism influenced development theories from the 1960s until the 1980s. Neo-
Marxism looks at imperialism from the perspective of the developing countries, and examines 
the consequences of imperialist penetration on these. In contrast to Marxism, Neo-Marxists does 
not only look at class relations (where one class exploits the labour of another) but also at rela-
tions where economic surplus between countries plays an important role.111 This means that neo-
Marxists blame imperialism for the underdevelopment of the developing world and that in order 
to create development there is a need for inclusion of different classes at different levels. Finally 
neo-Marxists call for an acceptance of the fact that international relations between developing 
countries as well as relations between developing and developed countries are important to bear 
in mind when explaining development and underdevelopment. 
 
Dependency Theory 
One of the neo-Marxist scholars who particularly focussed on the importance of relations be-
tween nations to explain development and underdevelopment was the American scholar André 
Gunder Frank, who at the end of the1960s was one of the leading scholars behind the Depend-
ency Theory. Like Modernisation theory, Dependency Theory was not a single theory, but again 
influenced by a diverse range of earlier theoretic schools.112 Nevertheless, there was consensus 
on some general characteristic of the Dependency school. First of all underdevelopment is a his-
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torical process where the dominant and the dependent countries form a capitalist system that 
harms the developing countries and prevents them from developing. According to the Dependen-
tistas,113 countries become dependent on each other, and cannot break the cycle. This means that 
underdevelopment is an inherent result of the way that the world system works. The surplus of 
the developing countries is transferred to the developed countries, which again means develop-
ment in the developed world and underdevelopment in the developing world.114 In other words 
instead of using the economic surplus in the developing countries the surplus is transferred to the 
developed countries, leaving the developing countries in a vicious circle of underdevelopment. 
Frank therefore argued that the developed countries saw no need for generating development in 
the developing countries and this blocked economic growth and led to underdevelopment in the 
developing countries.115 As a result of this situation Frank suggested that the developing coun-
tries were detached from the world market economy.116 
 
Modes of Production Theory 
In the 1970s and the 1980s other neo-Marxist scholars such as the Argentinean Ernesto Laclau 
took a slightly different focus to development than the Dependentistas. Instead of focussing on 
the relations between the nations as a reason for development and underdevelopment, he be-
lieved that it was more relevant to study modes of production. He argued that a number of modes 
of production coexist in a society, and that these modes of production have a relationship to each 
other (regarding exchange of labour, goods, capital, etc.). So instead of looking at the circulation 
of goods, the Modes of Production theory emphasised the production sphere. Laclau believed 
that the relationship between capitalist mode of production and non-capitalist mode of produc-
tion was favourable for the capitalist mode of production. An example of this relationship be-
tween capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production was seen in the Apartheid regimes. The 
workers lived in their traditional homeland, without the possibility to support themselves; there-
fore they offered their labour to the industries, which in return could give very low salaries, be-
cause the workers had some income from their land.117 The result of this was that many develop-
ing countries experienced that capitalism articulated with non-capitalist modes of production and 
thereby hindered these countries from developing. On this basis the French anthropologists Phil-
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ippe Rey and Claude Meillassoux argued for a need of inclusion of attention at the local level to 
development theory.118 
 
World Systems Theory 
This theory had its roots in the mid 1970s’ rapid growth in East Asian countries. This growth 
could not be described as dependent development, because these new rapid growing economies 
began to challenge the superiority of USA in some areas. Also the crisis in many socialist coun-
tries (failure of the culture revolution in China and economic stagnation in the east bloc) led to 
the elaboration of the World Systems Theory since the crisis led to an opening in the direction of 
international capital, and formed new alliances that were previously unthinkable (e.g. Washing-
ton and Peking). 119 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein was the leading scholar in the debate about World Systems Theory. He 
based his ideas on Dependentistas such as André Gunder Frank and dependency ideas about un-
equal trade, exploitation of the developing countries by the developed countries and the exis-
tence of a world market. He considered the world as consisting of three groups of countries: the 
core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. The core consists of industrialised countries, the pe-
riphery of the agricultural export countries and the semi-periphery acts as a buffer between the 
core and the periphery. The semi-periphery countries are differentiated from the periphery by 
their more significant industrial production. The semi-periphery imports high-tech from the core 
and exports semi-manufactured goods to the core. It also imports raw materials from the periph-
ery and exports industrial end products to the periphery. The core of Wallerstein’s theory builds 
on the argument of unequal trade. The developed countries are able to import products from the 
developing countries at prices that are lower than the cost of producing the products in the de-
veloped countries.120 This argument questions the classic liberal understanding of trade as a posi-
tive-sum game. 
 
The World Systems Theory could offer a solution to the question that Dependentistas were con-
fronted with concerning the differentiation of internal and external factors for underdevelopment. 
By focussing on a more abstract level (with countries as global analysis units) there are no more 
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external factors. Further, there are no longer different sorts of capitalism, such as core capitalism 
and peripheral capitalism, in stead there is one capitalist world system. The origin of develop-
ment and underdevelopment is then found in the incorporation of countries within the world sys-
tem. According to World Systems Theory, underdevelopment occurs because countries are sub-
ject to a trade regime and produce for a world market that is characterised by unequal trade.121 
 
4.2.3 Neo-Liberalism 
From the mid 1970s neo-Liberalism gained popularity and also influenced the way of thinking in 
development theory. Neo-Liberalism cannot be considered to be a development theory in itself, 
but rather a set of ideas about markets, state interference, free trade and world economy that can 
be linked to development theory. In terms of development neo-Liberalists considered state inter-
ference with the market mechanism as ineffective, counterproductive and basically inconsistent. 
Instead limiting the role of the state, liberal economies and a strict monetary policy according to 
the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were believed to be the 
major policy options in many developing countries. However, according to Michel Chossu-
dovsky (1991) the structural role of the IMF could be considered as the cause rather than the 
solution to the economic problems experienced in the third world. He believed that less state 
interference led to the increasing impoverishment of low-income groups and thus a liberalisation 
of the economy and the growing emphasis on export-led industrialisation would result in a dual 
economy, with one sector producing for the international market and another sector producing 
for a shrinking national market. As a development ideology, neo-Liberalism most resembles the 
Modernisation paradigm, but in fact it has less to offer because the role of the state has been 
minimalised.122However, the ideas of free trade as a way to generate development are based on 
the neo-Liberal views on the relation between trade and development.123 Therefore neo-
Liberalism can be considered to have an influence on development theory. 
 
4.2.4 Post-Impasse theories 
From the beginning of the 1980s there was an intense debate among development theorists about 
which approach to use. Many theorists had heavily criticised the neo-Marxist theories, but had 
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not succeeded in coming up with any new theories that could solve the obvious problems that 
neo-Marxist theories did not deal with. Therefore in 1988 Leslie Sklair argued for a shift of focus 
within development studies from the level of theory to the level of metatheory.124 Sklair consid-
ered the only way out of the impasse as the combination of metatheory, theory and empirical 
research. According to Sklair, the impasse was grounded on confusion among scholars of 
metatheory and theory. Scholars had attempted to test metatheories, which according to Sklair 
was untestable. Furthermore, Sklair underlined the problems of diverse, and sometimes diver-
gent, theories can be derived from one metatheory. These can be internally consistent, but are not 
necessarily consistent with each other.125 
 
The Regulation School 
The French scholars Alain Lipietz and Michel Aglietta elaborated one of the first post-impasse 
development theories in the early 1980s. This theory was called the Regulation School. The es-
sence of the school is that regularities in development trajectories are observable through histori-
cal comparative research.126 According to Lipietz regularities are considered as: “(…) a sequence 
of contradictions, crises and transformation in development trajectories.”127  These regularities 
can then be abstracted in two concepts namely regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. 
Lipietz describes the regime of accumulation as the way in which the economic product is allo-
cated between consumption and accumulation.128 Furthermore he adds to this a particular mode 
of regulation: regulating norms, values and laws. In other words this is a set of internalised rules 
and procedures that enables integration of social elements in individual behaviour.129 Lipietz and 
Aglietta argue that the stability and consistency of an economic world system cannot be consid-
ered as the consequence of the “working of the invisible hand of capitalism(…)”130 but it is more 
likely to be considered as the result of the interaction between relatively autonomous national 
regimes of accumulation.  
 
According to Lipietz and Aglietta this means that the functioning of multinational corporations 
will lead to an international division of labour; however, this is still on the condition of the coop-
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eration of the individual countries. Lipietz and Aglietta’s approach provides a way of giving a 
more precise form to the historical comparative research. Their observations of how develop-
ment strategies cannot be seen out of context of the position of the countries underlines the ne-
cessity of including the international society.131 
 
The Actor-Oriented Approach 
In contrast to Lipietz and Aglietta, who focus more on the level of nation state and internationali-
sation, sociologist Norman Long (1990) gives more attention to the relationship between the 
meso level, which he refers to as:  “(…) the wider context wherein access to power and re-
sources play a role (…)”132 and the micro level. Long argues that the actors’ behaviour is not 
based on their structural position, but rather on a lower analytical level. To Long human action, 
reaction and consciousness play a more crucial role. 
 
Long concluded that even when structural conditions and types of external impulses are rela-
tively constant, behaviour of actors can diverge in forms and therefore expressly do not reduce 
behaviour of individual actors to individual motive and interests. Long underlines the importance 
of the interface between the meso level and the individual actor, and he suggests that the latter 
has a wider variety of actions available than is usually presumed. Furthermore these actions can 
have an effect on a meso level, in contrast to the previous view that it is primarily meso-level 
impulses that determine the behaviour of individual actors. Long considers individuals, the 
church, the state bureaucracy and corporations as actors (or agents), but also corporations, but he 
does not see gender or class as actors or agents. Just like the Regulation School the Actor-
Oriented approach can also be considered a positivist approach since it too deals with the ques-
tions and solving the problems that have been documented by scholars of different schools.133 
 
4.2.5 Post-Imperialism 
Post-imperialism is not an actual development theory, but rather a set of ideas about the political 
and social organisation of international capitalism. Developing countries must bring themselves 
into line with a world economy dominated by trans national corporations, which could supply the 






missing inputs, and as such would also be in a position to exercise decision making power.134 
The important difference between this approach and Modernisation theory, is that the developing 




The ideas of gender studies as an element in development theories were born in the 1990s. On 
the one hand, gender studies contributed to the impasse in development theories by criticising the 
invisibility of women in the previous development theories. However, gender studies, on the 
other hand used metatheories, which they based on these previous development studies, which 
they had criticised. Therefore gender studies used Marxist metatheory as an inspirational source 
(e.g. the position of women and gender relations) as many development theories have done be-
fore.135 
Thus, according to one of the leading scholars Aafke Komter (1991) feminist theory in the past 
had constantly been searching for a more structuralist approach, and therefore ended in a crisis 
when the material object opened more space for the study of pluralism and diversity among 
women. The subsequent liaisons with Marxism, psychoanalysis, and post-modernism only led 
gender studies to growing theoretical fragmentation.136 
 
Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development entered the development theory range in the 1990s. The term sustain-
able development often defines a strategy that can “(…) satisfy the needs of the present genera-
tion without interfering with the needs of future generations.”137 This definition and the way it is 
often used in practice provides a rather heterogeneous basis for understanding the term since the 
term can cover development strategies which range from light-green to dark-green, from roman-
tic and nostalgic conservatism to utopian socialism, from absolute-zero growth rate in the econ-
omy to maintaining the present world economic growth rate.138 As a result the green notion of 
sustainable development could be incorporated without effort into both the neo-liberal develop-








ment models and the socialist or social democratic development models. Therefore critics argue 
that in a number of cases one cannot speak of an alternative development model.  
 
The common term sustainable development more often associates to connections between the 
discourse of sustainable development and that of women’s emancipation. Scholars argue that 
exploitative behaviour towards nature is a typical patriarchal attitude, in which both women and 
nature are given a subordinate role.139 Therefore it is also believed that women’s emancipation 
could lead to less exploitative relations with nature. In addition, by emphasising the importance 
of ethnic minorities in the developing countries, who generally are considered to treat nature in a 
less damaging manner, one can bring further shape to sustainable development. 
 
However, the negative consequences of the different ways developed countries and developing 
countries regard the substantiation of sustainable development strategies is according to Komter 
what creates the danger of ethnocentric handling of this concept.140 
 
4.3 Theory of policy analysis 
To be able to analyse the political processes of the European Union and the international institu-
tions with direct or indirect influence on the development and agricultural policy processes, it is 
necessary to apply a theoretical framework that will ensure that all aspects, actors and procedures 
are covered. For this purpose, we turn to policy analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Introduction to policy analysis 
The EU system is one of the most highly regulated societies in the world141 and the many proc-
esses and procedures make it complicated to provide one single theoretical framework that in-
cludes all involved aspects and actors of the EU policy processes.142 The policy processes take 
place at various levels and implies official as well as unofficial actors. This claim is supported by 
Peterson and Bomberg who state that: “EU decision-making is heavily nuanced, constantly 
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changing and even kaleidoscopic (…)”143 and further by a shift in the paradigm of EU policy 
literature that the notion of a single all-including theoretical framework is unrealistic.144 
 
The fragmented character makes it impossible to apply one single theoretical frame that would 
be satisfyingly sufficient for analysing the processes. Therefore, in order to be able to analyse the 
EU decision processes and the involved actors at the different stages we find it useful to combine 
different theoretical approaches that are aimed at analysing different political settings. The dif-
ferent elements in the ‘patchwork’ of theories used in this study are each chosen because they are 
believed to be the best available tool for analysing their respective policy area. The method is 
supported by the claim that: “Different kinds of theories are appropriate for different parts of the 
EU Puzzle.”145 
 
In practice, this means that the theoretical framework, for the analyses conducted in this study, 
builds upon different aspects from the EU literature and on the work of different scholars. 
The theories are chosen in this relation because they have been found to provide a background 
for analysing the decision processes in the EU and the different actors that are influencing them 
at the different stages.  
 
4.3.2 EU policy nature 
The first part of the policy analysis concerns an analysis and classification of the nature of the 
two EU policy areas. The purpose of this classification is to place the policies within a definition 
of policy nature and thus deduct conclusion about specific policy processes linked to these policy 
natures. The analysis of policy nature is conducted according to Hix’s five-fold classification 
model of EU policies.146 Hix’s model consists of five different policy natures that are each linked 
to two different institutional settings. The policy natures regard: Redistributive Policies, which 
are policies concerned with market, competition, and welfare regulations; Expenditure Policies, 
which are concerned with overall budget and finance matters; Macro Economic policies, which 
relate to monetary and overall economic policies; Citizens Policies, which are about citizenship; 
justice, freedom and rights; and finally Foreign Policies, which covers both external economic 
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relations as well external political relations. External economic relations concern the commercial 
and financial interactions with non-EU states, hereunder also development. External political 
relations consist of security and diplomatic relations.  
 
According to Hix the five natures of policies can be placed within two different institutional set-
tings; where regulatory, expenditure and some macro economic policies are considered to exist 
in a supranational setting. Citizens, foreign and most macro economic policies are on the other 
hand placed in an intergovernmental setting. Hix explains the reason for this division of policy 
natures with the fact that the policy processes linked to the different policy can be considered to 
be either supranational or intergovernmental and that these institutional settings are crucial for 
the individual policy processes. According to Hix, a supranational institutional setting places the 
EU Commission as the central policy actor along with the EU Council. Policies of supranational 
settings represent areas where the political integration in EU has gone furthest. These are policies 
where member states have transferred political power to the EU and thereby given EU the role as 
the central policy actor on these areas. In terms of policy setting, Hix argues that policies in a 
supranational setting will seek policy consensus within the EU and that the EU decisions domain 
over national preferences. 
 
On the other hand policies of intergovernmental setting will seek a political decentralisation from 
the EU to the individual member states. This means that the EU institutions no longer are the 
central policy actors, but instead the national governments overtake this role. Such policies rep-
resent areas where the national member states wish to remain autonomous and not be subjected 
to central EU legislation. This allows the national states to cooperate out of self-interest without 
giving up sovereignty.147 Hix’s model thus presents a framework for classifying the natures of 
the two EU policies and furthermore analyse on the institutional settings related to these natures. 
 
4.3.3 First and second order EU policies 
The establishment of the union was based on a few central policy areas which were crucial for 
the progress of the integration process in the EU.  These policies are defined as being central in 
the effort to place the EU as a strong international player on the international economic and po-
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litical scene. Therefore the scholars Chari and Kritzinger argue that there are two different policy 
orders that reflect this historical importance. 
 
Chari and Kritzinger set out to examine the actors involved in EU decision processes and further 
to characterise the policy formulation process on the basis of essential EU integration and com-
parative politics. Chari and Kritzinger operate with two classification levels for EU policies, 
namely first and second order policies. A central question in the classification process is how and 
why policies become respectively of first or second order nature. 
 
First order policies  
According to Chari and Kritzinger, the integration process has focused largely on harmonisation 
of first order policy areas between the member states.  This has added to the degree of decisions 
being made at supranational level, and diminished the national states’ roles in these matters: 
“The EU is increasingly gaining power to make policy on behalf of its member states.”148  
 
First order policies are defined as ‘high-importance’ policies by the institutions of the EU and 
include: Single market policies, competition policies, economic and monetary policies and the 
common agricultural policy. In short, it can be said that first order policies are those which are 
central and important to the foundation of the EU, and the focus in these policies lay within a 
political harmonisation within the EU. 
 
These policies politically unite the member states and are dealt with at the central EU institutions 
to represent a strong and unified EU that can match the other major players in the world econ-
omy.149  
First order policies can also be defined as the areas where the integration effort has succeeded 
and thus where the harmonisation and transfer from national to supranational levels of the mem-
ber states’ policies has proceeded smoothly.150 Chari and Kritzinger argue that several first order 
policies, though mostly economic, are allocated high priority by EU actors both at supranational 
and domestic levels.151 This means that the first order policies are in constant focus by national 
governments both at the domestic level as well as when it comes to the supranational level, and 







in both instances efforts to secure harmonisation in these political areas are high, in some occa-
sions, leading to national governments prioritising the consensus of the common and suprana-
tional society over those of national interests. 
 
Second order policies 
Second order policies are characterised by a decentralised influence on decision making. These 
are the policy areas where national governments have continued sovereignty. From a national 
state point of view this is an important indicator of not having completely given up national sov-
ereignty. Typical examples of such political areas are social, immigration and foreign policies152 
where the individual member states have maintained a large degree of control. The individual 
stances on these issues mean that it is difficult to achieve consensus among the EU-member 
states on second policy issues. 
 
Chari and Kritzinger thus present a theoretical framework for analysing different policy orders 
and their respective focus on EU or the individual member states as the central policy actor. This 
provides us with a theoretical approach for analysing EU policy processes on the basis of differ-
ent central policy actors. However, there is not one standard definition of EU policy or decision 
making processes. The policies are negotiated within varying complex settings and the actors 
involved are interrelating with each other in more or less transparent ways. Yet, several scholars 
in the field have contributed with different views on the EU policy and decision making proc-
esses. The aim of this study is not to explain the various existing theoretical approaches to under-
standing the EU integration process extensively, but merely to illustrate the main lines in the 
development of political integration theories. 
 
4.3.4 The policy cycle 
Many scholars have contributed to the theory of policy formation by commenting on and extend-
ing the theory field with new nuances and approaches. The theories have been build upon and 
further developed over the years, evolving in a time-related chronology, but to date, none of 
them seem to be convincing enough to completely eradicate the others. 
 
                                                 




This leaves us with three main theory frameworks for analysing policy formation: Punctuated 
equlibrium, Incrementalism and the Rational-Comprehensive approach. In the present study the 
Rational-Comprehensive approach is used as a means to examine policy content and policy in-
struments and to deduct the values and aims that lay behind the policy outcome. The policy 
analysis model that forms the theoretical analytical tool in this study is based on the policy cycle 
model presented Paul Spicker.153 
The model is based on traditional policy analysis and it describes the stages that a decision mak-
ing process normally goes through, and it considers the actors involved and their influence on the 
process and the outcome. 
 
The stages of the policy cycle 
As argued above, policies can be hard to read. The fact that decisions are being made at different 
levels by different actors causes the process to be unclear and this argues against any form of 
order of the process. Yet, several scholars have offered their views on how a logic way through 
the process may look. The suggestions vary from strict and detailed schemes to more loose 
guidelines, but they more or less contain the same elements and prescribe similar chronolo-
gies.154 This adds to the discussion by acknowledging that the different models are generic proc-
esses that must be adapted to a particular situation in order to be of any value. 155 
The policy analysis based on the policy cycle more or less follows the order of stages outlined 
below, but it is often not possible to list a clear structure because it depends on the case in ques-
tion and often the considerations are ad-hoc and diffuse,156 making it impossible to review all 
aspects of the process. However, the Policy cycle is useful for analysing the essential elements in 
a given policy process. Policies are often results of processes and all the things in between: Pol-
icy is not only about the issues that are formally decided on and set down. The stages described 
below may not cover all the phases in some policy processes and it may exaggerate the complex-
ion of other processes. In between the formal structures lay secret agendas and personal and or-
ganisational interests. Nevertheless, the policy cycle provides us with an analytical tool that can 
be used as a guideline to the different policy formation processes that can be relevant to include 
in an analysis. 
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The stages of the policy cycle are:  
 
1. Identifying issues 
This initial stage directs focus towards the importance, and impact, of the surrounding society in 
which the policy is being made. This stage focuses on the nature of political issues that need to 
be dealt with.157 
 
2. Policy analysis 
In this context Spicker uses the term policy analysis to relate to analysis of aims, values and ob-
jectives behind the policies. Aims and values must be identified in order to form a platform for 
the following decisions to be evaluated from.158 Some authors in the field name this phase the 
problem formulation-stage. Here the background and rationale for the policy is stated. The stage 
includes the identification and anticipation of problems or opportunities.159 It is also necessary to 
explain the background for this problem (or opportunity), and which causes and effects are at-
tached. The definition stage is crucial for the rest of the stages in the policy process and for the 
result of the policy insofar as the choice of language, approach, and background assumptions 
may implicitly favour some solutions and rule out others without the politicians being aware of 
this. 
 
At this stage aims describe what the policy is supposed to achieve160 and general purposes 
should be operational. Values are defined as moral principles or norms. They can be used in 
positive means, to lead policy in a certain direction, or by negative means to forestall particular 
options. Finally, objectives can be defined by asking questions: What are we trying to do, and 
how will we know when we have done it?161 It is important to identify constraints and limited 
factors, since there is often a gap between the expected and the desired future. In a system like 
the EU, it will often be necessary to examine alternatives and relative priorities of competing 
objectives in the struggle for the often limited resources available. 
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3. Policy instruments 
This stage allows for the evaluation of different strategies to reach the set objectives. There will 
often be more than one way to reach the goal. The constraints mentioned above will often eradi-
cate a good part of them. Other criteria to consider are the given factors that are not likely to 
change i.e. the constitution. The step is crucial to the policy process: It includes listing the out-
comes for the listed alternatives. It is far from an easy step, and since it involves the future and a 
lot of dependables, it implies a certain degree of uncertainty.  The possible methods for reaching 
a solution are listed and the methods are judged against the aims and objectives in order to de-
cide their probable effectiveness. There may be several ways to solve the problem but depending 
on the process and definition of values, objectives and methods up to this stage in the policy 
process (hence the process described in point two above), the number of methods may be limited 
at this stage.162 
 
4. Consultation 
The fourth stage of Spicker’s policy cycle concerns consultation. At this stage the policy objec-
tives as well as the policy instruments are discussed with relevant policy actors. These may be 
other political institutions, but can also consist of interest groups of any kind that are relevant to 
include in the policy formation process. In some cases some policy actors might act as profes-
sional counsellors to the policy formation processes.163 
 
5. Coordination 
The stage of coordination is not included in this thesis’ policy analysis. In short the coordination 
process concerns coordinating policies with bureaucratic institutions. 164 (See section 3.3.2). 
 
6. Decision 
Stage six about decision of policy includes many of the same elements as stage four. However, 
other policy actors than politicians are naturally not involved directly in the decision process, but 
nevertheless this stage can present heavy pressure from other policy actors that are trying to gain 
influence on the policy outcome. The most important analytical element for conducting analysis 
at this stage is a focus on the political and institutional setting in which the decision process takes 
                                                 





places. As this setting can vary from institution to institution there is not a standard form of ana-
lysing these settings, but rather a complex system of varying decision procedures.165 
 
7. Implementation 
This is the ‘moment of truth’ where the policy is tested, when it is put into practice. To ensure an 
effective policy implementation it is important that the necessary preceding stages in the policy 
process have been carried out carefully.166  
 
8. Evaluation  
The consequences of a policy are tracked and communicated back into the process of policy 
formation in order to improve the process. The main question to ask here is whether the policy 
has reached the desired objectives successfully.167 Since this thesis only focus on the actual for-
mation processes of policy stages 7 and 8 are not included in this thesis’ policy analysis. 
 
4.3.5 EU policy processes 
Like Spicker, Chari and Kritzinger consider the creation of policies to happen in stages. Chari 
and Kritzinger outline a framework for analysing the process through the different stages. They 
base their framework on the work of Peterson and Bomberg,168 although Chari and Kritzinger 
change the terminology slightly and emphasise the EU institutional setting and the different pol-
icy actors. Whereas Spicker’s policy cycle provided us with a theoretical guideline for identify-
ing the different policy formation processes that might exist within the EU, Chari and Kritzinger 
provide us with more in-depth analysis tools to examine the specific EU policy processes. Chari 
and Kritzinger base their theory on Peterson and Bomberg’s three-phase model consisting of: 
policy shaping, policy setting and history-making.169 These three perspectives are valuable for 
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Indicate the institutional setting in which the first thought of or need for a new regulation is for-
mulated. Policy shaping thus includes analysis of the different policy actors/interest groups and 
how these influence this stage. In order to understand and gain an overview of the many different 
types of actors that influence the policy shaping processes it is useful to divide these into two 
groups: The first being the official EU institutions and the other being the non-institutional inter-
est groups who are trying to influence the institutional actors. The interest groups consist of ac-
tors with different aims and means. It is therefore useful to further divide the interest groups into 
subgroups. The literature suggests different ways of doing this. The European Commission itself 
distinguishes between profit-making actors and non-profit making,170 while Chari and Kritzinger 
divide the interest groups into three subsections: Pluralism, Corporatism and DEC (Dominant 
Economic Perspective). These are the terms applied in this thesis. 
 
Pluralism concerns the situation where all groups with a vested interest can gain access to the 
policy making process. In other words all groups have equal opportunities to influence the policy 
development.  
 
Corporatism is when formally designated interest groups are incorporated in the decision mak-
ing and implementation processes. Capital and labour interest groups have (semi-
institutionalised) fixed positions in policy making process. 
 
DEC perspective is according to Chari and Kritzinger a relatively new perspective in EU-
relation. It concerns the fact that a plurality of elites or high-level political elites alone makes the 
crucial decisions. Corporate capital may cause disproportions in the policy making and thereby 
exclude other interest groups. 
 
Policy setting  
Chari and Kritzinger’s second phase concerns policy setting and takes place in either a suprana-
tional context or an intergovernmental context. At this stage, policies are formulated by interac-
tion by different actors and thus become a dynamic process and not just a matter of forming pol-




icy, but of negotiation between the involved actors.171 Like the institutional setting presented by 
Hix, Chari and Kritzinger apply the same definitions of supranational and intergovernmental 
setting. However, in the context of policy setting and with a focus on policy actors, Chari and 
Kritzinger apply these definitions in order to provide analytical means for examining which pol-
icy actors supranationalism and intergovernmentalism allow in the policy setting process. 
 
History-Making  
The third stage defined by Chari and Kritzinger is the History-Making process, which in other 
words relates to the actual decision process. Chari and Kritzinger present this stage on the basis 
of Peterson and Bomberg’s theory, however, in order to find a more precise and useful definition 
we turn to another scholar, namely Chatzopoulou.172 Based on Peterson and Bomberg’s work 
Chatzopoulou presents the four decision procedures of EU and examines how these procedures 
influence the policy outcome. 
 
Four different decision procedures exist in the EU: 
 
• Consultation procedure  
• Co-decision procedure  
• Cooperation procedure  
• Assent procedure 
 
Under the consultation procedure the Commission sends its proposal to both the Council and 
the Parliament, However, the Council is not obliged to take account of the Parliament's position, 
but only to consult the Parliament, so as a result the Parliament can only delay the adoption, but 
not change the text or prevent its adoption. If the Council amends a Commission proposal it must 
do so unanimously. The procedure applies in particular to the EU agricultural policy. In some 
cases, the consultation procedure is compulsory because the legal basis requires it and the pro-
posal cannot become law unless Parliament has given its opinion. In other cases, consultation is 
optional and the Commission will simply suggest that the Council consult Parliament.173 In terms 
of power balance, the Parliament is more or less ignored in this procedure since the Council is 
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not obligated to take the Parliament’s comment into consideration. According to Chatzopoulou 
this result in a decision process dominated by the Council which creates a democratic deficit in 
relation to the members of Parliament directly elected by the EU citizens.174 
 
The co-decision procedure is the most applied decision procedure. The co-decision procedure 
allows the Parliament the power to adopt legislation in cooperation with the Council, since it 
requires that the two institutions agree on an identical text before any proposal can become law. 
As with the Consultation procedure proposals must be initiated by the Commission. Neither the 
Council nor the Parliament have the power to directly initiate proposals, but can suggest that the 
Commission take certain initiatives.175 In contrast to the consultation procedure this procedure 
allows a balance of power between the three EU institutions in matters concerning the free 
movement of workers, right of establishment, services, the internal market, education (incentive 
measures), health (incentive measures), consumer policy, trans-European networks (guidelines), 
environment (general action programme), culture (incentive measures) and research (framework 
programme).176 
 
The cooperation procedure has more or less been abandoned with the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Before this it was applied only for certain aspects of economic and monetary union matters. The 
essence of this procedure was that it allowed the Parliament two readings of any proposals from 
the Commission and thereby gave more power to the Parliament than in cases of consultation.177  
 
The assent procedure requires the Council to obtain the Parliament's assent before certain im-
portant decisions are taken. The procedure is based on a single reading. The Parliament can ac-
cept or reject a proposal, but do not have the power to amend it. If the Parliament does not give 
its assent, the act in question cannot be adopted. The assent procedure is mainly used in question 
of accession of new member states, association agreements and other fundamental agreements 
with third countries. 
It is also applied in matters of citizenship, the specific tasks of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), amendments to the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the ECB, the 
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Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the uniform procedure for elections to the Parliament.178 
According to Chatzopoulou this procedure also shows evidence of a certain institutional balance 
of power, but not to the same extent as e.g. the co-decision procedure. The Parliament is in-
volved in the decision process, since it needs to give its assent, before the proposal can be 
adopted. This means that the Parliament can reject a proposal until it meets the demands of the 
Parliament. 179 
 
4.3.6 EU voting procedures 
As well as there are different policy settings in terms of decision procedures within the EU sys-
tem, there are also different voting procedures. EU operates with two main different voting pro-
cedures: unanimity and qualified-majority voting (QMV). In cases where unanimity is required 
the voting balance is equal; meaning that member states have one vote each. In contrast to cases 
where qualified-majority is needed votes are weighted according to size of member states’ popu-
lation. In result large countries such as Germany, France and UK have more votes than smaller 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark and Luxemburg. In order to have a qualified majority at 
least 255 of 345 votes or the equivalent of a representation of minimum 62% of the EU popula-
tion is required.180  
 
There are different procedures of voting for the different institutions and for the different poli-
cies. The prescription for the usage of the procedures is integrated in the Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community. The various reforms of the institutional setting 
that EU has undergone the last decades have introduced QMV as the most applied voting proce-
dure, since it eliminates the risk of veto from one member state and therefore allows a more op-
erational community policy. Unanimity is practically only used on matters relating to the second 
pillar of the EU, meaning matters of foreign relations and security policy.181 
 
In light of the enlargement of EU, the larger member states demanded that the concept of QMV 
was revised since the enlargement resulted in a scenario where a qualified majority actually 
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would not represent a majority of the EU population. Therefore the principle of the double ma-
jority was added to the qualified majority voting in November 2004. This means that not only 
does a proposal need 62% of the votes, but it also needs a majority of member states in order to 








5. Introduction to EU 
This section gives a short overview of the history and basic ideas of cooperation that have 
evolved into the European Union as we know it today. Secondly, it will present the role of the 
union and the different EU institutions along with their responsibilities. The section will close 
with an introduction to some of the future prospects of the EU in terms of new structures and 
new focus areas due to the continuous enlargement of the EU and the propositions for a new 
constitutional treaty.  
 
5.1 History and raison d’être of EU 
The main focus areas for the European Union or Community as it was named earlier have 
changed through the years: From an agreement based on collaboration and co-production of coal 
and steel to an international political actor, with an internal common market, common currency 
(for most members) and visions of a more united Europe. This section shortly presents the de-
velopment of the EU since the 1950s and the present role of EU. 
 
5.1.1. From co-production to a political union 
As mentioned above, the foundation for the EU started with a vision of a European collaboration 
on production of coal and steel. The French foreign minister Robert Schuman presented in 1950 
the French government’s vision for an agreement between France and West Germany concerning 
collaboration in terms of coal and steel. The so-called Schuman Declaration was presented in a 
time of European crisis on various levels. First of all Europe had not financially recovered from 
the Second World War, and the tensions of the cold war and a fear for a Third World War gave 
birth to visions about more collaboration in Europe. In addition to political tensions, Europe also 
experienced financial tensions since an over production of steel threatened the European econo-
mies.183 Therefore Schuman suggested that French and German coal and steel production was 
coordinated under “the High Authority” which has now become the Commission. France, West 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy signed the Schuman Declaration in 
1951 and thus in 1952 the European Coal and Steel Community was established.184  
                                                 




Over the years the formation of the Coal and Steel Community led to more and more European 
integration both politically and financially. Therefore in 1958 the treaty of Rome came into ef-
fect and thereby created the European Economic Community (EEC) and also brought along 
some of the institutional structures such as a commission and a parliamentary assembly. The 
High Authority however, still politically governed the community.185  
 
During the 1960s the EEC went through several changes of structure and the institutions we 
know today; Council, Commission and Parliament were established. In 1973 the first major 
enlargement of the EEC took place; Denmark, Ireland and UK entered the EEC. Due to in-
creased economic as well as political integration the EEC changed its name to EC (European 
Community) as of January 1st 1980. The process of enlargement continued through the 1970s 
and 1980s and in 1993 twelve countries had ratified the treaty of the European Union meaning 
an opening of the single European market in the member states and that EC again changed it 
name this time to EU (European Union).186 
 
The continuous political and economic integration resulted in the launch of the single European 
currency in the Eurozone in 2002 and in 2004 the EU underwent another major enlargement 
when 10 countries, primarily former east-bloc countries entered the union and raised the number 
of members from 15 to 25. In 2005 the constitutional treaty of EU was approved by all EU insti-
tutions and presented a vision for an even more politically integrated union with e.g. a common 
EU president and EU foreign minister.187 However, the national referendums, which were to take 
place in the EU member states during 2005 and 2006, have been stopped, due to rejections in the 
French and the Dutch referendums. At the moment EU politicians are still discussing whether to 
proceed with the constitutional treaty or to change the treaty. 
 
5.1.2. The role of EU today 
The treaty of the European Union that was ratified by all member states in 1993 has a statement 
of the purpose and goals for the EU. Article two of the treaty mentions some of the political and 
economic areas that are important to the EU. It mentions that EU should increase economic and 






social progress and seek to achieve a high employment and well-balanced sustainable develop-
ment by establishing an area without internal borders. This is to be achieved by creating a mone-
tary union with a single currency. Furthermore EU is to strengthen the European identity interna-
tionally through common foreign and security policies and eventually a common defence policy 
by establishing a EU defence unit.188 
 
On a more civilian level the treaty states that EU should ensure the protection of member states’ 
citizens’ rights and interests by introducing a EU citizenship. At the same time EU must preserve 
and enlarge the Union on the basis of principles as freedom, security and justice with free move-
ment of persons and with appropriate control with outer borders concerning asylum, immigration 
and proactive crime fighting.189 Finally, the treaty states a more political structural vision by say-
ing that EU should maintain the present community rights and develop these rights with the pur-
pose of continuously evaluating to what extent it is necessary to change the policies and the co-
operation stated by the EU treaty. This evaluation ensures the efficiency of the community 
mechanisms and institutions.190 
 
5.2 The EU institutions 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the EU institutions have undergone structural 
changes from the Coal and Steel Community to the European Union. The following section 
shortly introduces the present EU institutions, their composition, areas of responsibility and deci-
sion procedures. The three main institutions: the Council, the Commission and the Parliament are 
given most attention, since they are the most relevant in terms of policy making. Institutions such 
as the European Court, the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, etc. are no 
dealt with because they have little or no influence on the EU policy making. 
 
5.2.1. The Council 
The Council or the European Council or as it is also often referred to; the European Council of 
Ministers, depending on the composition of ministers, is the highest authority within the EU. It 
                                                 





consists of the member states’ ministers of the different relevant resorts. Thus there is a Council 
on finance consisting of all EU member states’ ministers for finances, council on agriculture 
consisting of all EU member states’ ministers for agriculture, and etc. However, the term Euro-
pean Council refers to the council consisting of EU member states’ heads of governments; prime 
ministers and presidents. Both the resort minister council and the European council posses the 
highest decision authority within EU. The council must approve all legislation, amendments, etc. 
In some cases, depending on its nature, the EU Parliament co-decides with the Council.  
 
The Council works on two different levels. One is a supranational level, where the Council - 
often the European Council seeks to form a political agenda for a common EU. This is often re-
lated to foreign matters, overall budget planning or other general EU policies. At the suprana-
tional level the Council disregards national interests and seek to work for the common EU inter-
ests. On the other hand the Council consisting of resort ministers often work on a more national 
level representing the national governments’ interests. Therefore, there are different voting pro-
cedures for the Council depending on the matter of the case. Cases in the Council relating to in-
terstate matters are decided upon according to the principle of unanimous voting; meaning all 
members must agree. If just one member state votes against the proposal is rejected.191 Other 
cases that are of a supranational nature are decided on according to the principle of qualified 
majority.192 This means that every member state is attributed a certain number of votes according 
to population. A proposal is approved if there is a majority of the total votes for it.193 This means 
that some member states can be overruled by others and thus be forced to accept and ratify legis-
lation they did not vote for. 
 
5.2.2. The Commission 
The Commission is the successor of the former High Authority (see section 5.1.1) and it is a cen-
tral actor in EU policy making and EU policy integration. The Commission consists of 27 com-
missioners appointed by the national governments: One commissioner pr. member state.194  In 
order for the Commission to come into force the EU Parliament must accept all commission-
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ers.195 The work of the Commission is similar to that of a national government. Each commis-
sioner is assigned his or her own resort department, which he or she is responsible for on a su-
pranational level. This means that even though the commissioner for agriculture is Danish, she 
does not in any way represent Danish interests, but only EU interests in her function as commis-
sioner.196 Apart from being responsible for ratification and acceptance of EU legislation in the 
member states, the Commission also functions as initiator of almost all EU laws and regulations. 
Even though the official decision making takes place in the Council, the Commission has an im-
portant influence on EU policies, since the Council needs to receive a proposal from the Com-
mission before it can decide on anything. This is the procedure in practically all cases. Matters 
concerning security, defence, or other urgent matters can exceptionally be dealt with by the 
Council without a proposal from the Commission. This means that the Commission has no direct 
decision making authority, but is the essential actor in initiating EU legislation.197 When the 
Commission decides on various legal proposals it bases its voting procedure on simple majority, 
however it seeks to reach unanimity if possible.198 
 
5.2.3. The Parliament 
The European Parliament was originally in the Coal and Steel Community an assembly of mem-
ber states’ representatives, who were also members of the national assemblies. Today it has de-
veloped into a democratic assembly consisting of directly elected representatives of the member 
states (number of representatives vary according to population).199 Member of European Parlia-
ment (MEPs) represent the European population. However, generally the MEPs are not grouped 
according to nationality, but to political beliefs.200 Nevertheless, MEPs occasionally tend to rep-
resent national interests since the national voters elect them. 
 
The main areas of responsibility for the EU Parliament is co-decision making with the Council in 
legal matters, budget decision making and democratic control of the other EU institutions. An-
other important role of the EU Parliament is the acceptance of the Commission.201 If the Parlia-
                                                 
195 Fredslund: 2002 
196 Ibid 




201 Fredslund: 2002 
 68
 
ment is not satisfied with a new Commission it can reject it. This happened with the first Barolo 
Commission. In terms of co-decision making with the Council, the Parliament can participate on 
two levels: either by a consultation procedure or by a co-decision procedure. The consultation 
procedure means that the Parliament not necessarily has any direct influence on the outcome, 
since the Council can accept the Parliament’s suggestions, but is not obliged to. This procedure 
is used in matters concerning agriculture, fishery, commerce, taxation, and duties.202 Critics 
claimed that this is one of the major democratic deficits in the EU system, since the EU Parlia-
ment is the only institution consisting of democratically elected representatives. Therefore the 
treaty of Maastricht introduced in 1993 the co-decision procedure, forcing the Council to coop-
erate with the Parliament, because the co-decision procedure needs an approval of both the 
Council and the Parliament in order to be accepted. If this is not the case, the Council and the 
Parliament will meet for negotiations.203 Decisions in the EU Parliament are reached by simple 
or absolute majority.204 
 
5.3 Future prospects of EU 
In recent years the EU has experienced major changes in terms of further political and economic 
integration, enlargement of the union and ongoing negotiations with nations that wish to enter 
the European Union. In the light of these changes and the following challenges EU is faced with 
the necessity of rethinking some of its political structures and also some of its policies. The fol-
lowing sections present some of these challenges in terms of the enlargement of the union and 
the new constitutional treaty. 
 
5.3.1. The enlargement of EU 
In 2004 when EU opened its doors to ten new member states, it was also forced to evaluate and 
rethink some of its political structures. First of all the number of Commissioners was naturally 
raised from 15 to 25.205 Also the enlargement generated a discussion of the presidency of the EU, 
which was previously held in turns of six month by the member states. However, with the 
enlargement this procedure would mean that a member state’s EU presidency would be with an 
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interval of 12.5 years, which was considered to be too long. Therefore EU has taken initiative to 
change this in the Constitutional Treaty (See section 5.2.3).  
 
The enlargement of EU, concerned to a large extent  former east bloc countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. By 
including these states EU was forced to consider how far the borders of Union could reach. Al-
ready the inclusion of the former Soviet Baltic states had caused some political discussions about 
inclusion of former Soviet states placed on the European continent. The political issue lies in the 
question of defining European geography, culture, and politics, and whether an inclusion of more 
former Soviet states would cause political instability towards Russia.206  
 
On a more political level another issue of discussion in relation to the continuous enlargement of 
the EU is illustrated by the situation in Cyprus. Because Cyprus is divided into a Greek and a 
Turkish part (only the Greek part is internationally recognised as a nation and Turkey does not 
recognise the Greek part)207 the referendum in Cyprus about EU membership needed to take this 
division into consideration. Thus the result was that only the Greek part of Cyprus is member of 
the EU. This naturally led to a more delicate discussion concerning Turkey’s membership of the 
EU. For years EU has been discussing whether or not Turkey should enter the Union. The argu-
ments both for and against have been many, but there are some main arguments that are often 
used in this discussion. The arguments against is: Turkey is primarily a Muslim country, Turkey 
is for a great part geographically placed in the Middle East and not in Europe, and finally Turkey 
has some difficulties fulfilling some of the political and economic demands for EU membership 
stated in the Copenhagen Criteria208. On the other hand people that are pro Turkish EU member-
ship often argue that by including Turkey in the EU, EU could gain more influence in the Middle 
East to e.g. solve the conflict in Israel and Palestine. Turkey as a member of EU could act as a 
buffer between Europe and EU, and since September 11, this argument has been used in relation 
to preventing terrorism. As it is today, EU is still split in the question of Turkey’s EU member-
ship.209 
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A final consequence of the enlargement of the EU concerns a rethinking of the EU agricultural 
policy, also referred to as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Many of the new member 
states saw EU agricultural subsidisation as a way to develop their agriculture and relating indus-
tries. Especially Poland, who has a large but rather inefficient agriculture in comparison to other 
EU countries, saw the CAP as a help to development. However, the enlargement of EU meant 
that the EU budgets could no longer support all countries with the same amount as before, and 
therefore the new member states were only granted a smaller percentage than the “originally” 15 
member states. This is of course a highly unstable solution, and can only be considered to be 
temporary. Thus EU is forced to rethink the CAP and cut drastically in the subsidies or possibly 
abandon them.210 
 
5.3.2 The Constitutional Treaty 
The constitutional treaty suggests some major political and structural changes to the EU system, 
as we know it today. This section is not meant to elaborate on all aspects, but merely to give a 
short outline of the most revolutionary changes. The first is that instead of the present six months 
EU presidency, the treaty suggests a permanent EU President elected by the European Council. 
This presidency is suggested to be of a period of two and half years.211 The present model of the 
presidency of the Council (resort ministers) is to be replaced by a shared presidency of three 
member states for a period of 18 months. The three member states hold the presidency in turns at 
all the Council’s assemblies with the exception of foreign policies.212 In matters of foreign poli-
cies, the treaty suggests a common EU foreign secretary with responsibilities concerning forma-
tion of EU foreign, security and defence policies.213 Another structural change suggested by the 
treaty is that the number of commissioners is reduced to only 2/3 of the member states.214 So it 
will no longer be possible for all member states to have a commissioner. The EU Parliament is 
also to undergo changes. The constitutional treaty suggests that the Parliament be granted more 
influence on the decision making procedure. This means that the procedure of co-decision will 
be applied in almost all cases with the exception of foreign, security and defence policies. In 
                                                 







terms of the CAP, this means that EU Parliament will gain more influence of the outcome of the 
policy, which earlier was more or less single-handed decided on by the Council.215 
 




6. Theoretical classification of EU policies 
This section seeks to place the EU policies on agriculture and development within a theoretical 
frame. This is done with the purpose of examining whether contradictions exist in the theoretical 
approaches to the two policy areas. The first policy to be examined is the EU agricultural policy 
and this is followed by a similar examination of the EU development policy. Before going into 
an examination of the theoretical framework for the EU agricultural and development policies, it 
is necessary to define the exact policies we are dealing with. The EU agricultural and develop-
ment policies are stated in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community. The term “consolidated version” refers to the version of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty 
Establishing the European Community) including the amendments introduced by the following 
treaties of Nice and Amsterdam which is now in use. 
 
6.1 Classification of EU agricultural policy 
The EU agricultural policy is stated in the treaty’s articles 32 through 38. Article 33 states a po-
litical view that increase in productivity along with redistribution of wealth can ensure farmers a 
fair income: “(…)to increase agricultural productivity (…) thus to ensure a fair standard of liv-
ing for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of per-
sons engaged in agriculture.”216 This points to an approach along the lines of Smith and Ricardo 
who state that economic wealth comes from exploiting advantages, whether these are absolute or 
relative. Article 33 supports this view by stating that European agriculture should benefit from an 
optimal use of the present resources and thereby increase productivity. “(…)by promoting tech-
nical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the op-
timum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour.” 217 Without any other defini-
tion of the resources than labour, one could argue that the article actually states that European 
farming has an advantage in terms of labour force and if this advantage is used optimal, Europe 
will experience an economic growth that will ensure farmers a fair income and also generate 
other advantageous conditions for e.g. the consumers.  
 
                                                 




Another point that supports the argument of wealth as a result of production advantages is stated 
in the same article paragraph 2 C: “(…) the fact that in the Member States agriculture constitutes 
a sector closely linked with the economy as a whole.”218 Here the relation between farming and 
the member states’ economies is emphasised. The paragraph underlines the importance of the 
EU agricultural policy to acknowledge and take account of the fact that the farming industry has 
a direct influence on the national economies. This also shows evidence of a tendency to lean on 
the classic liberal idea of generating wealth by exploiting production advantages. In the light of 
the classic liberal economic trade theories this part of the EU agricultural policy is based on the 
idea of increasing farming production where EU farmers possess some kind of advantage, and 
abandon other farming production areas without advantages. The general idea is that the Euro-
pean farmers should focus on productions where they have the most advantageous resources. In 
addition EU is taking different initiatives with the purpose of increasing productivity and thereby 
increase wealth both among farmers by securing them a fair income, but also among consumers 
by ensuring a supply of food at reasonable prices. 
 
However, the classic liberal approach is not the only approach, which can be found in the EU 
agricultural policy. Article 34 shows evidence of a strong protectionist approach to agricultural 
policy by stating that “all measures required” are allowed in order to reach the goals defined by 
the policy: “The common organisation established in accordance with paragraph 1 may include 
all measures required to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, in particular regulation of 
prices, aids for the production and marketing of the various products, storage and carryover 
arrangements and common machinery for stabilising imports or exports.”219 Furthermore, this 
article defines which protectionist measures can be used. It underlines that the use of regulation 
of prices, financial support for production and marketing and other technical support measures 
can be used with no restrictions as long as the purpose is to attain the goals of the EU agricultural 
policy. This paragraph clearly illustrates a protectionist approach to agricultural policy since it 
beyond any reason of doubt outlines that protectionist measures of all kinds are allowed and even 
emphasises that particular price regulation, subsidies and technical support can be applied in 
order to regulate imports and exports. 
 





The emphasis on the use of price regulation can be considered as a loophole to introduce duties 
on imported goods, which is otherwise prohibited by the WTO.220 By regulation of prices the 
same effect can be attained as duties or tariffs. If EU ensures the European farmers minimum 
prices for their products these products would need to be either more attractive in terms of prices 
for consumers in order to create demand, or otherwise the products would need to be subsidised 
directly by the EU in order to ensure the farmers a minimum price. This subsidisation would then 
result in low market prices for the consumers and thus imported goods would become more ex-
pensive than EU-goods. So in the end the result of price regulation and guaranteeing minimum 
prices is the same as that of introducing duties and tariffs. 
 
The second protectionist aspect of article 34 is the one relating to subsidisation of production and 
marketing. Subsidisation of production is in line with the example of price regulation. The pur-
pose is to support the EU farmers financially in order to increase productivity and secure the 
farmers a fair income. The other aspect concerning subsidisation for marketing is a little more 
complex. One side of this subsidisation relates to subsidising marketing for the agricultural 
products on the common EU market and thereby maintain consumers’ interest in the products 
and create a demand. The other side is of more external nature since it can be consider a way to 
help EU farmers meet with some of the technical standards that EU has introduced for agricul-
tural products. This could for instance be labelling, correct users manuals or other information 
about the production and what the products consist of. Because EU has decided to set many 
standards higher than UN, WTO and other international organisations prescribe, the European 
standards can be very difficult to meet, even for European farmers. Therefore this aspect of mar-
keting subsidisation can be considered a technical barrier for non-EU producers since the EU 
producers are supported financially in order to do marketing that corresponds to the standards. 
 
The third and last protectionist measure mentioned by article 34 concerns technical support for 
EU farmers. This paragraph underlines the possibilities of taking initiatives that support the 
farmers in terms of storage, carryover arrangements, and common machinery all with the pur-
pose of stabilising imports and exports. This measure is a more direct form of protectionism, 
which allows the EU farmers some general technical and logistic advantages in relation to non-
EU farmers. Again the purpose of the measure is to ensure competitiveness of EU farmers by 
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providing them with facilities that otherwise would have been considerable expenses for them. 
By eliminating these expenses EU ensures that EU products are competitive on the common 
market, but also ensures that the EU products are competitive on foreign markets by reducing 
some of the production costs. So not only does this measure have an effect on the EU market by 
preventing imported goods from overtaking the market, it also supports the export of EU prod-
ucts and thus supports the EU products in overtaking the foreign markets. 
 
In conclusion the EU agricultural policy can be considered to be a mix of two theoretical ap-
proaches, which on the surface can seem rather contradictory. But a closer examination shows 
that the way the two approaches are interpreted in the EU policy allows them to walk hand in 
hand. The classic liberal principles ensure that EU keeps a strong focus on the relation between 
growth in wealth and productivity of the agriculture. However, the advantages that the classic 
liberal principles are based on do not seem to exist in European agriculture. Therefore protec-
tionist measures are taken to create these advantages. This means that the advantages, which 
only exist due to the protectionist measures, can be profited from and thus create economic 
growth. However, the question is whether the maintenance of the protectionist measures is more 
costly than the income that the production advantages bring to the overall EU economy. If Euro-
pean agriculture has so important influence on the national economies as the policy suggests, 
then there is a reason for maintaining the agricultural production on the basis of protectionist 
measures. On the other hand, if modern European agriculture do not generate economic growth 
and thereby has little or no influence on the national economies, then the maintenance of the 
European agricultural production at its present level can be considered to have the exact opposite 
effect on the economy; namely that the protectionist measures have become so expensive to up-
hold that the EU agricultural policy actually results in an economic decrease. The issue about 
whether or not modern European agriculture contributes economically is further discussed in 
section 7.3.1. 
 
6.2 Classification of EU development policy 
Articles 177 through 181 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community state the EU development policy. Like the EU agricultural policy the development 
policy also seems to show evidence of a variety of theoretical approaches. The first evidence is 
seen in the first paragraph of article 177.  
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“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, (…) shall foster: the sustainable 
economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most 
disadvantaged among them.”221 The EU’s focus on sustainable development can be discussed 
along two lines: first whether sustainable refers to environmental issues, as it is often used in a 
western context, or whether sustainable refers to generating continuous development that will be 
self-supportive in the future. Here the term sustainable economic and social development is used 
without any further references to a definition of sustainability. Nevertheless, since the term is 
related to economic and social development, one must consider sustainability to be concerned 
with creating development that can be self-supportive. Therefore the term sustainability indicates 
that development in terms of social and economic programmes initiated by the EU is meant to 
build a solid ground for continuous development in the countries in question. The inclusion of 
the term sustainability and the likely interpretation of the term suggest an approach based on the 
post-Imperialist school. The post-Imperialist context defines sustainability to be concerned with 
the developing countries’ own interest and wish for adapting to world market economies, but that 
this adaptation is conducted by the developing countries themselves and not by a modern west-
ern imperialisation. 
 
In contrast, the second part of the first paragraph in article 177 suggests a different approach 
more in line with Modernisation theory and neo-Liberal thinking: “ (…) the smooth and gradual 
integration of the developing countries into the world economy.”222 The statement that EU 
wishes a smooth and harmonic integration of the developing countries into the world economy, 
suggests that EU considers development programmes to create free capitalist economies based 
on western values in the developing countries. Otherwise it would seem pointless to aim for an 
economic integration. So by stating a wish for economic integration EU reveals an approach 
based on liberal principles such as open economies, less state interference and free market 
forces. This approach also relates to Modernisation theory, where the basic idea is to “export” 
western values and norms to the developing countries in order to set them on a path to industri-
alisation. In this case the values and norms consist of capitalist economies. The Modernisation 
approach is also found in paragraph two in article 177: “Community policy in this area shall 
                                                 




contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of 
law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 223 
 
Here the EU policy states that development programmes should be based on the spread of de-
mocracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The fact that values 
such as democracy and freedoms are exported in a western context without a discussion whether 
democracy is a unique term or whether the concept of democracy depends on the cultural, social, 
geographical or historical setting, corresponds to Modernisation views on development as a 
copy-paste process, where western values are directly adopted by the developing countries lead-
ing the developing countries into a phase of westernisation.  
 
Yet another theoretical approach can be found in the third part of paragraph one in article 177: 
“(…) the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.”224 Here the EU policy focuses 
on the campaign against poverty. The fact that poverty is a focus area in itself and needs special 
attention suggests, rather inconsistently with the other paragraphs, that the problems of poverty 
need special focus and cannot be solved through the sustainable economic and social develop-
ment mentioned in the first part, nor by the harmonic economic integration of the developing 
countries stated in part two. The special focus on the campaign against poverty points to a neo-
Marxist approach, since it acknowledges that development need to involve different levels of 
society and not only institutions and capital actors. Contrary to the Modernisation and the neo-
Liberal theories, Neo-Marxism focuses on development of levels consisting of the people (work-
ers and peasants) and also has a strong emphasis on the negative consequences of imperialism, 
by arguing that development principles of the Modernisation and neo-Liberal theories, will only 
result in development in the higher social classes. Because these classes have the capital to invest 
in new production, they will also benefit from this investment. However, according to neo-
Marxists development at this social level will not generate overall development, but merely leave 
the developing countries in a situation where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. As evi-
dence of this neo-Marxist scholars often refer to the development phases of many Latin Ameri-
can countries where a small elite owns practically all productions and thereby all economic 
means. 
 





All in all just as the case of agricultural policy, EU development policy seems to consist of a set 
of various theoretical approaches. The Modernisation and neo-Liberal approaches can in this 
context be considered to have more or less the same theoretical background. The idea is to gen-
erate development by initiating a transformation of the developing countries into industrialised 
countries through programmes that focus on transferring western values such as capitalism, free 
competition, open economies and etc. On the other hand, the development policy shows evi-
dence of an approach based on generating development on different internal levels in the devel-
oping countries. This approach is based on the post-Imperialist definition of sustainable devel-
opment, where the developing countries are helped to start productions that over time can be-
come self-supportive and thereby generate economic and social development on all social levels. 
The mere fact that sustainable development is classified as post-Imperialist theory and that Mod-
ernisation and partly neo-Liberal theories can be considered to be imperialist theories in the 
sense that they argue that former colonisation and present economic imperialism are beneficial to 
the developing countries, seems rather paradoxical. The paradox lies within the fact that the de-
velopment policy is based on two more or less contradictive approaches; post-Imperialist theo-
ries blame imperialism for the underdevelopment and Modernisation theory accredits develop-
ment progress to imperialism. Unlike the different approaches of the agricultural policy, which 
seems to be able to support one another, the different views on imperialism seem to be in conflict 
with each other from a theoretical point of view. One explanation for this choice of approach 
could be an awareness of the lack of positive results a Modernisation approach brings in terms of 
development on more than one social level. Inclusion of a neo-Marxist approach ensures a more 
widespread theoretical focus on development. It is so to speak a bet on all horses that allows the 
member states to conduct their own development policy regardless of theoretical approach. An-
other possibility is a simple lack of awareness of the contradictive views on development. 
Whether it is the first or the latter explanation that is correct, does not change the fact that EU 
development policy includes theoretical approaches on development that are so far apart that the 
policy itself becomes very undefined, inconsistent and unfocused. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
A first hand impression of the EU agricultural policy seems to indicate a contradiction between 
two theoretical approaches: classic liberalism and protectionism. From a theoretical point of 
view these two approaches do not correspond since one is concerned with increasing wealth on 
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the principles of benefiting from production advantages on a free market and the other is con-
cerned with protecting one’s own market in order to increase exports and minimise imports. But 
in the historic context of the political integration of EU, these two approaches become more and 
more reasonable. The classic liberal approach is based on a former situation in Europe when 
farmers had strong political influence due to a general economic relation between agricultural 
production and national economies. At the time when the Treaty of Rome was signed, farming 
was a crucial industry in Europe both in terms of economic, social and political aspects. Because 
of this strong influence from the farmers, the EU policy also had to include elements that would 
maintain agriculture as a central economic and political actor. Therefore protectionist measures 
were also included in the text of the treaty. This way the farmers had insurance for maintaining 
political influence and at the same time were secured a fair income. Whether or not the produc-
tion advantages that the classic liberal approach is based on existed at the time of signing the 
treaty can be discussed. Some experts argue that already in the 1950s the European farming in-
dustry had lost the battle to world competition. Other experts claim that it was the introduction of 
the protectionist measures that made the European farmers loose the battle, since they were not 
forced to improve production and reduce costs due to stable markets and minimum prices. Nev-
ertheless the fact is that today the text of the EU policy on agriculture remains the same as in 
1957 despite the drastic changes that European agriculture has experienced the last 50 years. 
 
As far as the EU development policy is concerned a multifaceted theoretical approach can also 
be found here. The policy contains elements of Modernisation theory and neo-Liberalism. These 
two theoretical approaches can easily walk hand in hand since they more or less have the same 
view on development namely that the developing countries shall adopt world economy principles 
as fast as possible as thus this will set them on the path to development. However, post-
Imperialist and neo-Marxist approaches can also be detected in the EU policy. These two ap-
proaches can also be considered to correspond well with each other. They both have a focus on 
development at several social levels of the society and not only among capital actors. Further-
more, they both counter argue with the Modernisation and neo-Liberal approaches. The main 
point of difference of these two views on development is the effect of imperialism. Modernisa-
tion and neo-Liberal theories see positive results from exporting western values to the develop-
ing countries, whereas post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism only see negative results from this. 
By having a very open and undefined development policy EU allows member states to conduct 
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almost any kind of development policy as long as the overall purposes of the policy are re-
spected.  
 
All in all the EU agricultural policy can be considered to be based on theoretical approaches that 
are aimed at maintaining the EU farmers’ economic, social and political influence through a 
creation of artificial production advantages based on protectionist measures. The EU develop-
ment policy on the other hand seems to open up for very individual interpretations of develop-
ment approaches by the member states since it is based on approaches that more or less cover the 
whole spectre of development theories. 
 
Holding the two policy areas against each other also sheds light on contradictions between the 
two policies. Not only do contradictions exist within the policies, but also between the two poli-
cies. The classic liberal approach found in the agricultural policy can on a theoretical level be 
considered to contradict the post-Imperialist/neo-Marxist approaches found in the development 
policy. The main theoretical contradiction of these two aspects is the view on the relationship 
between capitalism and social development. Classic liberalism bases its principles on the mecha-
nisms of capitalism and the economic growth that liberal capitalism generates without any con-
cern to different social levels and what impact or lack of impact liberal capitalism has on the 
lower social levels. Post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism on the other hand blame capitalism for 
underdevelopment since it only generates development among higher social levels. Another con-
tradiction is found in the relation between the agricultural policy’s protectionist approach on one 
side and the development policy’s approach of Modernisation and neo-Liberalism. The main 
inconsistence between these two policy approaches is within the aspect of economic integration 
and free trade. Modernisation and neo-Liberalism argue that the developing countries should 
enter a system of liberal economies and free world trade in order to generate a development 
process. However, in terms of agriculture EU does not show any commitment to these principles 
since its policy on this area is heavily protectionistic. Thus the two approaches collide when on 
the one hand a theoretical approach to development is based on liberal economies and free trade 
and on the other hand EU bases its agricultural policy on the direct opposite theoretical ap-
proach. Furthermore, the protectionist approach also contradicts the post-Imperialist and neo-
Marxist approach, which EU development policy also is based on. Here the notion on reducing 
poverty in the developing countries is counteracted by the protection of EU agricultural markets. 
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By protecting its own markets, EU also harms production possibilities in the developing coun-
tries and thereby also eliminates means of income.  
 
In fact the only theoretical approaches that seem to be somewhat corresponding with each other 
are the classic liberal approach of the agricultural policy and the Modernisation/neo-Liberal ap-
proach found in the development policy. The main reason for this correspondence is a common 
understanding and belief that the principles of liberalism generate economic growth and that the 
developing countries therefore as soon as possible should adopt western liberal economies. Since 
the liberal principles have generated development in the western world, the argument is that this 
will also be the case for the developing countries. In conclusion the EU policies on agriculture 
and development can be considered not only to have internal inconsistencies due to different 
theoretical approaches, but there are also inconsistencies the two policies in between. A further 





7. Policy analysis 
The following sections analyse different political aspects of EU agricultural and development 
policies. The first aspect to be analysed is the nature of the policies, which determines certain 
policy processes. The following section analyses the policy order and concludes how different 
orders can influence the policy processes. The third section identifies political issues and instru-
ments in the EU agricultural and development policies and takes these aspects to a further policy 
analysis of approaches, values and aims behind the policies. On the basis of the previous sec-
tions, section four analyses how different actors can influence the policy formation through dif-
ferent processes. Finally, the last section examines different voting procedures and their influ-
ence on the outcome of the policy making. The basis for the text analysis in these sections is the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. This version, which 
is the original Treaty of Rome amended by the Treaties of Nice and Amsterdam, is the present 
basis for the different EU policies.225 A copy of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community can be found in the annex. 
 
7.1 Analysis of policy nature 
This section uses Hix’s theory about the five types of EU policies in order to analyse what types 
of policy nature EU agricultural and development policies are, what they consist of, how they are 
formed and what consequences this has. 
 
7.1.1 Agricultural policy 
EU agricultural policy is based on the ideas of increasing productivity in order to secure a rea-
sonable living for the farmers, to stabilise the markets, to secure food supply and to ensure fair 
prices on farmer products.226 These elements all encompass the description of a redistributive 
policy elaborated by Richard Musgrave227 consisting of allocation, redistribution and stabilisa-
tion. Hix bases his definition of redistributive policies on Musgrave’s work and therefore consid-
ers the ideas about securing food supply and keeping prices at a fair level to relate to allocation; 
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The idea to secure a reasonable living standard for farmers is an element of redistribution and 
finally increase of productivity and stabilisation of markets derive from the concept of stabilisa-
tion.228 Therefore EU agricultural policy can rightfully be considered to be of a redistributive 
nature. Not only is EU agricultural policy of a redistributive nature, it is also the largest area of 
EU expenditure. The EU budget in 2004 showed that expenses concerning agriculture reached 
45,693 million Euros out of a total budget of 111,300 million Euros, which represent more than 
40% of the budget. In comparison the second largest EU expenditure area, which are structural 
arrangements, accounts for 30,822 million Euros representing less than 30%.229 
 
As mentioned in section 6 the purposes of the EU agricultural policy were sought fulfilled 
through various redistributive initiatives such as removal of internal trade barriers to ensure the 
free flow of agricultural goods between the member states, priority of EU products over non-EU 
products, and common EU expenditure of the agricultural policy. This resulted in an agreement 
between the member states to implement redistributive mechanisms in the agricultural policy.230 
These mechanisms are: Protection of low internal prices by introducing a system of buying sur-
plus goods from farmers when prices dropped below a common EU price guaranteed to the 
farmers, protection against low import prices by means of import quotas on agricultural products 
in cases of the price falling below the world market price and finally, to implement subsidies to 
achieve a low export price by creating a system of refund for export goods when prices fall be-
low the world market level.231  These mechanisms of redistribution have resulted in a EU agricul-
tural policy that indirectly supports EU farmers both by means of increasing prices for imported 
agricultural goods; which keeps non-EU products out of the European market, and at the same 
time lowering prices for export of agricultural products. Since the EU agricultural policy is a 
redistributive policy this means that the expenditures are paid for by the EU budget, resulting in 
EU taxpayers both having to pay for the funding via EU and to pay for the EU products that are 
more expensive than the imported agricultural goods would have been, had there been no protec-
tion of EU farmers. One of the main reasons for these redistributive mechanisms to be imple-
mented was the fact that farming was considered a historical and important industry by many 
member states combined with the wish to maintain an attachment to rural society.232 
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Another problem that occurred with the EU agricultural policy was an overproduction of food 
due to the guaranteed prices. Farmers were no longer dependent on a demand for their products 
and thus did not coordinate their production with the market. The result of this was wine lakes, 
grain and butter mountains that needed to be stored at the expense of the EU. Furthermore the 
revenues of the EU funding to farmers went to large-scale farmers because they were able to 
produce more, whereas the small-scale farmer did not receive the same financial aid. This led to 
an industrialisation of the EU farmers, where large-scale production is more lucrative than small-
scale farming, leading to an extinction of small-scale farmers. So in the light of the historic ar-
gument of maintaining a rural society, the results of the agricultural policy seemed to be some-
what different than the original visions. 
 
In relation to the introduction of import quotas on farming goods and the export subsidies this 
also had different consequences than anticipated. The import quotas created disputes in relation 
to world trade and more or less prevented global trade with agricultural goods from being free 
and furthermore the EU export subsidies were destroying agricultural markets in the developing 
countries due to the low prices on EU products created by the subsidies. 
 
Being well aware of the budgetary and the production related problems that the agricultural pol-
icy created EU introduced several reform programmes that were meant to solve some of these 
issues. Since the beginning of the 1990s EU has through the MacSherry233 and the Fischler234 
programmes reformed its agricultural policy so it no longer guarantees prices for all products 
(e.g. beef and cereal prices were reduced by respectively 29% and 15%)235 Also the indirect in-
come support to farmers was replaced by a system of direct income support to compensate for 
price reductions in some sectors. This was supported by a system of set-aside support, where 
farmers in some sectors were paid to leave their land fallow in order not to create overproduc-
tion. Finally, a new type of financial aid was introduced to support rural development and 
thereby maintain the rural society. 
 
As a result of the MacSherry and the Fischler plans EU agricultural policy is now more focussed 
on its redistributive functions than allocation and stabilisation. This means that prices for agricul-
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tural products are increasingly based on the free market and the support programmes are funded 
via taxation and not increasing prices. Furthermore, the support programmes are based on a 
means testing in order to estimate how farmers can qualify for welfare subsidies.236 This means 
that small-scale farmers can benefit from EU subsidies whereas large-scale farmers are forced to 
coordinate production to market and demands. 
 
However, the reforms were not able to introduce any changes to the fact that EU taxpayers are 
faced with double expenditure in terms of agricultural products. The support programmes are 
still funded by the EU, meaning the taxpayers, and the consumers are still faced with regulated 
prices on agricultural products. 
 
7.1.2 Redistributive policy processes 
The EU agricultural policy is of redistributive nature, which means that the central issues of the 
policy are concerned with budgetary planning for redistribution of wealth. The fact that overall 
budgetary and financial decisions in almost every case are placed in the hands of the Council, the 
central decision making organ in terms of EU agricultural policy is the Council of Agriculture 
Ministers. Almost all decisions in relation to the EU agricultural policy are taken within this fo-
rum. Only in extreme budgetary questions does the Council of Finance Ministers or the Council 
of Heads of States intervene. This means that the Council of Agriculture Ministers have more or 
less free hands to decide on the policies it find most convenient. Due to the fact that a large ma-
jority of the agriculture ministers represents national parties that are traditionally supported by 
farmers and farming groups (e.g. Irish Fianna Fail, French Gaullist, Italian Christian Democrats 
and Bavarian Christian Social Union) or represent rural regions such as Bavaria, rural Spain and 
France, East Anglia and Jutland237 this often results in a  lack of will to introduce major reforms 
that could drastically change the conditions for EU farmers.  
 
Furthermore, since the agricultural policy is a redistributive policy the Council of Agriculture 
Ministers is supported by the Commission’s Special Committee of Agriculture staffed with offi-
cials from the national agriculture ministries. This is contrary to usual Committee of Permanent 





Representatives, which is staffed with political EU diplomats.238 Along with the fact that the EU 
Commissioner of agriculture traditionally represents a political party supported by farmers and 
comes from a farming member state, this setting of policy actors in the making of the redistribu-
tive agricultural EU policy ensures that farming countries seek to wield influence on the com-
mon policy. Critics of the EU agricultural policy often refer to this phenomenon as the iron tri-
angle meaning that EU agricultural policy is made by national agriculture ministers, agriculture 
officials in the Commission and European-level farming interests. This iron triangle becomes 
impossible to penetrate for outside parties such as the Parliament or other stakeholders since all 
three parties defend and support the other triangle-parties’ interest: agriculture ministers wish to 
maintain their autonomy in terms of decision power without interference from the Council of 
Finance Ministers or heads of state. The Special Committee seeks to maintain the centrality of 
the agricultural policy and thereby the Committee as a central actor. The farming interest groups 
also have no incentive to break the iron triangle since this is the main channel for influence on 
the policy.   
 
However, the iron triangle seems to be under pressure due to social and economic changes in 
Europe through the last 40 years, resulting in a situation where agriculture is of less importance 
to national economy, employment, and to rural urbanisation.239 As an example the percentage of 
the European labour force employed in agriculture declined from over 20% to less than 10% and 
in terms of national income from over 10% to less than 3% in the years 1950 through 1990.240 
This decline in agricultural interest among European voters has led to a change of focus for po-
litical parties traditionally supported by farmers. In the 1990s it was estimated that in most mem-
ber states about 4% of the voters were active farmers and therefore these political parties are now 
focusing on urban middleclass voters, who are the ones that are paying for the agricultural pol-
icy. This shift of focus in voters generated a shift of focus in policy. Therefore the recent years 
has shown tendencies towards agricultural policy becoming of more and more secondary status 
and thus creating a political demand for further negotiations of reforms.241 
 
Nevertheless, the iron triangle is still dominating in agricultural policy making with the other EU 
institutions as co-players. Even though all three EU institutions are involved in the policy proc-







esses concerning the EU agricultural policy, the European Parliament seems to be set aside be-
cause the procedure of consultation is chosen. Section 7.4 elaborates more on the concrete results 
of this particular procedure, but it is without a doubt that the European Parliament is more or less 
paralysed when it comes to influencing the agricultural policy. This ensures that the Council of 
Agriculture Ministers are not forced to consider any other issues than protecting EU farming, and 
thus have practically free hands to do so, within an overall budgetary frame.  
 
7.1.3 Development policy 
The foreign policies of the EU are divided into two main areas; external political relations and 
external economic policy. External political relations relate to foreign and security policy and 
defence policy, whereas external economic policies are concerned with trade, development and 
humanitarian aid. According to Hix’s classification of policy nature, EU development policy can 
be considered an external economic policy because it focuses on the EU’s foreign economic rela-
tions in terms of development through trade, aid programmes and other initiatives of economic 
nature. 
 
EU development policy consists of four main focus areas. The first is to create sustainable eco-
nomic and social development for the developing countries. Secondly, to primarily focus on the 
countries that are doing worst. “Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, 
(…) shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, 
and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them.”242 
 
The third area of focus relates to ensuring a harmonic and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy and finally the fourth focus is concerned with fight against 
poverty in the developing world. “(…) the smooth and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy,” and ”the campaign against poverty in the developing coun-
tries.” 243 
 
Another aspect of the EU development policy that is important to underline is the fact that the 
EU policy is only meant as a supplement to the national policies on development: “Community 
                                                 




policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies 
pursued by the Member States, (…).” 244 For some member states this has resulted in a focus on 
a Euro-Mediterranean partnership that seeks to increase trade with non-EU states situated around 
the Mediterranean and also a focus on partnerships with former colonies. This approached is led 
by some of the former colonial powers such as France, Spain, Portugal and UK. The general idea 
in these partnerships is that EU is willing to trade with these states on the conditions that they 
fulfil certain demands of human rights and market acces. This has especially been the case with 
countries such as Morocco and other Northern African countries. This approach is led by EU 
Mediterranean member states that have a special interest in engaging in trade and development 
partnerships with non-EU Mediterranean states, and thus act according to own interests.245 This 
discussion is further elaborated on in section 7.2.2. 
 
7.1.4 External economic policy processes 
As seen above the EU policy on development is meant to be a supplement to the member states’ 
national development policies. However, EU has expressed a wish that the member states coor-
dinate their development policies through different forums, preventing any direct conflicts of 
interest among EU member states: “The Community and the Member States shall coordinate 
their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid pro-
grammes,(…).” 246  
 
Still the very broad and loose definition of the EU development policy and foreign policy in gen-
eral places the main responsibility for acting with the member states and thus allows the member 
states to act more or less according to own interests. An example of lack of coherence within EU 
development policy is the fact that the member states do not follow the UN standards defined by 
the Millennium Development Goals for how large a percentage of the GDP that must be allo-
cated to development, even though these standards are ratified by EU.247 This lack of coherence 
is not so much due to a certain policy process when making development policy in the EU; rather 
it is a consequence of a more liberal approach to supranational cooperation, where the individual 
country is considered to be the best actor for executing development policy. Nevertheless EU has 
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established some supranational institutions that are meant to assist the member states in their 
execution of development policy; these are institutions such as European Investment Bank, the 
Development Directorate General and the EP Committee on development. However, these insti-
tutions are only practically involved in execution of the development policy in few cases. In the 
development programmes led by EU these institutions mostly act as financial supports and coun-
selling on the basis on their relations with representatives of the developing countries that are 
accredited to EU. (See section 7.4).  
The final outcome of this approach to development policy is that member states act according to 
own interest and thus seek to benefit from individual partnerships in their execution of develop-
ment policy. The liberal approach to supranational cooperation placing the individual member 
state as a central actor prevents strong centralised policy execution. This results in an EU devel-
opment policy that is not necessarily coherent since a central EU organ only vaguely defines it. 
The fact that a central execution of EU development policy is not in focus opens up for the pos-
sibilities of member states pursuing own interest through their individual development policy. 
The possibility of pursuing own interests generates a wish for a decentralised EU development 
policy. One of the reasons why member states do not wish for a central policy in this area is that 
national states historically have been very reluctant to engage in political integration on matters 
of foreign policy.248 Therefore the EU has been equally reluctant to emphasise such political in-
tegration. In result this leads to a situation of decentralised development policy. 
 
EU agricultural and development policies can be placed in two different political categories: re-
spectively redistributive and external economic policies. Apart from the obvious content of the 
policies, the main differences between these two policy natures are found in the policy processes 
attached to these policy natures. Agricultural policy processes are due to their redistributive na-
ture placed at a central EU level with the Council of Agriculture Ministers as the central decision 
organ along with the Commissioner of Agriculture and special committees. On the other hand 
development policy is based on decentralised policy processes because of its foreign policy char-
acter. The main conclusion to draw from section 7.1 is therefore that due to different policy na-
tures, different policy processes are in play; both centralised and decentralised policy processes. 
These differences in approaches to policy processes can be considered a part of the explanation 
why there seems to be a lack of coherence between the two policy areas. 
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7.2 Analysis of policy order 
This section takes a closer look at Chari and Kritzinger’s definition of first and second order EU 
policies. Based on the theory explained in section 4.3.3 EU agricultural and development poli-
cies are placed within these definitions, and afterwards the meanings of the different policy or-
ders is analysed. Chari and Kritzinger define first order policies to concern: single market poli-
cies, competition, monetary, and agricultural policies.249 Second order policies consist of: social, 
immigration, and foreign policies (with the exception of security policy, which has its own order, 
since it is always of top priority).250 
 
7.2.1 Agricultural policy 
Based on the work of Chari and Kritzinger EU agricultural policy can be considered to be of first 
order. This means that when it comes to forming policy on agriculture within EU, reaching con-
sensus on a supranational level is of high priority. Historically EU agricultural policy was the 
first supranational policy that sought to establish a common stand within the EU in order to pro-
tect farming and farmers. Today EU agricultural policy is still placed in a supranational context, 
where the aim is to create common rules and legislation for farmers in the EU and thus according 
to the formulation of the policy to strengthen the position both internally and externally for farm-
ers.  
 
The fact that EU agricultural policy is a first order policy with a focus on supranationalism also 
means that EU overtakes the role as the central political actor from the member states. Focus is 
not on the needs of the individual member states, but on a common best for the EU farmers. The 
high importance of a first order policy means that it is considered that European integration on 
this specific political area is important to develop and increase. This has to be seen in relation to 
the power balance between USA, Japan and EU.251 A common and well-grounded EU agricul-
tural policy is necessary in order to be internationally competitive. Only by securing the internal 
markets and protecting itself against external markets can EU agriculture be competitive and thus 
also secure EU hegemony. Therefore the emphasis is put on a common policy that can ensure a 
                                                 





positive-sum game for EU farmers instead of diversified policies that are considered to be a 
negative-sum game. 
 
Placing EU agricultural policy on a supranational level means that the Commission and the 
Council of Agriculture Ministers become the central policy actors. However, it is important to 
underline that even though the Council of Agriculture Ministers represents a supranational po-
litical organ, national interests can still play a significant role in the negotiation of agricultural 
policy. In contrast to EU development policy, which is only vaguely defined by some overall 
frames, EU agricultural policy is clearly defined and thus has a central political basis on which 
the EU agriculture ministers can work from. This phenomenon is a clear example of how EU has 
overtaken a political area from the national governments through high priority of political inte-
gration. Through these priorities EU has put agricultural policy on a supranational level and 
more or less nullified the role of the national governments. 
 
In terms of policy processes of the EU agricultural policy the supranational setting results in the 
Council of Agriculture Ministers being the central decision maker with the Commission as the 
political initiator. The fact that the Council seeks to decide through consensus of all members has 
resulted in a state of stalling where no major reforms or amendments can be agreed. The consen-
sus approach opens up for the possibility of vetoing suggestions and thus allows the member 
states that have an interest in protecting the farming industries to veto reforms. The outcome is 
that no major reforms are carried out and only small adjustments are agreed.  
 
According to Chari and Kritzinger there is yet another aspect of first order policies that needs to 
be elaborated on. Based on their work on policy orders it can be discussed whether first order 
policies can be said to benefit capital actors and therefore experience this state of stalling. Chari 
and Kritzinger hypothesise that the reason why some policies have become of first order with a 
high emphasis on supranationalism and political integration is that this is in the interest of pow-
erful capital actors - in this case farming organisations, large landowners and etc. However, as 
section 7.4 elaborates further on, it can be discussed to what extent farming organisations politi-
cally pressurise EU politicians. Nevertheless, an argument for this hypothesis can be found in the 
fact that agriculture ministers and the Commissioner of agriculture represent political parties that 
were traditionally supported by farmers and farmer organisations. This could suggest that one of 
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the reasons that EU agricultural policy was originally considered to be of first policy order can 
be seen in the relationship between EU politicians and national voters. At the time when the 
Treaty was originally signed, agriculture had economic, social and employment related impor-
tance, and therefore farmers and farmers’ organisations were indeed important capital actors and 
in order to satisfy their demands, EU policy on agriculture needed to be beneficial to these capi-
tal actors. Even though agriculture does not have the same socio-economic importance as earlier, 
there are still important capital actors to include in the EU policy processes. Section 7.4 elabo-
rates further on these actors. 
 
Therefore the EU agricultural policy as a first order policy can be considered to be a policy based 
heavily on supranational principles with the Council and the Commissioner as the central actors. 
Furthermore, since the Council of Agriculture Ministers is the central decision maker and since 
the Council bases most decision on consensus, farming member states have the possibility to 
generate a situation where no drastic reforms are introduced. Finally, the fact that the agricultural 
policy area holds several issues that are of interest to important capital actors can still have an 
impact on the policy making. 
 
7.2.2 Development policy  
In contrast to agricultural policy Chari and Kritzinger consider EU development policy to be a 
second order policy. The characteristics of a second order policy as development policy are 
manifested in the fact that EU acts in a decentralised manner, that ensures that the national gov-
ernments remain sovereign. In second order policy areas such as social, immigration and foreign 
policies the political power is still placed in the national government and member states are gen-
erally reluctant to transfer political power to the EU due to a mistrust in EU political integration 
of these areas.252 This results in a weak definition of EU policy on these areas, and thus enforces 
the national sovereignty.   
 
Examples of disintegration in relation to foreign EU policy was clearly seen in the case of the 
recent Iraq invasion, where some EU member states such as UK, Spain, Denmark and Italy pur-
sued military actions in Iraq whereas France and Germany were strongly opposed to a such in-




tervention. Also in the case of immigration policy, EU is split. Despite some overall set of EU 
legislation, the individual member states have to a large extent the possibility of controlling na-
tional immigration.253 
 
In the light of this it seems natural that in the question of negotiating development policy EU 
does not offer a central defined policy, but merely a set of overall frames in order to fulfil de-
mands of WTO, OECD, the World Bank and other development institutions. The agreements of 
the different development initiatives such as the rounds of Uruguay and Doha and the UN mil-
lennium goals are represented in central EU legislation, but only as an overall political frame for 
the member states’ development policy, which of course has to be executed within the EU 
frames. This is explicitly expressed in article 177, paragraph 3 of the treaty:  ”The Community 
and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives 
they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international or-
ganisations.”254 
 
However, as concluded in section 7.1.4 the EU development policy is vaguely defined and there-
fore allows member states to act according to own political and economic interests as long as 
their policy can fit under the EU development frame. This is seen in the case of France, who is 
very focussed on development in the North African states, which are mostly former French colo-
nies. This particular interest in the former colonies is partly based on an economic interest to 
develop neighbouring markets that have a historical, cultural and linguistic connection to 
France.255 In addition there is a more political reason for focussing on these states, since France 
is experiencing heavy immigration from its former colonies, especially the North African colo-
nies. There is both a domestic political pressure to improve conditions in these states as a result 
of some sort of political responsibility, and there is a wish for decreasing immigration to France 
from these states by supporting local development.256 
 
This example shows how EU development policy is based on the ideas of intergovernmentalism, 
where national states cooperate and to a certain extent coordinate their development policies, but 
without the existence of a centralised policy or a central policy actor. Even though EU develop-
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ment policy is decided by the Council of foreign ministers and heads of states and thus should 
reflect a common EU view, this is not always the case. One of the reasons, which is elaborated 
on in section 7.4 is that since development policy is categorised as foreign policy, the Commis-
sion does not have monopoly for initiating legislation as it is the case in most other policy areas. 
This creates the state of intergovernmentalism where nation states individually can choose to act 
within a broad frame of the EU development policy. Execution of development policy is in the 
hands of the national governments with the exception of a few EU conducted development pro-
grammes. 
 
EU development policy as a second order policy is based on the principles of intergovernmental-
ism and therefore it does not include any capital actors in the negotiation processes. This means 
that the EU institutions (mostly the Council) and the national governments form the development 
policy. The lack of interest from capital actors in the formation of this policy, based on the rea-
son that EU development policy cannot benefit these capital actors, explains why they are not 
involved in the policy process. The fact there are no external actors like development organisa-
tions that can economically benefit from influencing the outcome of the EU policy is also a rea-
son why it is possible to base the development policy on intergovernmentalism and thus increase 
national sovereignty by letting the individual member states define their own development pol-
icy. 
 
In conclusion EU agricultural and development policies can be placed within two different insti-
tutional paradigms. Agricultural policy is based on supranationalism where the Council is the 
central decision maker. The supranational approach in relation to the agricultural policy is based 
on a strong political integration where power is transferred from the member states to the EU. 
This process of political integration can be seen as a result of historic socio-economic impor-
tance of agriculture in Europe, which to a certain extent still exists today. This historic and partly 
present importance that agriculture is given along with the existence of powerful capital actors 
ensure that agriculture remains of first policy order with the EU as the central political actor.  
 
In contrast EU development policy is based on the institutional setting of intergovernmentalism 
where the individual member state is considered to be the central actor. There is no attempt from 
EU to seek political integration in the field of development policy and traditionally member 
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states are reluctant to transfer power to EU relating to foreign matters. This situation and the fact 
that there are no important capital actors that can benefit from influencing development policy 
make development policy of second policy order and therefore in terms of priority less important 
than agricultural policy. In other words, priority is given to agricultural policy, and therefore the 
policy is not concerned with any consequences it might have on other policies. Development 
policy on the other hand needs to take account of the agricultural policy since it has lower prior-
ity and therefore is politically subjected to the consequences of the agricultural policy. 
 
7.3 Analysis of policy formation processes 
This section takes a closer look at the processes behind the formation of EU agricultural and de-
velopment policies. Based on Spicker’s policy cycle, it analyses the first three steps in the cycle 
consisting of: identifying issues, where an analysis of the focus of the policies is conducted. Sec-
ondly it examines the policy instruments by an analysis of which political instruments that are 
used to execute the policies, and finally it presents a policy analysis of the aims and values that 
lie behind the two policies. The policy cycle’s elements concerning consultation and decision are 
analysed in section 7.4 and 7.5. However, these analyses are not directly based on Spicker’s the-
ory, but on theory containing the same elements. The elements concerning coordination, imple-
mentation and evaluation are not elaborated on in this thesis. (See section 3.3.2). 
 
7.3.1 Agricultural policy 
This first section examines the aspects or problems that the EU agricultural policy tries to solve 
by identifying and analysing the elements stated in the EU legislation concerning agricultural 
policy. Hereafter the section analyses what political instruments the treaty introduces as a means 
to solve these problems. Finally, these two dimensions are concluded on in an analysis of under-
lying values and aims of the EU agricultural policy. 
 
Identifying issues 
The main issues of the EU agricultural policy are clearly stated in the Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, part three, title two, articles 32 through 38.257 
This treaty is the original Treaty of Rome including the amendments and supplements that have 
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been introduced since then through the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice in 1997 and 2001. Nev-
ertheless the paragraphs stated in the original Treaty of Rome remain unchanged and therefore 
still form the basis for the EU agricultural policy. This means that even though paragraphs con-
cerning other policy issues such as environment, social and economic integration in the EU legis-
lation258 have been introduced, the paragraphs in the Treaty of Rome are still the core of the EU 
agricultural policy. 
 
Article 33, part 1, paragraphs a through e of the treaty state that there are five main focuses of the 
agricultural policy:259  
 
a. to increase agricultural productivity, by promoting technical progress and ensur-
ing rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the 
factors of production, particularly labour; 
 
b. to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
 
c. to stabilise markets; 
 
d. to ensure the availability of supply; 
 
e. and to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
The political issues stated in these five paragraphs point in different directions. The first issue is 
concerned with development and maximum benefit from the resources on hand. This point of 
view relates to the problems that were present for the farming industries at the time of the forma-
tion of the treaty (1957). It was formed at a time when European agriculture was faced with 
heavy demands to increase productivity in order to be competitive. The farming industry was 
considered to be very important to Europe, partially because most of the European production 
industries still suffered from the aftermath of the Second World War, but also due to a historical 
attachment to farming. Farming was considered to be an industry where Europe had advantages 
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in relation to the rest of the world, due to a long history of farming and relative high quality of 
products. Therefore it was considered of utmost importance to support the European farmers by 
emphasising the technological development and thus gain optimal benefit from the resources in 
terms of land and labour with the result of increase in productivity. 
 
The second paragraph that focuses on securing a fair living standard for farmers, can be seen as 
an attempt of economic modernisation of the European societies, where small farmers’ loyalty 
were attached to the rebuilding of democracy in Europe.260 The idea was based on a transfer of 
welfare functions from the national governments to a European level that should secure a central 
welfare organ that were not subject to national policy, economy or conflicts and therefore could 
gain the trust of the European farmers. This was of particular interest since the farmers repre-
sented a large percentage of the total labour force in the member states, and also because farming 
still attributed to a great extent to the overall European economy in the late 1950s. This view is 
expressed in the treaty’s article 33, part 2, paragraph c: “ (…) the fact that in the Member States 
agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a whole.” 261 However, in 
relation to other industries farmers did not earn as much money as a person employed in other 
sectors. The income of farmers was in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Luxembourg and 
Germany equivalent to respectively 74%, 61%, 51%, 44%, 35%, and 34% of that of a person 
working in other sectors.262 
 
Therefore it was crucial to form an agricultural policy that aimed at redistributing wealth within 
the various industries in order to secure the farming industry and thus gain the farmers’ support 
for further European integration.  
 
The third aspect that refers to stabilising agricultural markets is closely related to the first para-
graph about increasing productivity. The central issue is to create and stabilise the European ag-
ricultural markets by using a demand-supply management to secure agricultural employment, 
increase productivity and thereby also control inflation within the member states.263 A stable 
market will provide secure and beneficial conditions for the farmers since they are no longer 
subject to uncontrollable market conditions in one member state, but instead can rely on a solid 
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and stable European market with little or no fluctuations. The insurance of a stable European 
agricultural market will also be beneficial to European farmers in terms of outside competition; 
whereas other farmers need to adapt to changing conditions in their homeland, European farmers 
are guaranteed favourable local market conditions and are therefore also able to export at a lower 
cost since production is more stable and not dependent on positive fluctuations. So all in all the 
idea of stabilising the European agricultural markets is a means of indirectly supporting technical 
and economic developments in the European farming industry. 
 
The fourth paragraph about ensuring the availability of supply of agricultural products is like the 
first paragraphs very much a product of its time. In 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, 
Europe had just experienced shortage of almost all kinds of food due to the Second World War. 
Therefore a political focus on securing the farming industry was more or less based on the neces-
sity of being self-sufficient of agricultural products. Farming was considered a very important 
industry that needed to be taken care of and supported so that people could get food both on a 
daily basis and in case of crisis. It was thought to be of strategic importance to maintain a pro-
ductive farming industry in Europe in order to become self-sufficient and not dependent on for-
eign producers. 
 
The final paragraph is concerned with ensuring consumers reasonable prices for agricultural 
products. In the light of the second paragraph about securing a fair living standard and increasing 
the farmers’ income this paragraph seems to be somewhat contradictive in its aims. How can one 
increase income for farmers and still ensure fair prices for farming products? The answer lies 
within the mechanisms of stabilising the markets. If there is a stable European market, where 
production is coordinated with demand, the farmers are not forced to dump their products on the 
market in case of overproduction. However, consumers can never be faced with agricultural 
products at the lowest prices, since the market is always stable. So whether or not the phrasing of 
“reasonable prices” refers to lowest prices is not discussable since this is never the case. On the 
other hand, consumers are also generally ensured from paying heavy overprices due to higher 
demand than supply. This means that consumers are ensured a medium price that will never be-
come the lowest price possible, but also not likely to become the highest price possible. So the 
political issue here is a two-faced aspect, where legislation on one hand has a welfare function 
that secures a steady income for farmers by not allowing prices to drop under a certain level, and 
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on the other hand has an economic aspect by letting consumers pay a higher price than the lowest 
possible, and thus help financing the income support of the farmers. 
 
Policy instruments 
In relation to the above aims of the EU agricultural policy, the Treaty also states what political 
instruments can be used to execute the policy. These policy instruments are found in the treaty’s 
third part, section two, articles 34 and 35. The two articles contain two main policy instruments; 
common organisation of the agricultural markets and support to initiatives that can benefit the 
agricultural industry. 
 
Article 34, part 1 states that in order to reach the goals presented in article 33, a common organi-
sation of the European agricultural markets is necessary and depending on the nature of the 
products, this organisation can according to article 34, part 1, paragraphs a through c take any of 
the following forms:264 
 
a. common rules on competition; 
 
b. compulsory coordination of the various national market organisations; 
 
c. a European market organisation. 
 
The instruments referred to in this paragraph relates to a regulation of the European market for 
agricultural products. The purpose is to support the farmers by introducing common compulsory 
market organisations that will ensure that European farmers do not compete with each other, but 
in stead gain similar market conditions in all member states. The fact that the treaty in article 34, 
part 2 states that the common organisation “(…) shall exclude any discrimination between pro-
ducers or consumers within the Community” 265 reveals an approach based only on internal 
European concerns and not external consequences of the policy. Emphasis is only on supporting 
the European farmers and increase market possibilities for them, without any concern of effects 
on non-member states’ farming industries. 
 
                                                 




Paragraphs a through c in part 1 of article 34 suggest a strong centralisation of the market organi-
sations by introducing a European market organisation. Paragraph b points to a strong suprana-
tional approach since the member states are forced to coordinate the market organisations and 
thereby engage in a process of transferring power from national governments to the European 
Community. 
 
Another important aspect concerning the political instruments at hand for executing the agricul-
tural policy is stated in part 2 of article 34. This part suggests that all means necessary to reach 
the goals stated in article 33 are allowed. ”The common organisation (…) may include all meas-
ures required to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, in particular regulation of prices, aids 
for the production and marketing of the various products, storage and carryover arrangements 
and common machinery for stabilising imports or exports.”266 This means that in order to protect 
European farming in terms of prices, production and export, all political instruments for regulat-
ing the agricultural market are allowed, especially price protection and subsidies that can en-
hance production and sales. It is obvious that protectionism by means of market regulations and 
direct economic support are the two main principles behind the political instruments concerning 
the market organisations. 
 
In contrast to the direct financial and protectionist instruments stated in article 34, article 35 is 
more concerned with an indirect support of the farming industry through various development 
initiatives. According to paragraphs a and b in this article the initiatives include: 267 
 
a. an effective coordination of efforts in the spheres of vocational training, of re-
search and of the dissemination of agricultural knowledge; this may include joint financ-
ing of projects or institutions; 
 
b. joint measures to promote consumption of certain products. 
 
Article 35 states another type of policy instruments seeking to attain the aims of agricultural pol-
icy, which are concerned with establishing education and research facilities that can develop 
European agriculture and thereby indirectly increase its market possibilities. However, not only 





does this article suggest that the Community initiates education and research facilities, but also 
that these facilities are funded from central hold, and that this central unit also functions as a 
central organ for coordination of the various development efforts and as a central knowledge 
bank for European agriculture. The key aspect in these two paragraphs is joint action in Euro-
pean agriculture. This supports the supranational approach seen above, and underlines the impor-




The analyses of the EU agricultural policy show that there are various values and aims behind 
the policy. The analysis in the section about identifying political issues of the policy points to a 
liberal approach based on Smith and Ricardo’s theories about advantages. (See section 4.1.2) 
The policy is focussed on developing technology, benefiting maximum from resources, and sta-
bilising markets all in order to increase productivity and thus become more competitive. At the 
time of the formulation of the policy, farming was considered an area where Europe had advan-
tages in relation to world farming. Therefore the idea was that by developing the farming indus-
try and thereby benefit from the advantages the wealth of Europe would also be increased. This 
increase of wealth should in first case benefit the farmers through a guarantee of prices and sta-
ble markets, but in second case it should also benefit the consumers in terms of fair prices and 
insurance of food supply. So the basic underlying aim behind this part of the policy is to benefit 
economically from the production advantages and then introduce a sort of welfare management 
led by the EU in order to distribute wealth.  
 
The question is whether this is still the case for European farming. Production costs, land quality 
and resources are by some experts considered to be uncompetitive compared to e.g. production 
in Africa, Asia or South America.268 If there are no longer any production advantages of Euro-
pean farming, then there will be no economic surplus from the agricultural industry to increase 
wealth in Europe. It seems that the approach of benefiting from production advantages is turned 
up side down and has a contrary effect on the economic outcome. If European farming is no 
longer competitive, then Smith and Ricardo argue that this production should be abandoned, and 
instead EU should focus on production where it actually possesses advantages. Smith and Ri-
                                                 
268 Korsgaard: 2004 
 102
 
cardo’s theories precisely argue that maintaining production with no advantages will only have a 
negative impact on the economy. So the key issue here seems to be a policy that is based on an 
economic, social and demographic situation that created advantages for European farming in the 
1950s and 1960s, but is not representative of the present situation. 
 
Another aspect in relation to the welfare function of the policy was to ensure political support 
from farmers. In 1957 the political support from the farmers was crucial for the further political 
integration of the EU. Therefore the financial support to farmers can also be explained by politi-
cal strategy. However, as section 7.1.2 illustrates, the importance of political support from farm-
ers has diminished drastically through the last fifty years. The fact that political parties tradition-
ally supported by farmers now seek support from the urban middleclass also suggests that the 
incentive to maintain financial support to farmers as a political strategy is gone, because the ur-
ban middleclass is more concerned with prices and quality of food production. Therefore the 
political strategy of supporting the farmers also seems to be a product of the time when the treaty 
was signed in 1957. 
 
Supranationalism is also one of the clear aims of the EU agricultural policy. In the light of the 
political strategy of gaining farmers’ support, there was a need for building a strong coherent 
European policy on agriculture. Otherwise farmers could have experienced national fluctuations 
that would have affected their support to European integration negatively. The concept of supra-
nationalism is in this case also the reason why the agricultural policy is only concerned with in-
ternal issues, and not external issues aside from export possibilities and import control. The su-
pranational agricultural policy has ensured that conditions for European farmers are equal and 
that these conditions are favourable. This prevents any external considerations.  
 
The EU agricultural policy only deals with one external aspect and that is to protect its own 
farming industry against outside competition. As concluded in section 6.2 about the theoretical 
classification of the EU agricultural policy the view on protectionism could not have been stated 
more clearly than in article 34, part 2: “The common organisation (…) may include all measures 
required to attain the objectives set out in Article 33(…).” In other words protectionism in what 
ever form necessary is allowed as long as it aims at fulfilling the objectives of the policy. How-
ever, international organisations such as WTO and UN have restricted the use of protectionist 
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measures, nevertheless, the phrasing of the EU legislation is a clear statement of a wish to pro-
tect its own farming industry by all means. 
 
In conclusion the EU agricultural policy is based on the idea of increasing wealth by supporting 
and developing its production advantages in the farming industry and at the same time protecting 
its farming industry against cheap foreign products. In terms of theoretical approach it looks like 
EU is sitting between two chairs when on the one side there is an approach based on liberalism 
in terms of free market trade and competition advantages, and on the other side protectionist 
measures ensure that these advantages are artificially upheld even though they might not exist 
any longer. It can seem as a paradox when the ideas of generating economic wealth by focusing 
on production where EU has advantages, become EU’s major source of expenditure. European 
agriculture today does not seem to generate economic growth to the national economies to the 
same extent as it did earlier. But instead of acknowledging this problem and seek other produc-
tion forms, which might have advantages, EU seems to artificially maintain production advan-
tages by the use of protectionist measures, which are very costly.  
  
7.3.2 Development policy 
The development policy of EU is also stated in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community and like the agricultural policy development policy also remains in 
its original phrasing from the Treaty of Rome despite amendments and supplements by the Trea-
ties of Amsterdam and Nice. The EU development policy is stated in the treaty’s part three, title 
20, articles 177 through 181. This analysis follows the same structure as the analysis of the EU 
agricultural policy: first section analyses the political key issues of the policy; second section 
analyses the policy instruments for executing the policy and finally the last section concludes on 
the overall aims and values behind the policy. 
 
Identifying issues 
The key elements of the EU development policy are stated in article 177 of the treaty. The policy 
is based on three main focus areas, which are expressed in the following three paragraphs:269 
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1. the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and 
more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; 
 
2. the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world 
economy; 
 
3. the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
 
Paragraph one focuses on economic and social development based on the principle of sustain-
ability. In the light of the theory about sustainability as to “(…) satisfy the needs of the present 
generation without interfering with the needs of future generations” (See section 4.2.5) and the 
discussion in section 6.2 about the theoretical approach to sustainability, the policy focuses on 
generating development through support programmes, and the idea is that this development shall 
be self-supportive after a certain period of time. 
This idea is supported by paragraph two by stating that over time the developing countries 
should be integrated gradually in the world economy. This prerequisites that the developing 
countries are actually experiencing economic development that is not dependent on foreign aid 
programmes or western investors. This means that paragraph two is a vision from EU that indi-
cates that by initiating sustainable development in the developing countries, these countries will 
gradually build up a solid economy that will be able to be integrated in the world economy in-
cluding world market competition, open economies and etc. 
 
The third paragraph is of particular interest in relation to the first two paragraphs. It seems that 
the focus of sustainable development stated in paragraphs one and two are not considered to help 
solving the problems of poverty in the developing countries. There seems to be somewhat incon-
sistence between these issues, since the campaign against poverty could be a result of creating 
sustainable development and not a focus area in itself. It can be discussed whether it is possible 
to generate sustainable development and over time integrate developing countries in the world 
economy if they at the same time are experiencing heavy poverty. Modernisation theory argues 
that by focusing on economic structures and production it is possible to generate economic sus-
tainable development that will benefit company owners, land owners and investors, and thus take 
the developing countries through a growth phase transforming them into modern industrialised 
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countries. However, according to neo-Marxist theories this will not generate a social sustainable 
development that will benefit the general population, but only increase the wealth of those who 
have capital to invest in production, and since this is often western companies, the argument is 
that economic surplus will be transferred out of the developing countries and into to developed 
countries.  
 
So the two-facetted development policy suggests on the one hand that EU believes in generating 
development that over time will be self-supportive and thus allow the developing countries to be 
integrated in the world economy, and on the other hand, EU acknowledges that this development 
strategy does not make an end to poverty in the developing countries. 
 
Article 177 also states that in addition to the areas mentioned above, focus is also set on democ-
racy and human rights in the development programmes: “Community policy in this area shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of 
law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.270 As this paragraph 
states, it is a clear vision from the EU to build institutional structures that can ensure and support 
an economic and social development. If the developing countries are to be integrated in the 
world economy, which implies a liberal and capitalistic economy, the developing countries’ in-
ternal institutional structures will have to align to this paradigm. Therefore in the line of integrat-
ing the developing countries into the world economy it is important to create structures that en-
sure right of property, free competition, freedom of speech, and democratic political influence. 
Modernisation development theory argues that the “export” of western modern values will result 
in a modernisation and development of the developing countries, as they will slowly become 
more and more developed in the line of western values. The counter arguments to this, such as 
the actor-oriented approach, underlines the importance of including a broader range of local ac-
tors in the development process than those who would benefit from an open and free economy, 
which would be investors, land owners and owners of production resources.  
 
The key issue of this paragraph is the lack of definition of democracy, rule of law and fundamen-
tal freedoms. Even though paragraph 177 provides a reference for definitions that are found in 
the UN human rights and other charters: “The Community and the Member States shall comply 




with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the 
United Nations and other competent international organisations.” 271 Without a definition of 
these terms, the individual EU member-state can choose how to interpret them. 
 
Policy instruments 
Unlike the agricultural policy where the policy instruments are stated in a few clear-voiced para-
graphs, the policy instruments for executing the development policy seem somewhat more dif-
fuse and broadly defined. The first evidence of a policy instrument is stated in article 177 part 1:  
“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to 
the policies pursued by the Member States, (…).”272 This paragraph supports the conclusion in 
section 7.2.2 that development policy is not an area for a strict common EU policy, but rather an 
issue for political intergovernmentalism, where the EU legislation is considered a supplement to 
the member states’ development policies. However, even though the overall initiative is in the 
hands of the member states, the Council is still responsible for providing means for execution of 
policies, as stated in article 179, part 1: “Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, 
the Council, (…), shall adopt the measures necessary to further the objectives referred to in Arti-
cle 177. Such measures may take the form of multiannual programmes.” This means that from a 
central hold, the European Investment Bank contributes to financing programmes that corre-
spond to the aims of the development policy stated in article 177. As evidence of the argument 
presented in section 7.1.3 about EU member states seeking to execute development policy in 
compliance with own interests, article 179, part 3 states that cooperation with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries (where most former European colonies are situated) is excluded from the 
demand of corresponding to the aims of the development stated in paragraph 177. 
 
Another policy instrument for executing the development policy through the member states is by 
coordination of policies. Article 180, part 1 clearly states that consultation and coordination of 
policies on development is compulsory and that this must take place via international organisa-
tions and international conferences: “The Community and the Member States shall coordinate 
their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, 
including in international organisations and during international conferences. (…).”273 






Also, member states are forced to participate in any Community programmes: “Member States 
shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programmes.” 274 Never-
theless, the article says nothing about how this coordination between member states are to be 
executed, but only mentions that the Commission is allowed to take initiatives to promote this 
coordination. The only aspect mentioned in the policy about how to coordinate policies is in arti-
cle 181 that states that: “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the 
Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organi-
sations. (…).”275 and also that: “The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member 
States' competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agree-
ments.”276 
 
Therefore, again the conclusion on EU development policy must be that there is no central vision 
for creating a coherent common EU policy on development, with a central organ to execute the 
policy. Member states have the competence to negotiate and decide individually on development 
issues and are thus practically free to act as they wish as long as it is within a few general frames 
set by the EU. 
 
Policy analysis 
The analysis of the EU development policy has shown that from a theoretical point of view the 
development policy, like the agricultural policy seems to place itself between two schools of 
thinking. EU’s Modernisation approach to development aims at integrating the developing coun-
tries in the free world economy by generating development that focuses on democracy, rule of 
law and fundamental freedoms defined by western values. EU considers the idea of “exporting” 
western values to result in a process of growth in the developing countries. The fact that EU de-
velopment policy needs to comply with international development policy such as WTO, IMF, 
and the World Bank only supports this approach. As evidence to this argument, the World Bank 
and IMF do only allow loans to developing countries if they liberalise their economies and adjust 
to a western capital world economy.277 Therefore the use of the term sustainable development 
becomes somewhat diffuse due to the fact that if the principles of liberal economies are intro-
duced without any precautions in the developing countries, the economic surplus will be trans-
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ferred out of the country because of foreign investors. This would result in no economic basis for 
generating development. Since the policy also includes focus on the campaign against poverty, it 
seems that EU acknowledges that the development programmes will not eliminate poverty and 
thus takes on a different approach to development. This neo-Marxist approach sees development 
as change coming from the lower social levels of society and not only for capital actors. 
 
Another aspect that characterises the development policy is the strong tendency to intergovern-
mentalism in almost every aspect of the policy. Responsibility is clearly placed within the mem-
ber states, and EU only provides an overall political framework with little means for the execu-
tion of development policies e.g. the European Investment Bank.278 Intergovernmentalism is also 
brought to light by the fact that the policy directly states that development policy in relation to 
former colonies can be suspended from the general objectives of the policy and still be supported 
by the Investment Bank. This strong focus on intergovernmental cooperation is a clear statement 
that EU has no wish to pursue a coherent common development policy. As long as the member 
states’ development policies do not collide with each other and fulfil the requirements set by the 
international organisations such as WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
UN, the EU treaty states no vision about having a more consistent policy on development. 
 
Section 7.3 has showed how the differences in policy instruments and policy aims can be consid-
ered to be somewhat contradictive for EU agricultural and development policies both within the 
policies and between the policies. When looking at the policy issues and the policy instruments 
for agriculture the contradictions stand out in the paradox between having a liberal approach for 
the general purpose of the policy by focusing on generating economic growth by exploiting pro-
duction advantages and at the same time introduce protectionism as the policy instrument to at-
tain this. The paradox seems obvious, but in the present situation where EU agriculture is not 
competitive to the same extent as the present market allows it to be, protectionist measures are 
the only means of maintaining market assets. Therefore the reason for EU to use protectionism 
as a policy instrument in order to be competitive seems logical. However, the main problem lies 
in the fact that EU agriculture is not generating economic growth to the EU in relation to the 
expenses of maintaining the market positions. Therefore the overall contradiction in EU agricul-
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tural policy is placed in the very approach that agriculture ensures economic growth to EU and 
therefore expenses to maintain present positions are legitimate.  
 
In terms of development policy internal inconsistencies can also be found. The dualism of Mod-
ernisation and neo-Marxist theories shows evidence of this. EU development policy is based on 
two theoretical approaches that are in direct conflict. One focuses on generating economic de-
velopment through capital investors and the other to generate development among the lower so-
cial classes. This inconsistency of approaches suggests that EU development policy is made on 
the basis on the individual member states’ policies and not the other way around, as it is the case 
with the EU agricultural policy. This difference of approach in terms of intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism becomes evident in the analyses of the policy instruments. The objectives 
of the agricultural policy are meant to be attained through a coherent and centralised market or-
ganisation where the individual member states adapt to EU agricultural policy. This is not the 
case with EU development policy. Here the policy instruments are reduced to a few structural 
and political frames, in which the member states are to conduct their development policy. 
 
When the two policies are faced with one another, contradictive aspects occur. First of all the 
contradictive fact that EU wishes to integrate the developing countriees in a liberal world econ-
omy based on the principles of free trade, and world competition and at the same time do not 
follow these liberal principles in its own agricultural policy. Instead EU subjects the developing 
countries to heavy protectionism in order to protect internal markets and gain access to foreign 
markets.  
 
The protectionist approach of EU also prevents the developing countries from benefiting from 
the sustainable development that EU also expresses a wish for. It is rather paradoxical to have a 
vision for sustainable development in the developing world and then at the same time protect 
own markets. How will development ever be sustainable, if the developing countries are not able 
to build up productions that can be self-supportive and eventually generate economic growth due 






7.4 Analysis of policy processes in EU  
EU like most organisations consists of a wide range of formal organisational structures which 
serve the purpose of systematising and distributing the work tasks according to the available re-
sources. In a complex multi-level system like the EU the formal organisational structure helps 
politicians, bureaucrats and citizens to understand, act in and make use of the system in the best 
possible way. The formal structures are laid down in the treaties for EU but the complex formal 
system of EU rules and regulations causes even more complex sub-systems; This being formal as 
well as informal ways of influencing decision makers and decision procedures by e.g. using so-
cial and otherwise non-political settings to lobby for a certain case. In the following section the 
decision processes of EU agricultural and development policies are presented and commented 
on. The structure of the section is based on the triple-stepped model of decision making in EU279 
as introduced by Chari and Kritzinger.280 The model’s three stages provide a framework that is 
helpful for understanding EU policy processes. The three stages are: 
 
• Policy shaping 
• Policy setting 
• History making 
 
Within each policy process stage an analysis of the different actors and their individual role in 
influencing the processes is conducted. 
 
7.4.1 Policy shaping   
The policy shaping stage refers to the processes that take place around the formulation of a new 
policy in EU, and it includes the EU institution responsible for initiating a draft for the policy 
and the actors that wield influence on the policy formulation processes. Generally, it is believed 
that the actors capable of influencing the EU policy formation processes fall under one of two 
categories; namely institutional or interest groups.281 In the following the institutions and actors 
                                                 
279 Peterson & Bomberg: 1999 
280 Chari and Kritzinger’s approach builds on an interpretation of the work of Peterson and Bomberg. See section 
4.3.5 
281 Nugent: 2003 
 111
 
that wield influence on the policy initiation stage for agricultural and development policies are 
identified and analysed. 
 
Agricultural policy 
As argued for in section 7.2 on policy order, agricultural matters in the EU are regarded to be of 
first policy order. This confirms the high priority that the agricultural area is ascribed and under-
lines that decision making regarding agriculture takes place in a supranational setting. The im-
portant economic and social results of the agricultural policy make it an intensely monitored po-
litical area. The formulation of first order policies is heavily influenced by interest groups trying 
to ensure that the institutional actors consider and represent their interests in the supranational 
legislation.  
 
The actors in EU policy formulation can be divided in two groups: The institutional players and 
interest groups. The two groups may have coinciding objectives in some matters and may even 
work together to reach them, but the methods they use in this process may be of very different 
character. The actors that influence the policy shaping process are analysed in the following. 
 
Institutional players 
The institutional players are the official EU institutions and other institutions whose basis for 
involvement in the policy process is based on constitutional law or treaties. The Commission has 
the right to initiate agricultural issues and this makes it an important actor in the initiation proc-
ess but also the target of lobbying from interest organisations. However, the national states still 
have a strong influence on the policy formation processes. This is partly because of the national 
governments’ role in the Council of ministers, where each country has the possibility to adduce 
the national interests via their national agricultural ministers or even through the head of state in 
the Council. The latter is seen in the case of France and Spain, where the significant national 
agricultural interests are promoted in the Council by the prime ministers of the countries. The 
historical development of agricultural policies shows evidence of supranational governance as 
well as intergovernmentalism. The supranational governance level has influenced the initiation 
phase of the reforms in the agricultural area in form of the central role of the Commission, 





In order to facilitate an understanding of the policy initiation process it is beneficial to look at the 
institutional procedures at supranational as well as national level. Policy formulation regarding 
agricultural policy is formally initiated by the Commission. Other parts may suggest that the 
Commission treats certain matters, but the formal formulation must come from the Commission. 
This underpins the argument of agriculture being a supranational matter, since any suggestion for 
agricultural policy is formulated so that it complies with what is regarded as best for the common 
European interests.  
 
The suggestion for a new policy is forwarded to the Council, where the standard working proce-
dure prescribes that the suggestion is sent to a work group consisting of country representatives. 
When the group has agreed on the most important points they forward it to the Special Commit-
tee on Agriculture. At this stage, political considerations are more important than technical de-
tails, meaning that the political consensus is prioritised over that of technical details in the sug-
gested policy. This is partly ensured by inviting agricultural specialist groups to offer their view 
on the matter. In case the Committee does not come to an agreement, the suggestion is sent back 
to the work group, to make a new suggestion. 
 
The involvement of agricultural experts in the Special Committee on Agriculture ensures not 
only  
expert advice, but also allows the agricultural industry access to the initiation phase and secures 
that suggestions are in compliance with the agricultural industry’s interests and thus shows evi-
dence of a mutual beneficial relationship that exists between the official institutional initiators 
and the interest groups. In this relation it is interesting to examine the relationship between the 
institutional and non-institutional actors further. The agricultural experts are often representa-
tives of the professional European farmers’ groups who, for the larger part, are in favour of 
maintaining the CAP system of subsidisation and protection against non-EU agricultural prod-
ucts. The inclusion of expert groups on agricultural matters has become a tradition to an extent 
that is almost institutionalised. The long existing procedure of consulting agricultural experts on 
political or technical matters were introduced to ensure the political anchorage of decisions be-
tween those that it involved, and to ensure that the agricultural sector approves of the suggestions 
put forward by the Commission. 
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At the national level, governments can act in domestic matters concerning agriculture, but it 
must be within the overall frame of the CAP. Therefore the national governments’ best chance to 
exert influence on policy matters is via the national representative in the Council of Agriculture 




At the supranational level the EU institutions are the main actors in the policy initiating process. 
The Council and the Parliament can unofficially suggest that the Commission takes action in a 
certain case but other actors can make suggestions as well: interest groups, committees etc. The 
same actors may also be included in other parts of the decision process as sources of expert in-
formation on certain topics, as it is the case with the Euro-agric groups,282 and these may affect 
the initiation stage by trying to ensure implementation of their interests.  
 
As decision making in the farming area increasingly has moved to Brussels, the national farmers’ 
unions have followed, and some of them have joined forces in trans-European unions to 
strengthen their position and their chances of having their interests considered in the EU policy 
process. Non-institutional actors are trying to influence the policy processes at supranational as 
well as national levels. The interest groups can generally be seen as deriving from three forms of 
interests: economic interests, professional interests and finally the interests of public groups.283 
In the case of agricultural policy the interest groups are trying to gain influence at national as 
well as supranational level and in both cases they are constituted by professionally acting farm-
ing groups. 
 
Farmers’ organisations have a long and strong history in most European countries,284 and they 
share a common goal, in that they try to improve their conditions through available channels in 
the national political arena. The special historical status and political influence of the agricultural 
sector in most of the member states as explained in section 7.1.1, ensures the industry access to 
and influence on the decision making process on a national level. The influence on the policy 
process at this level is important for the agricultural sector in order to be able to influence na-
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tional administered laws, but also to gain influence on the national politicians who are represent-
ing the national interests in the Council of ministers. 
Furthermore, in spite of the tendency to centralisation of agricultural legislation towards the EU 
level, the national states still have some autonomy in the agricultural area, especially on the envi-
ronment, where the agricultural sector has strong interests in influencing the policy formation285. 
 
The largest of the agricultural interest organisations in EU is the umbrella Committee of Profes-
sional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA),286 which unites and represents 
the interests of European farmers’ national groups in one body in Brussels. The overall aim of 
COPA, in its own words, is to: ‘Defend and develop a European model of agriculture.’287 In 
other words, the main purpose for economic actors like COPA is to ensure that the agricultural 
policy provides lucrative production and market conditions to guarantee the economic interests 
and future existence of the European farming industry. COPA’s choice of words is interesting 
and seems to contain an implicit self-contradiction; it seems impossible to defend something and 
develop it at the same time. The use of the word ‘defend’ expresses conservative values, while 
the term ‘development’ gives an impression of progress and modernisation.  The agricultural 
sector’s traditionally conservative approach to changes does not exactly promote a developing 
environment. Rather a reasonable assumption could be that the development term refers to the 
ensuring of the development of continued economic means of existence for the agricultural in-
dustry. 
 
Generally, the Commission is positively positioned to the organised lobby groups who offer their 
expertise in specific cases and this argues for the influencing role these posses. A common factor 
for first order policies is that economically strong interest bodies have influenced the formulation 
stage. By working closely together with the Commission and the Council, as it is seen in the ex-
pert position COPA enjoys in these institutions, they have gained influence on the formulation of 
agricultural policies.  
 
Apart from being concerned with internal production circumstances in EU, the economic interest 
groups are also concerned with the international agreements, especially those regarding export 






and trade agreements with third parties, to ensure a competitive EU economy on the world stage 
through influencing the export agreements. This demonstrates a convergence between interests 
of EU institutions and interest groups since institutions primarily are concerned with internal 
affairs. This is a shared objective for EU institutional and non-institutional players at the domes-
tic as well as supranational level. However, the farming lobby may no longer enjoy the same 




Since the beginning of the 90’s the agricultural policy has undergone a series of reforms.  
In order to analyse the policy formulation stage within the CAP it is useful to take a look at the 
processes for these reforms. The purpose of including the reforms is to illustrate which actors 
that wield influence on agricultural policy and how and where they act their influence. 
 
The first was the MacSharry reform in the early 90s and latest the Fischler reform in 2003. The 
reasons for these reforms were among others deteriorating market conditions and problems with 
enormous surplus production, not to mention the fact that the agricultural sector received more 
than half of the EU budget, and this forced the Commission to initiate long-term plans to solve 
the problems.  
Additionally the rising pressure from the concurrent negotiations at WTO about trade agree-
ments with third parties, to ease subsidy levels and export supports made the reform of the CAP 
relevant and necessary for other parties as well, such as the EU citizens’, environmental and hu-
manitarian organisations that questioned the ability of EU to take responsibility for its actions in 
the increasingly globalising world. 
 
The proposals of the MacSharry reform were put forward in 1991. It started out as a consulta-
tions document issued by the Commission, followed by specific proposals for changes and re-
forms of the CAP in 1992. The background for the reforms was, among others, the inconsistency 
between demand and agricultural production levels and the high share of the EU’s budget that 
was tied to the agricultural post. Although the original proposals were diluted, the agriculture 
ministers agreed to implement the restructuring of the CAP. Thereby the Commission forced its 
will through, in spite of strong protests from the farming lobby as well as from national actors. 
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This demonstration of power can be seen as an indication of the Commission beginning to re-
spond to the pressure from citizens and politicians (who were concerned about voters’ interests), 
to introduce reforms in the agricultural area in order to cut expenses on the EU budget and to try 
to regulate the farming industry’s harming production methods. The result was that the Council 
increasingly concentrated the policy powers to the political institutions in the EU and that the 
influencing role of the farming interest groups was weakened.288 
 
Detaching the level of support from level of output (decoupling) was among the major issues in 
the reforms. The large farmers rejected this proposal since the consequence of it would cause 
them to loose a major income source, whereas it would be an advantage for smaller farmers. 
From COPA’s perspective, this internal inconsistency of interests within the different national 
members resulted in a more fragmented impression of the organisation, and it was made clear 
that European farming was not able to speak as one sector when it regarded the CAP reforms. 
This made the national agricultural interest organisations turn to their national channels in the 
hope of gaining more influence here. The same scenario was more or less repeated in the case of 
the Agenda 2000 proposals. The problems that caused the reform initiatives were more or less 
the same, as in 1991, and again, the process was initiated by the Commission.  
 
As it is seen above, the Commission plays a strong role in the initiation process, and this makes 
it the most interesting aim for agricultural interest groups. But the interest works both ways, and 
the Commission is open for the farmers’ opinions and professional advice on agricultural mat-
ters, and has established a close cooperation with groups that represent European farmers. The 
cooperation facilitates a close communication and mutual understanding between the Commis-
sion and the farmers,289 and this ensures COPA direct access to the policy initiation process. 
 
The European farmers’ direct access to the policy initiation stage illustrates a special admittance 
to the influential processes that no other interest group enjoys. Even though consumers’ and en-
vironmentalists’ interests have gained more focus in EU, none of them come close to possessing 
the same level of economic and political influence as the agricultural organisations.290 
                                                 
288 Hix 1999 
289 Ibid 
290 Wallace & al.: 2005 
 117
 
However, the weakening of COPA’s influence on the Commission as a result of the MacSharry 
reform and the before mentioned decrease in voters’ support to farming led to a re-concentration 
of decisional powers to the Commission. 
 
The course of events in the reforms of the CAP, outlined above, confirms the Commission as the 
initiating actor and thereby determines the evidence of supranational governance, in which the 
Commission and the Council of agriculture ministers become the central policy actors. 
 
Development policy 
The development area falls within the EU’s external policies. As the classification in section 
7.1.4 confirmed, development policy is of second policy order and is classified as an external 
economic policy, and the situation regarding development policy sets a very different scene than 
the one concerning agricultural policy. The secondary status of development at EU level to the 
member states’ individually defined and regulated development programmes is expressed in arti-
cle 177, in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which 
states that: “Community policy (…) of development (…) shall be complimentary to the policies 
pursued by the member states.”291  
 
The Council sets the overall agenda for the development programmes initiated at the EU level in 
accordance with the commitments that EU has adopted on the development area, regardless of 
varying national interests. At this level the intensions for the development policy seem strong 
and clearly defined, but as the policy proposal moves from the overall supranational level of the 
Council to the national or sub-national level where most of the development projects are planned 
and carried out by national development organisations or NGOs, the overall objectives of EU 
development policy risk being blurred or neglected by the executing organisation. 
 
Within the foreign policy, the Commission administers three General Directorates (DGs) which 
cover each their policy area related to development. Each DG has its own commissioner attached 
and the DG that is the focus of attention here is the DG of Development (DG DEV), where de-
velopment aid is administered. The DG Development mandate is to enhance the development 
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policies in all developing countries worldwide. 292 Further it provides policy guidance on devel-
opment policy and oversees the programming of aid in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and in overseas countries and territories. 
 
Returning to the example of Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships in section 7.1.3 in e.g. Morocco 
where the initial intention of promoting democracy and stable political environment seem to van-
ish as economic interests of gaining power over the ideologies defined by the Council. On one 
hand, the actors that influence the development policy are generally not economically strong, and 
therefore they are not allocated a strong voice in the decision process. But on the other hand, it 
can be argued that exactly the strong economic actors influence the decision process of the de-
velopment policy, but by means of ruling out the development area by prioritising agricultural 
and commercial interests over development matters. However, as the Commission formulates 
proposals for developmental programmes and forwards them to the Council, it is clear that the 
development policy is not defined as precisely as it is the case with the agricultural area. Fur-
thermore the policy processes surrounding it are not the target of the influence from as many 
different actors as in the agricultural sector.  
 
The different interests between member states in the development area result in a vague common 
external policy. In addition, the decisions are dominated by some member states’ interests (e.g. 
France), and thus not driven by common European interests. The economic and bargain wise 
influential member states’ national diverse interests domain over supranational ruling, and this 
makes a consensus for a common position almost impossible to reach. 
 
7.4.2 Policy setting  
Policy setting can be defined as the stage where policy is formed and bargained over, by the im-
plied actors, institutional as well as interest groups. The stage of policy setting is dominated by 
different actors trying to make their voice heard in the negotiations for EU policies. This section 
analyses the elements of policy setting in the agricultural and development policy processes; this 
being actors and institutions involved at this level. 
 
                                                 




In the case of agricultural policy, the strengthened role of environmental and consumers’ groups 
could argue that there is room for more interest groups to be heard at the negotiation stage. They 
do not necessarily need to be economically powerful, but if they represent large groups of citi-
zens they may be powerful in terms of votes. However, this does not offer sufficiently strong 
arguments to argue for the pluralist point perspective. The historical strong influence of the 
European farmers’ lobby organ, COPA on the negotiation processes in agricultural policy at both 
EU and national levels, advocates for a Dominant Economic Class perspective, which argues that 
a plurality of elites or high-level political elites influence or alone make the crucial decisions. 
The weakened position of COPA in the policy process caused by the Commission’s change of 
political agenda on farming interests has resulted in an increasing focus from COPA on the ef-
forts to influence national politicians. 
 
In extension of the above, a relevant discussion is whether the implied actors and persons have 
personal interests in a certain result. Critiques have raised questions regarding the personal inter-
est of the Commissioner for agriculture and the president of the Commission, since they both 
come from nations with traditionally strong farming interests (Denmark and Portugal). Although 
the Commissioners are supposed to act on a common best for Europe, expertise and knowledge 
in an area is hardly separable from personal interests. Under the current circumstances the Com-
missioner of Agriculture is personally involved in large scale farming, and it would therefore be 
easy – and reasonable – to assume that it must be hard for the Commissioner to separate personal 
professional large scale farming interests from what is common overall best for the EU society. 
The DEC – perspective can also be substantiated with the fact that the major interest groups gen-
erally have represented the economic interests of large-scale farmers. 
 
The role of interest groups 
In order to understand the decision process of the CAP fully, all influencing (f-)actors that affect 
the political output before the final voting in the Council, must be considered. The stages before 
the actual voting and hearing can be crucial as these can change a suggestion drastically on its 
way through the different actors. The analysis in this study is based on a differentiation of politi-
cal actors into three groups; those who represent economic interests, those of professional inter-
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ests, and, finally, those representing public interests. The influence and role of interest groups are 
exemplified in the recent reforms of the CAP which are depicted in the following. 
 
MacSharry and other reforms 
The negotiation stage of the CAP reforms was influenced by national actors, who participated 
alongside representatives of large-scale farmers who based their survival on the subsidies, to 
secure that the reforms would not decrease their subsidies. The result was that it was hard to in-
troduce any larger reforms to the CAP, and only minor changes were made. Furthermore the 
negotiation process was to a larger extent influenced by national actors, both governmental and 
professional interest groups representing the large farmers. Furthermore, the agricultural interest 
groups gained influence on the Council by influencing the national ministers and members of the 
Council. This points to a conclusion that the negotiation stage was dominated by intergovern-
mentalist principles and largely influenced by representatives from the Dominant Economic 
Class, in this case the large farmers. This means that the role and economic strength of farming 
organisations in some countries enable them to pressure national politicians to oppose or vote in 
favour of certain schemes, in accordance with the large-scale farmers’ interests.  
 
Development Policy 
The EU’s external economic policy is based mainly on intergovernmental agreements made be-
tween the national governments and the development policy is no exception. In comparison with 
the agricultural policy, which takes up around 45% of the EU budget, the development area is 
only allocated around 4 % of the budget. The European Development Fund which finances the 
Commission’s development programmes is not included in the EU general budget but is mainly 
financed via the member states, 293 and the European Union counts for 10% of the total aid given 
to developing countries. Collectively the member states of the European Union are the largest 
contributors to international development, contributing with 45% of all international help. The 
largest amounts are paid via the member states’ individual bilateral aid programmes294 which are 
defined and budgeted for in the individual country.  
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Institutions in development policy 
EU’s economic policy reflects the deviating political stands on the issue between the member 
states. The arguments for the intergovernmental perspective are further strengthened by the fact 
that member states have very different positions on development issues. Regarding agreements 
that solely concern trade with external parties, the Commission and the Council are the main 
actors in the policy according to article 133 in the Treaty, which states the Commissions role as 
the initiating part at the EU level. 295 
 
The EU humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) coordinates the EU action on emergency, food and 
refugee aid but the aid scene is also strongly influenced by national and international aid pro-
grammes provided by actors such as Oxfam, Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, and etc. 
The mentioned organisations’ objectives are merely to provide humanitarian aid to developing 
countries and do not represent any economic interests. 
 
The development scene is thus dominated by interest groups such as the above mentioned and 
this underlines the de-central management of development initiatives that origin within Europe, 
either at sub-national, national or supranational level. The cooperation between EU institutions 
and private or national state initiated development programmes calls for a characterisation of the 
policy setting in the Development area as belonging to that of the pluralist perspective, since all 
the different actors are able to influence the policy development. The pluralist system of interest 
representation involves interest groups lobbying the formal institutions with the aim of trying to 
get their preferred legislative options adopted. However, the system does not advocate an equal 
access to the decision process; it rather favours those holding key resources, such as information, 
expertise and economic format296 over the groups that do not possess any resources interesting to 
the formal EU institutions.  Since the influencing actors in the development area are mainly hu-
manitarian organisations with humanitarian and political objectives, groups with mainly eco-
nomic interests are absent in the policy processes of development policy, following the limited 
economic benefits the development area offers. 
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After the initiation and formulation of a policy the implementation of policies takes place at the 
history-making stage. The principles of history-making are based on the work of Sevasti Chat-
zopoulou297 and cover the different decision procedures that are used by the EU institutions. 
Since the introduction of the Maastricht treaty the EU institutions have operated with four differ-
ent standard procedures for non-administrative legislation:298 
 
 
The four decision procedures in EU: 
 
• The consultation procedure: The Council must consult the EP before disposing of  
   proposals from the Commission.  
• The co-decision procedure: Gives the EP and Council equal powers. 
• The cooperation procedure: The Council adopts a ‘common position’ by qualified  
majority vote after a first round of consultation. The po-
sition is then communicated to the EP. 
• The assent procedure:   The assent of the EP is required for a measure to be  
  adopted. 
 
The consultation, co-decision, and assent procedures stand out in that they allow for qualified 
majority voting (QMV), when certain treaty articles are being defined, while unanimity is used 
for other articles. The voting procedures are further discussed in section 7.5 below. 
 
Agricultural policy 
After the Commission officially has decided on the initiation, stage different actors can contrib-
ute with their viewpoints. For the CAP the consultation procedure is used as it is prescribed in 
article 37, part 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty: “ The Council shall, on a proposal 
from the commission and after consulting the European Parliament, (…) make regulations, issue 
directives, or take decisions, without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make.” 299 
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The process of the consultation procedure entails that the Commission sends the proposal to the 
Council for a single reading, after which it is passed on to the Parliament. The Parliament must 
be consulted in a single reading albeit it has no right to veto the suggestion. The Council can 
reject the comments put forward by the Parliament and if so, the parliament has no other way to 
influence the decision in the Council – at the most, it can delay the process by taking its time to 
formulate the comments. 
 
By ensuring the Council the last saying in the case, the possibility for the Parliament to influence 
the case is eradicated and the official decision maker in the consultation procedure is thus the 
Council of Agriculture Ministers because it holds the right to give the final and conclusive say-
ing in agricultural matters. The allocation of powers to the Council gives reason to reflect on 
which consequences it has for the policy processes that the European Parliament’s possibility to 
influence the decision processes are eradicated. First of all, the notion of a democratic deficit in 
the EU is supported, since the European Parliament is the only institution that represents the citi-
zens of the member states directly. This is further supported by the fact that the Council of Agri-
culture Ministers decides on supranational agricultural matters by means of QMV. This adds to 
the argument that agricultural policy procedures are based on top-managed decision processes, in 
opposition to the more consensus-seeking policies that also allow actors without significant eco-
nomic or historical relations to the area, admittance to the decision processes. 
 
In sum, the position of the Council of agricultural ministers as the official decision making body 
in agricultural policy is emphasized by the use of the consultation procedure. The consultation 
procedure forces the ministers to try and incorporate the member states’ position on each case 
into the complex decision processes regarding agriculture. 
 
Development policy 
In matters of development policy the Council can issue declarations or resolutions without con-
sulting the European Parliament meaning that the Parliament’s possibilities to influence the pol-
icy process are practically non-existent. However, for he principles of the decision procedure in 
Development policy is defined in Title XX on Development Cooperation in the TEU. The title 
points to the procedures for the consultation procedure laid out in chapter 2, article 251 which 




states that: The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council 
(…)  The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European 
Parliament.300 This means that the EP can offer their opinion on a case but they have no power 
to stop the aid funding.301 
 
In sum, the EU’s external economic policies are inconsistent. A central aim of the single market, 
the CCP (Common Commercial Policy) and some of the internal policies (most notably the 
CAP) favour domestic producers over producers in third countries. These circumstances are be-
ing specified further in section 8. 
 
Inter-Institutional powers 
In the light of the above it is interesting to take a closer look at the distribution of powers be-
tween the institutions of EU and the national interests. Authors within the EU literature, espe-
cially representatives of new institutionalism, debate that the institutions share a great deal of 
institutional autonomy between them.302 In order to pass important decisions, a broad inter-
institutional agreement is required. Even though the national governments try their best to wield 
their individual interests, the powers that are shared between the institutions are beyond the con-
trol of the national governments or coalitions formed among them.303 This adds to the New Insti-
tutionalists’ beliefs that EU is an autonomous system of governance with entitlement to special 
rights and privileges.  
 
However, the analysis in the previous sections of allocation of interests and powers between in-
stitutions and actors in decision making processes regarding agriculture and development poli-
cies, points towards the enforcement of powers and national interests depending on the political 
issue, and further it indicates an asymmetric allocation of interests, activity, and hence powers 
between the two political areas. 
 
A recent study from the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ads to the idea of 
asymmetry of the influence of the member states by pointing to the core large member states 
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France and Germany in company with Great Britain possess more influence on EU decision 
making compared with the small and medium sized states, 304 despite the fact that they are for-
mally given equal influence and that the group of EU member states recently has been extended 
to 25. The large states especially exploit their size to gain negotiation power in the Council, mak-
ing it hard for small and medium sized states to press their interests through. The procedures of 
negotiations in the Council (explained in section 5.2.1) of carrying out negotiations behind 
locked doors and the fact that the Council can issue declarations and resolutions without consult-
ing the EP further promote the chances of the large states to overrule the smaller member states, 
since the procedure allows for coalitions between states with similar interests. 
 
The negotiation power in the Council is further commented on by Professor of political science 
Jonas Tallberg305 who identifies three forms of coalitions building that take place in the Council; 
country groupings, party networks, and issue coalitions.306 Regarding the agricultural policy, all 
three of the coalition forms are potential instruments in favour of the member states who wish to 
influence the negotiation and decision making in the agricultural policy matters and in the case 
of agricultural policy, the traditional farming member states are excellent examples of states 
seeking to protect their agricultural interests both via their agriculture minister as well as their 
heads of state. The group of member states that mainly profits from or for other reasons give the 
agricultural sector high priority, are more likely to “(…) invest scarce resources, negotiate with 
greater care, stay longer at the negotiation table, and have higher aspirations.”307 according to 
Tallberg. 
 
                                                 






7.5 Analysis of EU voting procedures  
On the way through the political institutions of EU a decision can receive “red,” “yellow” or 
“green” light from the different institutions. The procedures add to the complexity of the deci-
sion process; each level in the process uses different procedures to vote and this has different 
effects on the formation of policies. The voting procedures mainly used are the unanimity-
procedure which means that each member state has one equally weighed vote, or the Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV), where each country’s voting power is calculated according to the size 
of population.  
 
Agricultural policy 
Within the CAP the voting procedure in the Council is qualified majority as it is stated in article 
37, paragraph 2 in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity. The paragraph declares that following the Commission’s initiating role to put forward new 
suggestions, and that the Parliament must be consulted, the Council makes final decisions via 
QMV on directives.308 However, this has proven to obstruct the introduction of reforms since the 
QMV allocates proportional large decision power to the member states that support the original 
CAP-system. This favour of inertia and status quo has the consequence that if no changes are 
suggested, even less decided on, the system will continue to work as always. The use of QMV on 
supranational matters allows actors to use the strategy explained above, where coalitions are 
formed between countries or political parties with similar interests or groups with alike issues, in 
order to influence the outcome of the negotiation process. 
 
As a result, it is being discussed to use the co-decision procedure in cases with general impor-
tance for the development of the CAP. This takes its point of departure in the argument that the 
co-decision procedure would make up for some of the democratic deficit,309 make the EU Par-
liament an important actor in the decision process, and thereby give EU citizens a more direct 
influence on EU decisions and politics through their national members of the European Parlia-
ment. The introduction of co-decision would further add to the transparency of the decision pro-
cedures and thereby also improve the possibility for EU citizens to understand and influence the 
agricultural policy processes. 
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Since the development policy is negotiated in an intergovernmental setting, the principles of una-
nimity are used (although under the external economic and trade policy, qualified majority vot-
ing is used in the Council if the matter concerns trade). Whenever the Parliament is involved in 
the decision process it acts by the principles of co-decision. This underlines the relative openness 
in the decision process regarding development policy, since it allows other actors to be heard and 
thus influence the decision result. The result is that decisions made on development issues often 
end up representing very different stances on the issue, and thus not really changing much. The 
coalitions potentially formed in the negotiations of development policy include the group of na-
tional states who agree on the level and form of development aid. Further, political parties across 
Europe with the same stance on development policy, and interest groups such as NGO aid pro-
grammes and non-profit organisations may work together to try to ensure that development pol-
icy is formulated in accordance with their goals. 
 
The asymmetry of interests in the EU development policy area is apparent when development is 
seen in the light of the economic interests of some the EU member states. For example, the for-
mer colonial powers of Europe have special bonds with their former colonies, e.g. because of 
close (and lucrative) trading relations or a large share of immigrants from former colonies, as the 
case is with France, which have extensive trade agreements with Morocco and in addition ac-
commodates a large share of Moroccans.310 The political situation in Morocco is criticised by 
humanitarian organisations and is accused of being a dictatorship. The example of the relation-
ship between France and Morocco illustrates that economic interests often precede over those of 
the official development policies and aid organisations, since the member states with economic 
interests tied to a certain political or economic construct in a developing country will seek to 
influence the decisions in the direction of their interests. This often leads countries to prioritise 
their economic interests higher than those of their official development policy. In the French-
Moroccan case the French wish to maintain the present relative political stability, in order not to 
jeopardise lucrative trade arrangements in France’s favour, and this contributes to maintain the 
present undemocratic political situation in Morocco in spite of development organisations’ warn-
ings against collaboration with the dictator regime.  
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The influential powers of the member states with strong economic interests in the decision proc-
ess further promote the gap between EU development programmes and more philanthropic pro-
jects initiated and carried out by independent NGOs in the single member states. This means that 
the EU institutions in effect are without the possibility to influence the majority of development 
projects carried out by EU member states. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Section 6 concluded that there are contradictions both within and between EU policies on agri-
culture and development. The analyses in section 7 have attempted to explain why these contra-
dictions in policies exist through different analyses of policy processes. The first analysis shows 
that there are great differences between processes of redistributive policies as the EU agricultural 
policy and of foreign economic policies as the EU development policy. The central explanation 
for contradictions in relation to these two policy processes is that agricultural policy making is in 
the hands of the Council of Agriculture Ministers supported by the Commissioner on agriculture 
and special committees on agriculture; the so called iron triangle. The Council is the central de-
cision maker of all policies on agriculture even budgetary decisions. Therefore the interests of 
the farmers are protected by a strong central coherent EU policy. On the other hand the processes 
concerning development policy are more or less placed in the hands of the individual member 
states. EU policy on development is only meant as an overall political framework and as a sup-
plement to the member states’ development policy. This results in a scenario where the individ-
ual member states act according to own interests in the execution of the development policy. EU 
policy on development only requests that member states’ development policies do not collide 
with each other and that the policies respect some very general principles stated by EU. 
 
The second analysis found evidence of differences of priority of the two political areas. Whereas 
agricultural policy can be considered to be of first policy order with high priority on consensus 
and supranationalism, development policy is of second policy order and consensus among the 
EU member states is not considered to be of importance. This result is an intergovernmental ap-
proach to development policy where the individual member states not are forced to follow cen-
tral legislation, as it is the case with agricultural policy. Agricultural policy as a first order policy 
is given priority by EU and has become one of the areas where EU has gained most political and 
economic influence over member states’ autonomy due to a historical focus on the farming in-
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dustry. On the other hand development policy as a second order policy and as a part of the for-
eign policy has never been of priority in terms of political integration in EU. This is mainly be-
cause EU member states traditionally have been reluctant to transfer political powers to EU in 
questions regarding foreign policy. 
 
These arguments are supported by the findings of the third analysis that conclude that EU agri-
cultural policy focuses on generating economic wealth in EU by benefiting from production ad-
vantages that are artificially maintained by a heavy protectionist policy. Again the historical 
element plays an important role since farmers represented a large economic factor at the time 
when the policy was formulated. By securing farmers reasonable income and protecting the EU 
market, EU could gain important political support from the farmers which was crucial for the 
political integration of EU as a new institution. This mutual economic-political beneficial ar-
rangement between EU and the farmers is the reason why EU has gained strong influence on the 
agricultural policy and why EU sees a need for a strong coherent EU policy on agriculture. De-
velopment policy does not have and has never had the same political importance as agriculture 
and therefore it is of less importance in relation to political integration of the EU. This explains 
why most EU development policy is placed in the hands of the individual member states and not 
in a central coherent political organ.  
 
Furthermore, the analyses of policy instruments and policy aims also points to an inconsistency 
both within the policy themselves and between the two policy areas. Agricultural policy instru-
ments include both liberal and protectionist measures, which by definition are theoretically 
contradictive. Nevertheless, the EU policy on agriculture has created a situation where the two 
approaches seem to walk hand in hand. The benefits of the classic liberal approach are attained 
through heavy protectionism that generates production advantages. As for development policy, 
the inconsistency is found in the contradictive relationship between sustainable development 
with the purpose of smooth economic integration and the campaign against poverty. It seems that 
the inclusion of the campaign against poverty implies an acknowledgement that the sustainable 
development fails. Also, the section points to some inconsistencies between the two policies. 
This is mainly seen is the paradox of a wish for economic integration of the developing countries 
into a liberal world economy with free trade and free competition on the one hand, and heavy 
protectionism from EU in terms of agricultural markets on the other hand. How can the develop-
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ing countries be expected to be integrated in a liberal world economy, if the developed countries 
do not follow the liberal principles in all matters? Another inconsistency is placed in the contra-
diction within EU’s wish for sustainable development in the developing countries on the one 
hand, and the heavy protectionist measures that keep foreign products out of the EU market on 
the other.  
 
So both in terms of agricultural and development policies the reasons for contradictions can be 
found in policy processes behind the two policies. More precisely, the policy instruments and the 
aims and values behind the policies hold the explanation for the policy inconsistency. The policy 
instruments and the objectives of the agricultural policy do not seem to include any concerns of 
its consequences for the developing countries. In addition the EU development policy does not 
seem to acknowledge the problems that EU agricultural policy is causing for the developing 
countries and therefore is not concerned with solving the problems caused by the agricultural 
policy. 
 
In the fourth analysis the role of and allocation of power between EU institutions at the suprana-
tional level and national actors at the intergovernmental level was discussed. The effects of dif-
ferent formal and informal procedures were evaluated, and in conclusion it can be said that na-
tional interests, political as well as economic interest actors, are sought fulfilled by interest 
groups, trying to influence the channels that have access to the policy formation process at su-
pranational level. Overall, it can be said of the EU development policy that compared with the 
agricultural policy, it is characterised by the absence of political and economic actors fighting to 
gain influence in the policy processes. Instead, the most significant development projects are 
planned, financed and carried out by organisations at national levels. This reflects in the low lob-
bying activity in the development area, which is characterised by the pluralist perspective, since 
the potential economic gains for lobbying organisations are low. The development policies that 
are initiated at the EU level are characterised by the fact that the political priority allocated to 
them is low, compared to policies negotiated in the agricultural area. 
 
The last analysis shows how different voting procedures in EU can affect the outcome of the 
policies. Agricultural policy is decided on through QMV procedures which ensure that the large 
EU states, which also traditionally are farming nations, can dominate the voting result, whereas 
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smaller states are more or less prevented from having any important influence on the result. This 
leads to a situation where no major reforms are introduced. Development policy on the other 
hand make use of unanimity voting, which gives each member state equal votes. This way 
groups of states that form a direct majority can influence the result. This again proves the lack of 
interest for strong EU political integration in terms of development policy. 
 
All in all the conclusion on section 7 is that the contradictions in EU agricultural and develop-
ment policies are caused by policy processes that are very different due to different approaches 
in terms of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, different priorities regarding first and 
second order policies, different actors involved in the processes of decision making both institu-
tional actors, economic actors and other interest groups and finally different procedures in terms 
of voting. Together these different processes result in a scenario where the EU agricultural policy 
in many areas directly collides with the development policy even though EU as an international 




8. Analysis of consequences for the developing countries 
This section takes a closer look on what consequences EU policies on agriculture and develop-
ment have for the developing countries. However, this section is only concerned with the theo-
retical analysis of the consequences and not with any empirical verification of the results. (Sec-
tion 9 presents an empirical analysis of the consequences for the developing countries). This sec-
tion bases its analyses on the theoretical classification of the EU policies conducted in section 6 
and seeks to outline and conclude in details how the different theoretical approaches of the EU 
policies affect the developing countries. The section is structured in three main subsections. The 
first subsection analyses the consequences of the different approaches found in the EU agricul-
tural policy, the second subsection analyses the consequences of the different theoretical ap-
proaches found in the EU development policy. The third subsection analyses on the conse-
quences of the existing contradictions in the EU policies and sums up and concludes on the over-
all theoretical consequences for the developing countries. 
 
8.1 Consequences of EU agricultural policy 
As concluded in section 6 the EU agricultural policy is based on two main theoretical ap-
proaches: classic liberalism and protectionism. This section takes the conclusions of section 6.1 
to a further analysis in terms of discussions about the direct and indirect consequences of these 
theoretical approaches for the developing countries. 
 
8.1.1 Classic liberal approaches 
The classic liberal economic trade theories are based on the principles of free world trade where 
national states compete on equal basis. This free world trade allows nations to focus on the pro-
duction where they have advantages and thus have competitive possibilities. The basic idea of 
classic liberal economic trade theories is that world trade will always be a positive-sum game, 
where all parties can benefit economically if they focus on the advantageous production and 
abandon non-advantageous production. In theory this means that the developing countries also 
should possess production advantages, since the theory of Ricardo argues that even relative ad-
vantages can result in economic benefit. According to the theory this should mean that if the de-
veloping countries focus on the advantageous production they should be able to gain market ac-
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cess due to competitive advantages. But in the light of the fact that the only area where develop-
ing countries have a small chance of production advantages is within agriculture (primarily in 
terms of cheap labour and climate advantages), the EU becomes an obstacle to exploiting these 
production advantages due to its agricultural policy. 
 
The reason that EU prevents the developing countries from exploiting their production advan-
tages is that EU does not acknowledge the need to abandon some agricultural productions that in 
fact are not competitive. One example is the production of sugar. EU farmers are not able to pro-
duce sugar at the same low cost as in e.g. South Africa. Nevertheless the EU sugar industry is 
given artificial production advantages and thereby becomes internationally competitive. (The 
case of sugar production is further elaborated on in section 9). So in terms of the classic liberal 
principles, EU artificially maintains production advantages that do not exist and this leads to a 
situation where EU products, which in fact are more expensive to produce, become internation-
ally competitive. The reasons for doing this are solely based on a wish to secure EU farmers a 
reasonable income and thereby satisfy farmers’ organisations demands. 
 
If EU wishes to base its agricultural policy on the classic liberal principles, EU should abandon 
all agricultural production that do not experience production advantages, and thereby open up for 
the free market mechanisms where genuine production advantages are the basis for market ac-
cess. When EU artificially maintains production advantages the free market mechanisms are set 
aside and this creates an unbalance in the positive-sum game that classic liberalism otherwise 
prescribes. By abandoning non-advantageous EU production, the situation of a positive-sum 
game in terms of trade with agricultural products can be realised according to theory. Some de-
veloping countries would have to focus on other productions, but a shift to a competitive produc-
tion would eventually generate economic benefit. 
 
In other words, even though the EU policy on agriculture claims to be based on the liberal prin-
ciples of free world trade, this is in fact not the case. Liberalist principles are found in the pol-
icy’s approach to economic growth, but nevertheless the policy does not turn to any of the liberal 
principles in the specific policy. In fact the main theoretical principle of the policy is protection-




8.1.2 Protectionist approaches 
The protectionist measures that EU has introduced in its agricultural policy as seen in section 6 
has a direct influence on the developing countries in terms of eliminating possible production 
advantages. By introducing financial, technical and logistic support for EU farmers, EU also 
creates a situation where EU products become more competitive in relation to non-EU products. 
In other words this means that the protectionist measures result in the fact that the developing 
countries have no production advantages and thus are unable to benefit from any competitive 
advantages.311 The effect of this is that only very few non-EU agricultural products are imported 
into EU. These products are primarily products that EU cannot produce itself due to climatic or 
other circumstances that cannot be politically or economically regulated (e.g. coffee, tea, tobacco 
etc.). 
 
Another consequence of the protectionist measures is that EU products are able to out-compete 
local products in the developing countries due to heavy export subsidies. This means that not 
only does EU prevent farmers in the developing countries from exporting their products to 
EU,312 but it also means that the EU products overtake the local markets in the developing coun-
tries and thus prevents the local farmers from selling their products locally. The protectionist 
measures that EU has introduced on its agricultural policy therefore not only effect the EU farm-
ers in terms of better market conditions internally; it also destroys the local market conditions for 
the farmers in the developing countries. The result of destroying market access both internally 
and externally for the farmers in the developing countries is rather evident. If the farmers cannot 
sell their products, they will have to find another employment. However, if labour forces in the 
developing countries are forced to shift to another industry, this means that the farming industry, 
where the developing countries actually possess some production advantages will be abandoned 
and the costly EU agricultural industry will gain even more market access.  
 
In addition, the shift to other productions would mean that the developing countries have to 
make large investments in new production material such as machinery, knowledge, raw materials 
and etc. but since the developing countries do not posses the capital means for this kind of in-
vestment, the investors would have to be foreign investors. Foreign investors could bring some 
                                                 
311 McMahon: 1992 
312 Langbehn & al: 2006 
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economic growth to the developing countries in terms of new industries and thereby employ-
ment. However, foreign investors would not see a need for investing in further development that 
could generate overall development in the specific country. Therefore the capital that is gener-
ated by these foreign investments will for the most part be transferred out of the developing 
countries and into the developed countries. 
 
One consequence of this scenario is that the developing countries will need to abandon agricul-
ture and thereby become dependent on food supply from EU and that this dependency on EU and 
the market dominance of EU products will increase prices for agricultural products and thus 
leave the developing countries in a situation where they cannot produce their own food and can-
not afford to import it from EU. In other words the EU protectionist agricultural policy is slowly 
elimination the means of existence for the developing countries.  
 
A likely reaction to this is heavy emigration to EU, which already can be seen today. So at a 
more indirect level, the EU agricultural policy as it is today generates a pressure on the EU bor-
ders and results in illegal immigration since people are trying to escape the worsening situation 
in the developing countries. By eliminating the developing countries’ means of existence, EU 
generates heavy immigration because people in the developing countries see no future in staying. 
This is already a well-known phenomenon today in the EU Mediterranean countries. An example 
of this is seen in Spain, where illegal immigrants from Africa now compete with the local Span-
ish farmers. This happens when legal African immigrants buy land and then hire illegal immi-
grants to work on the farms at prices that are much lower than the local labour force. Local 
farmer organisations have protested heavily against this, because they know that if this problem 
is not solved, the Spanish farmers will be out-competed by the African farmers due to cheap la-
bour. However, there is another paradox to this situation. Some Spanish farmers, especially those 
of labour-intensive productions such as e.g. tomato production, maintain their competitiveness 
only by means of using cheap African labour. 313 
 
Another aspect of this emigration is that the people, which are the poorest and the less educated, 
will have to stay in the developing countries. This economic and knowledge depopulation of the 
                                                 
313 Heilbuth: 2006 
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developing countries will result in a situation where they do not have the means nor are they able 
to provide the means for any kind of development. 
So not only does the protectionist agricultural policy eliminates the means of existence for the 
developing countries by forcing them to shift to other productions where they might not have any 
production advantages or productions that need heavy investments, but this will also make the 
developing countries even more dependent on the developed countries both in terms of invest-
ments and for food supply. This vicious circle of no means of existence and more dependency on 
the developed world will undoubtedly put the borders of the developed world under pressure due 
to heavy emigration from the developing countries. 
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion the EU agricultural policy can be said to create a situation where the farmers in the 
developing countries have no possibility of producing for the EU market, even though they can 
produce cheaper than EU farmers. EU sets aside market mechanisms that otherwise would have 
given the developing countries production advantages and thereby a possibility to export to EU. 
Instead it allows the more expensive EU products to be exported and dumped on the markets in 
the developing countries.  
 
The export and dumping of EU agricultural products in the developing countries furthermore 
generates a situation where the farmers in the developing countries cannot compete on the local 
market with EU products. The farmers are therefore forced to abandon farming and shift to other 
industries, where the developing countries have no production advantages. The final result is that 
the developing countries will become more and more dependent on food supply from EU and 
investment from the developed countries. Furthermore, they will have no industries that can gen-
erate economic means for development. The developing countries will become more and more 
poor, and capital actors, educated people and investors will leave the developing countries and 
their situation will only worsen in a vicious circle of more dependency on the developed world; 
both economically, socially and politically, because the EU agricultural policy undermines the 
developing countries’ means of existence. Furthermore, this lack of means of existence leads to 
immigration that creates a future situation for the farmers in the South of Europe that seems 
somewhat insecure due to the paradoxical scenario of the EU agricultural policy, which on first 
hand allows EU farmers to destroy the markets of the developing countries, but on second hand 
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indirectly also destroys the EU farmers’ means of existence by generating heavy immigration, 
which out-compete EU farmers due legal immigrant landowners that hire cheap labour. 
 
8.2 Consequences of EU development policy  
As seen in section 6, the EU development policy can also be categorised within two major theo-
retical frames of development theory: Modernisation/neo-Liberal theories on the one hand and 
post-Imperialist/neo-Marxist theories on the other. Based on the conclusions in section 6.2 this 
section discusses the possible consequences of the EU development policy. 
 
8.2.1 Modernisation and neo-Liberal approaches 
The Modernisation development theory is based on an assumption that the developing countries 
have benefited from previous imperialism and still can benefit from a close cooperation with the 
developed countries. The main principles behind this approach is based on the thought that west-
ern values of capitalism, western culture and western social principles can be copied by the de-
veloping countries and thereby set them on a path to economic growth. However, the economic 
growth is only considered to concern capital actors in the developing countries such as land 
owners, owners of production means, natural resources etc. The problem with this approach lies 
in the fact that the social classes that will benefit from economic growth based on Modernisation 
theory are the ones that need it the least. In other words, Modernisation theory makes the rich 
richer and the poor poorer.  
 
Another problem of this focus on generating development at this social level is that most of the 
capital actors are western companies or locals that live abroad. This means that the economic 
growth that is generated by supporting these capital actors is transferred out of the developing 
countries. This capital drain leaves the other social classes with no economic means to create 
development, and result in conditions where a small elite owns almost everything that can gener-
ate economic growth, and transfers the money out of the country. In terms of development this 
means that the lower social levels do not experience any development. Also political and admin-
istrative institutions have no economic means for generating development. So all in all this 
leaves the general population in a situation were economic development is impossible. Since 
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economic development is the basis for almost any other sort of development, this results in no 
social, political, environmental or sanitary development.  
 
In addition the principles of neo-Liberalism in terms of open economies, world competition and 
open markets will destroy the fragile economies of the developing countries, since they have no 
means of protecting own productions and markets. This results in a situation where local produc-
tion is out-competed by international competition: in the case of agricultural goods, by subsi-
dised EU products that are cheaper than local products. If the developing countries have no 
means to protect their own productions against foreign competition, they will eventually be left 
without any means of production, and be dependent on import of foreign products, but without 
the possibility to make the necessary capital to pay for the imported goods.  
 
A country with no or little production that is forced to import most goods, will inevitably experi-
ence a huge deficit on the trade balance, and therefore be in heavy dept. The only actors that 
benefit from a neo-Liberal development approach are trans national companies, foreign inves-
tors, and local capital actors in the developing countries. All economic surplus is generated and 
absorbed by these actors. 
 
8.2.2 Post-Imperialist and neo-Marxist approaches 
On the other side of the development theory spectre, EU development policy also presents an 
approach based on post-Imperialist and neo-Marxist theories. Unlike Modernisation and neo-
Liberal theory, these approaches consider the effect of imperialism to be damaging to the devel-
oping countries and see a need for generating development at other social levels.  
 
Post-Imperialism agrees with neo-Liberal theory concerning the need for some capital actors 
(primarily TNCs)314 and the positive influence these can have on generating economic growth. 
However, the central difference between neo-Liberalism and post-Imperialism is that it is not the 
developing countries that have to play along the rules of the TNCs, but that the developing coun-
tries and the TNCs should find a way of mutual benefit. Some TNCs are very interested in mov-
ing to a place with easy access to raw materials, cheap labour or other advantages, and this 
                                                 
314 Trans national companies 
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should result in a scenario where the developing countries provide some kind of production ad-
vantage on the condition that the TNCs use some of their economic surplus to generate develop-
ment locally e.g. by hiring local workers, pay for the construction of infra structure, building of 
institutions etc. This way, the TNCs can benefit from production advantages and the developing 
countries are added economic means to create development.  
 
The fact that TNCs should hire and educate local workers results in a development process on 
more than one social level. This way a process of sustainable development is started. Workers 
that become educated and/or get a permanent job will bring capital to the local society, which 
then again will nourish from this capital flow that the TNCs generate. If the TNCs do not in any 
way try to exploit the local society by e.g. heavy pollution, underpayment and etc. the develop-
ment process will, according to the theory of post-Imperialism become sustainable and continue 
on a long term basis. This is the core meaning of the term sustainable development: To generate 
a process that will continue on its own over a long period of time and not harm future genera-
tions and their possibilities. 
 
This approach is supported by the neo-Marxist theory. Like post-Imperialism, neo-Marxism sees 
the need for inclusion of other classes than the capital actors. They see the workers and the farm-
ers as the main channels to generate development. This corresponds well with the principles of 
making use of mutual beneficial relationship between TNCs and the host country. Workers are 
employed and educated and thereby can generate a general development including the overall 
population. Neo-Marxism focuses on generating development in a bottom-up model. If the lower 
classes experience development so will other classes too. That is also why EU’s focus on the 
campaign against poverty falls within neo-Marxist theory. The lowest class is the one to focus on 
in order to generate general development. By ensuring an economic stability poverty can be re-
duced through different campaigns, and development will be generated because people will have 
the means to bye food from the local farmers, the farmers will earn money to improve their pro-
duction and so on.315 
 
                                                 




EU development policy can be considered to result in two practically opposite situations for the 
developing countries. The Modernisation and neo-Liberal approaches generate economic growth 
in the higher social classes and lead to a capital drain of the developing countries. The effect of 
the economic growth will therefore not be of benefit to the general population, but only to the 
elites. 
 
In addition the principles of the neo-Liberal development theory will destroy the economies of 
the developing countries by forcing them to have open economies and thereby be subjected to 
world competition. The fragile economies and the less competitive industries of the developing 
countries will be undermined and this has devastating results for the developing countries. The 
industries that are not competitive on the world market, which in terms of developing countries 
are most industries, are out-competed and will have to shut down. The developing countries will 
become totally dependent on the developed countries with no means for generating any eco-
nomic growth due to lack of competitive industries. 
 
On the other hand the post-Imperialist and neo-Marxist approaches guarantee the developing 
countries a minimum of living standards. The post-Imperialist approach of generating sustain-
able development allows small productions that are not out-competed by international compa-
nies. This way people in the developing countries can be employed in these productions and 
generate capital flow on a micro economic level. However, these productions are not of a size 
that can gain influence on the world markets and thus generate more substantial economic 
growth. Therefore the question is whether it can be considered to be sustainable or not. Never-
theless, the development programmes of this nature have proven to be sustainable at least for a 
period of time. One of the problems with the programmes seeking to generate sustainable devel-
opment is the simple relation between production and market. A development programme that 
has established e.g. a production of agricultural goods needs to have a market in order to be sus-
tainable. However, when EU agricultural products out-compete local producers and protect own 
markets, there will be no market for these products, and thus many of the programmes turn out to 




The neo-Marxist approach has more or less the same effect on the developing countries. The aim 
of reducing poverty in the developing countries also effects the capital flow in the local societies 
and at the same time improves education, sanitation, health and environment in these societies. 
However, the campaign against poverty can seem endless, if there are no industries to generate 
the capital to reduce poverty. Again the main obstacle for a sustainable reduction of poverty is 
the neo-Liberal principles of open economies and free competition. If the developing countries 
have no competition advantages there will be no economic growth and thereby no capital to re-
duce poverty.  
 
All in all the different approaches of the EU development policy can be considered to counteract 
each other. Where the post-Imperialist and the neo-Marxist approaches generate economic 
growth on a micro economic level, Modernisation and neo-Liberal approaches can be considered 
to drain capital from the developing countries on a macro economic level. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
As concluded in the sections above there seem to exist contradictions between the EU agricul-
tural policy and EU development policy. On one hand EU agricultural policy aims at protecting 
and increasing market possibilities for the EU farmers by eliminating the means of existence for 
the farmers in the developing countries and on the other hand the development policy tries to 
generate development in these countries. However, contradictions are not only seen between 
these two policies, but can also be found in approaches within the individual policies.  
 
Section 6.1 concluded that even though the theoretical principles of the agricultural policy are 
categorised to be contradictive, the different approaches actually support one another. However, 
in the case of the development policy this seems to be somewhat different. The main problem of 
EU development policy is that the approaches of post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism are in direct 
conflict with the theories of Modernisation and neo-Liberalism. So the key issue in terms of the 
EU development policy is that there seems to be great disagreement on what to focus on and 
what approach that has the best results. This means that the EU member states are allowed to 
follow any of these approaches to execute their development policy, and then the individual 
member state must consider itself, which approach it finds best. Furthermore, there is no path 
dependency in terms of choosing development approach. One development programme can be 
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based on the neo-Marxist approach and the next programme on neo-Liberalism. This inconsis-
tency of development approaches leaves the developing countries in a situation where develop-
ment is entirely in the hands of the funding country or private organisations and their interests. If 
a EU member state finds it more beneficial to support the capital actors in a given developing 
country, there is no central EU policy that prevents the member country from this.  
 
In terms of the contradictions between EU agricultural and development policies the different 
analyses conducted in sections 6 and 7 clearly show that on a political level agriculture is more 
important than development. EU has a strong emphasis on coherence in agricultural policy, 
which cannot be found in the development policy. This means that EU as a political and eco-
nomic power is more concerned with internal than external issues and therefore also shows evi-
dence of strong political and economic coherence internally and weak or practically no political 
and economic coherence externally.  
 
This results in a situation where the two policies more or less counteract each other. One of the 
most obvious evidence of this is the contradiction between a wish for an integration of the devel-
oping countries into a liberal world economy and the fact that EU in no way participates in the 
world economy on liberal terms when it comes to agriculture. So the demand that the developing 
countries should introduce liberal economies in order to be integrated in the world economy does 
not correspond with the principles of protectionism behind the EU agricultural policy. Another 
obvious contradiction between the two policies can be seen in the relation between generating 
sustainable development and EU protectionism. The development that is generated in the devel-
oping countries can never become sustainable when EU protects its own market and at the same 
time out-competes local producers.  
 
In conclusion the two policies can be said to contradict each other on several levels. Also, the 
policies can be said to directly counteract one another due to lack of coherence. The EU agricul-
tural policy eliminates the developing countries’ means of existence and in addition the EU de-
velopment policy provides no solutions to repair on the damages caused by the agricultural pol-
icy. This is where the most obvious lack of coherence is seen. On the basis of what have been 
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found in the previous analyses it can seem like “(…) the one hand does not know what the other 
is doing, or even worse that the one hand does not care what the other hand is doing.”316 
 
                                                 
316 Midé & Heilbuth: 2004: Quotation by the Danish development scholar Per Pinstrup-Andersen. 
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9. Analysis of empirical consequences for the developing 
countries 
In continuation of the theoretical analysis and characterisation in sections 6, 7 and 8, three differ-
ent cases of development projects are presented, in order to exemplify what consequences EU 
development and agriculture policies cause in the developing world. The purpose of including 
case studies in the thesis work serves as a link between the theoretical analyses and the societies 
where the policies are implemented and the consequences of these policies. 
 
9.1 Cases 
The cases present different types of development projects initiated or affiliated with the EU de-
velopment organisations and some are executed by or in corporation with partners from the 
member states. For each case it will be assessed who the initiating part is, who the main financ-
ing actors are, and how and by whom the project is executed. Further it is examined how the 
projects are related to EU development, and how EU development and agriculture policies affect 
the outcome of the projects. The cases that will be presented are the following 3: 
 
• PROLINO: EU development project in the Dominican Republic ‘EU giveth and 
EU taketh’ EU initiated and executed project. 
• Sugar production in South Africa: Consequences of export subsidies of European 
agricultural products.  
• The MEDA programme: Development in North Africa and the Middle East: EU 
co-operation with external and national partners. 
 
9.1.1 The Prolino Project 
EU Giveth’… 
As it was presented in the introductory section of this study, the European Development Fund 
financed and executed a development project in The Dominican Republic from 1994 - 2001. The 
project was set up in 1994 with a budget of 23.6 million €, and the overall objectives were to 
improve the living conditions in the poorest regions of The Dominican Republic. 
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The project concentrated mainly on two major aspects; The first was to boost farm production, 
while the second aim was to improve social infrastructures and the living conditions of the popu-
lation in the rural areas.317 The purpose of enforcing the rural areas was further an attempt to 
reverse the trend toward exodus from the rural areas to the larger cities, which resulted in a lack 
of labour force in some of the areas. The enforcement was done by providing the farming popu-
lation with necessities like water and electricity supplies combined with education programmes 
on e.g. the sensible use of water, hygiene and etc. Further, the EU development project set up 
agricultural development programmes to train farmers in live stock rearing. The training helped 
farmers like Rodolfo Fiche make a living of livestocks and the land, in opposition to barely sur-
vive on it, and the initiatives have contributed to a raise in the quality of living in the farming 
communities. 
 
The effects of the project were tangible to many farmers. With help from the PROLINO Pro-
gramme the Dominican farmers improved feed qualities and farming practices, and at the heyday 
of his farming carrier the dairy farmer Rodolfo Fiche managed 120 dairy cows. The country’s 
production of milk doubled during the programme period, and Fiche earned money enough from 
his milk production to invest in better production facilities, to produce better feed for his cows 
and to pay for clothes and schooling for his children. 
 
...And EU taketh’ 
But the Dominican dairy market was subject to export of substantial quantities of milk powder 
from Europe. The milk powder was part of the large amounts of surplus milk produced by Euro-
pean dairy farmers. The Agriculture subsidy system ensured the farmers a subsidy for their sur-
plus milk production318 even though it could not be sold on the European market. Instead it was 
turned into milk powder and exported to non-EU countries with export subsidies, where it was 
sold at prices below normal market prices.  
 
The result for the dairy farmers in the Dominican Republic is that their fresh milk produce is de-
selected by consumers in favour of the cheaper milk powder, and suddenly the basis for the dairy 
production in the Dominican Republic was undermined. It is estimated that Rodolfo Fiche’s des-
                                                 
317 http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm 
318 The subsidy system ensures that the European overproduction can be disposed of without loosing turnover by 
means of EU guaranteed profit. About one fifth of the milk produced in Europe is exported to non-EU countries. 
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tiny is shared by around 20.000 farmers in the Dominican Republic319 and similar scenarios can 
be observed in Jamaica and South Africa.320Some of the things that were brought by the devel-
opment project improved the living conditions in the otherwise poorly developed farming areas; 
among other things an improved infrastructure and water and electricity supplies to the remote 
rural areas. But in some points the Dominican farmers are worse of than before the implementa-
tion of the EU project. They are left with production facilities that are just about useless and with 
no chances to finance a switch to other production areas that would secure them a steady income. 
At the limit, the loss of basis for living may force the farmers to leave their farms and move to 
the larger cities in order to try and find jobs there. 
 
The PROLINO project is initiated and financed by the EU Development Fund and a relevant 
question is; is the 23 million € that EU invested in the development project all wasted? 
Compared to the amount that is paid in export subsidies for the European milk the developing 
countries would have been better of without EU exports and development support.  
The farmers and the rural societies have gained some advantages from the projects, such as ex-
tended electricity and water supplies but the failed milk production project means the farmers 
need to find other ways to make a living and that leaves them in the same – or even worse - 
situation compared to before the implementation of the PROLINO project. 
 
9.1.2 Sugar production in South Africa 
Sugar is one of the main crops grown in South Africa. Ed Graham is one of the many sugar cane 
farmers in South Africa and he owns a small candy production facility. In spite of the uneco-
nomic sugar production in EU the European farmers exports six million ton of sugar annually.321 
It is estimated that for each billion ton of sugar that South Africa could export, a 100.000 jobs 
would be created;322 a considerable number that would lead to a change in the increasing unem-
ployment rate South Africa suffers from. The unemployment forces many farmers to abandon 
the country and instead try to make a living in the larger cities. 
 
                                                 
319 Mide & Brems: 2004 
320 Sørensen: 2003 
321 Mide & Brems: 2004 
322 Hansen & al.: 2002 
 147
 
Regardless that South Africa is one of the world’s most effective sugar producers323 the com-
parative advantages of South Africa’s sugar production are undermined because of the heavy 
production and export subsides of EU-produced sugar.324 The economic support to production 
and export of sugar in EU member states means that EU sugar and candy products are being ex-
ported to Africa where it is sold at prices below half the normal price level for sugar containing 
products. For Ed Graham this means that he can not sell his raw sugar or his processed candy 
anywhere. The imported products are sold at prices below what he needs to charge for the un-
processed sugar, making it impossible for Graham to compete with the EU produced candy.  
 
The example illustrates the effect that EU’s agriculture policy and the associated export subsidies 
have on farmers’ living conditions and development possibilities. The policies that was initially 
defined with the purpose of “protecting  and developing” the European farmers, are doing so by 
influencing and outmanoeuvring the market powers far from European fields at the expense of 
farmers in the developing countries. 
 
9.1.3 The MEDA Programme 
The European – Mediterranean Programme MEDA (measures d’accompagnement)325 is the 
principal financial instrument of the European Union for strengthening of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.326 Geographically the programme stretches from Morocco, Tunisia, 
Jordan, and Egypt at the African continent, to Lebanon, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Tur-
key in the Middle East. The programme includes development activities aimed at rural develop-
ment and water supplies in some countries to establishing infrastructure and industry in others. 
 
In the Commissions’ own words the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to turn the 
Mediterranean area into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, sta-
bility and prosperity; strengthen the political dialogue, development of economic and financial 
co-operation, social, cultural and human dimension, and by 2010 establish a free-trade area.327 It 
makes economic transition and free trade the central issue of the EU financial co-operation with 
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the Mediterranean region. This emphasises the fact that another of the projects’ overall objects is 
that both the Mediterranean partners as well as the EU member states should benefit from the 
project.  
 
The Commission’s External Relations Directorate-General is responsible for drawing up the 
overall strategy for the MEDA programme. Based on this input, the Commission's EuropeAid 
Co-operation Office establishes the financing plans and manages the projects and programmes 
from the identification to the evaluation phase. The partnership involves both bilateral and multi-
lateral cooperation. The regional/multilateral activities are outsourced to national governmental 
partners as well as independent development organisations from the member states. The scope of 
the programme considered, this is a necessity; it would not be possible for the External Relations 
Directorate-General to facilitate all the different projects in the different countries on its own. 
 
The advantage of the many partners involved is that it is possible for the Commission to choose 
the best operator for the different development objectives. Some development organisations are 
highly specialised in a specific geographical area or provide a special technical service that it 
would be hard – and expensive - for the External Relations Directorate-General to perform just 
as well on its own. On the other hand, the diversity of structure, political background, and differ-
ent expectations to outcome of the projects in participating organisations add to the fragmenta-
tion of the EU development. The MEDA programme illustrates the important role of develop-
ment programmes in relation to EU’s foreign policy, as tools to promote political security. By 
establishing close cooperation, trade, and support of governments and/or opposition parties in 
North African and Middle Eastern countries, EU gains influence on the political setting and 
promotion of democracy.328 
 
9.2 Conclusion of the analysed cases 
The case of the Dominican farmer Rodolfo Fiche illustrates that even though EU initiates and 
runs development programmes with successfully meet the objectives in the first place, they still 
fail to succeed overall because of incoherence of EU’s external policies. The high priority status 
internally in EU and the external consequences of the agriculture policy undermine the possibil-
                                                 
328 Holden: 2006 
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ity of the development programmes to reach objectives of creating sustainable living conditions 
for the poor populations in the developing part of the world. 
Following revision reports that pointed to the issue of inconsistency between the aims of EU 
policies and development programmes the EU external assistance seeks coordination and com-
plementarity between community and bilateral initiated assistance.329 But the secondary status of 
development policy taken into consideration, this seems merely to be a mission statement, and 
not a factor that is visible in the practical examples, and even less a demand that the member 
states can be forced to follow. Yet, revision reports on the different development programmes 
points to problems with inconsistency and long execution times for projects. This relates to the 
varying structures and aims of development actors and not least to the inconsistent results be-
tween development and agriculture policies. 
 
The effects of the inconsistency between EU agriculture and development policies cause severe 
consequences outside of EU. The examples of Rodolfo Fiche and Ed Granham illustrate how the 
two policy areas exist side by side with contradictory objectives. The results of the development 
policy becomes the ‘weaker’ of the two, and the results made through the PROLINO project falls 
to the ground because it is undermined by the agricultural production terms in Europe. The con-
sequences may not have been foreseen by the EU officials, but the question is, whether anything 
would – or could - have been changed. The two policy areas are allocated different emphasis and 
resources in favour of agriculture policy and this means that it is unlikely that an (external) de-
velopment issue would preside over an (internal) agricultural matter. The inconsistency of poli-
cies supports the argumentation in section 8 which stated that the free trade conditions that EU 
claims to promote are very conditional and not giving the developed countries real chances to act 
on equal terms with the EU member states. 
 
An internal revision of the EU development programmes from 2005 highlights problems with 
long execution times of programmes and further attention is directed to the fact that the Commis-
sions procedures are rigid and slow.330 Another report published by the Evaluation Unit, an inde-
pendent revision organ under the Commission, states that some development programmes do not 
take all relevant policy areas into account; This can be seen as an indication that the EU organi-
sations are aware of the fragmented state of the development policy area. In other cases it is 





pointed to that unclear or inappropriate government policies and strategies lead to poor identifi-
cation of suitable projects. This questions the ability of national governments to recognise devel-
opment needs and act in the best suitable way in a given development situation. Further, it ques-
tions the individual governments’ interests in choosing certain projects or procedures. Some may 
focus on own (economic) gains at the expense of the overall success of the development project 
and the people and organisations it involves. The revision results can be interpreted as an indica-
tion that the institutions managing EU development are aware of the problems that the systemic 
political procedures cause. It may still be a long way, though, before the initiated changes and 
stated objectives to improve this situation will be evident in the development projects. 
 
Farming is often the main occupation and more or less the only source of food in developing 
countries, while developed countries are importing increasingly more food and employing fewer 
in the primary agricultural industry. But the export subsidies creates problems at regional as well 
as at the international level because the farmers in the developing countries are not able to com-
pete with products helped on the way with export subsidies and beneficial taxes, and this causes 
a deprivation of the chances to ensure a self-supported basic living which again leads to a further 
dependency on development aid in the affected areas. 
 
The total budget of the export subsidies paid for by EU amounts to annually 26 million EUR.331 
Seen in relation to the budget for development aid at 7.5 million EUR,332 some of the develop-
ment activities could seem in vain. The 26 million EUR could pay for a great deal of develop-
ment programmes.  
 
It is positive that the subsidy secures the existence of e.g. organic and small scale mountain 
farmers in Europe, but the negative effects of the extensive economic redistributions are felt ten-
fold in developing countries where farmers are forced to give up their land because they can not 




                                                 







Although agriculture and development policy are negotiated and approved by the same overall 
European Union, the differences between the 2 policies are significant; Not least the influence 
from the different institutions and actors that wield authority on the policy processes regarding 
the two policies, is of decisive importance to the practical outcome of the policies. The first and 
most considerable difference that can be observed is the different setting of the policies in terms 
of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The fact that there is no clear model for EU de-
velopment programmes and foreign policy in general means that it is subject to influence from 
the individual national governments and aid groups, and even though the EU institution define 
the overall politic direction, the execution of the development programmes often represents the 
economic or political interests of the individual aid donor.333 Further the coordination of devel-
opment programmes is blurred by the mixed picture of donors, meaning that the different pro-
jects may counteract each other, resulting in reduced or even nullified effects of the individual 
programmes.  
 
The parties involved in the policy process from initiation to execution, influence the policy out-
come in different ways, depending on whether it is an agricultural or developmental matter that 
is being negotiated. The different procedures for voting on agriculture issues versus development 
issues mean that the institutions involved in the procedures are of decisive importance for the 
outcome of the negotiations. The MEDA programme is negotiated by the consultation procedure, 
which means that the Commission and the Council are the main actors while the Parliament is 
left with the chance to offer its opinion on development matters but with no right to block nego-
tiated aid programmes.  
 
9.2.1 Consequences of EU agricultural policy for development policy 
In comparison with the theoretical consequences of EU development and agriculture policies 
presented in section 8 the empirical evidence in this section supports the conclusion of the theo-
retical analysis of EU policies that showed evidence of liberal and protectionist tendencies in the 
policy output; The EU subsidising of export goods and dumping in non-EU markets price locally 
produced agricultural products out of the market. The dumping of e.g. milk powder and sugar in 
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African and Caribbean countries contributes to the argumentation that EU cares about develop-
ing countries only as long as it does not conflict with internal (agricultural and economic) inter-
ests.  
 
The EU farmers benefit from subsidised agricultural production, but it is necessary to differenti-
ate the support between the parties of the agricultural production that produce intensively in or-
der to gain maximum economical benefits from the ground, and those who contributes to pre-
serving special geographical areas like the extensive farmers who produce extra careful in order 
to preserve nature. Ideally the European farmers would produce the products they are best at 
(regional comparative advantages, French farmers wine, Italian farmers parmesan cheese and 
vinegar), less intensively it would heighten the quality of the food products and leave room for 
import of non-EU foods, plus of course free markets in developing countries for dumping of sec-







This study analysed the contradictions that exist between and within the EU policy on agriculture 
and the EU policy on development. Further, it examined why these contradictions exist and what 
consequences these policy contradictions have for the developing countries. The focus on EU is 
based on the fact that EU plays an important role as an international economic and political insti-
tution and thereby through its policies wields influence on the economic and political world 
situation. This influence entails a responsibility towards the developing countries. This means 
that an examination of EU policies and EU policy processes is relevant in order to analyse the 
relation between EU policies and processes on the one hand, and the following consequences for 
the developing countries on the other. 
 
The chosen frame of economic trade and development theories against which the EU policies on 
agriculture and development are mirrored, represent the traditional main schools within these 
two policy areas. This approach provided us with a broad theoretical tool for placing the EU 
policies in an overall theoretical frame. However, the theoretical categorisation of agricultural 
and development policies does not facilitate an in-depth analysis of policy content. On the other 
hand this was found in the policy analysis sections where policy content was analysed as the 
outcome of the different policy processes. 
 
 In order to examine EU policy processes a variety of policy analysis theories were applied. The 
choice of a composite approach to policy analysis resulted in analyses consisting of different 
individual focal points which together add to an overall (picture) of EU policy processes. 
The lack of one single theoretical approach for EU policy analysis necessitated a multi-
dimensional theoretical approach. Therefore the framework of this study is based on a collage of 
theories each chosen because they allow differentiated analyses that are necessary for examining 
the diversity and complexity of the EU policy processes. 
 
The focus on the consequences that EU policies and policy processes have for the developing 
countries called for an inclusion of theoretical deductive analyses as well as empirical inductive 
analyses. This resulted in an abductive approach enabling us to base our conclusions about con-
sequences on two different foundations. In term of this thesis’ conclusion of the consequences 
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for the developing countries the theoretical and empirical findings supported each other and thus 
reinforce our conclusions. 
 
The following sections conclude in details on the analyses on EU policy processes and conse-
quences for the developing countries.  
 
10.1 Conclusion on contradictions in EU agriculture and development 
policies 
This thesis’ section 6 analysed and categorised the different theoretical approaches to both EU 
agricultural and development policies. The categorisations in section 6 were based on an analysis 
of the texts concerning agriculture and development stated in the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community. Based on the theory about economic trade and 
development the analyses in section 6 found that both EU agricultural and development policies 
consist of a dualism of theoretical approach. 
 
As far as the EU agricultural policy is concerned section 6 showed that the dualistic theoretical 
approach of this policy area concerns classic liberalism and protectionism. Classic liberalism was 
seen in the policy’s notions of generating economic growth by exploiting production advantages 
and also in the acknowledgement that agriculture and national economies are closely linked and 
that agriculture thus is a main factor for economic growth and thereby national economic wealth. 
On the other hand the protectionist approaches were found in the policy’s focus on price regula-
tion, securing minimum prices for farming products, subsidisation that secures more export and 
less import and finally technical barriers that impose high standards on imported products and 
support EU farmers in terms of marketing and logistics. 
 
Even though these two theoretical approaches at first look seem to be in direct conflict with each 
other, the analyses in section 6 showed that the EU agricultural policy is formed in a way that 
enables these two approaches to support one another. The classic liberal approaches of exploiting 
production advantages can only be realised by introducing protectionism that creates artificial 
production advantages. This way protectionism ensures that EU can profit from the classic lib-
eral principles of production advantages. 
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The same dualism was found in the theoretical approaches to EU development policy. Here the 
two strings are Modernisation/neo-Liberalism and post-Imperialism/neo-Marxism. Even though 
Modernisation and neo-Liberalism cannot be considered to consist of the exact same principles 
there are some similarities that allow us to consider them as one side of the development spectre 
as opposed to post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism on the other, which also are considered suffi-
ciently similar in order to categorise them as a common theoretical approach. 
 
Modernisation and neo-Liberalist approaches were found in the EU development policy’s state-
ment about a smooth integration of the developing countries into the liberal world economy and 
in the policy’s paragraphs about the spread of western values such as democracy, human rights 
and etc. In contrast to these approaches signs of post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism were pointed 
out by the policy’s focus on sustainable development and the campaign against poverty. Unlike 
the case of the theoretical approaches applied in the agricultural policy, the approaches in devel-
opment policy cannot be considered to support one another. Rather, the development approaches 
can be considered to represent opposite sites of the development theory spectre and thus have 
completely different focuses that in some cases are in direct conflict with each other. Further-
more, section 6 concluded that not only do contradictions exist within the two policies, but also 
between these. Classic liberal approaches of the agricultural policy collide with the post-
Imperialist/neo-Marxist notions about capitalism and economic growth and the relation between 
capitalism and development. The protectionist approaches found in the agricultural policy con-
tradict the Modernisation/neo-Liberal approaches on the aspects of a wish for liberal economic 
integration of the developing countries but without EU itself being part of the liberal economy 
due to protection of agriculture. In addition, the protectionist approach counteracts the post-
Imperialist/neo-Marxist approach. This is seen in the contradiction between protection of EU 
markets and at the same time a wish for sustainable development and poverty reduction in the 
developing countries. This does not correspond since poverty can be seen as a result of EU pro-
tectionism. If EU markets are closed to the developing countries’ farmers they need to turn to 
other productions that are less advantageous and thereby less competitive. This will inevitably 
result in poverty in the developing countries. Furthermore, EU protectionism also allows EU 
farmers to conquer markets in the developing countries and thereby out-compete local farmers. 
Thus a wish for generating sustainable development can seem ridiculous in the light of the fact 
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that EU offers no market for productions in the developing countries. Without a market for sell-
ing products, no production can become sustainable, nor can it reduce poverty. 
10.2 Conclusion on reasons for EU policy contradictions 
In section 7 different policy analysis approaches were applied in order to examine the reasons 
behind the policy contradictions found in section 6. The various policy analysis approaches al-
lowed us to conclude on a range of different aspects that can explain the inconsistencies of the 
EU policies on agriculture and development. 
 
The first conclusion of section 7 was that different policy natures cause different policy proc-
esses in different institutional settings. Section 7.1 concluded that the EU agricultural policy was 
of redistributive nature, meaning that the main purpose of the policy is to regulate markets, com-
petition and welfare; whereas the EU development policy is of external economic nature. The 
analysis of section 7.1 also showed that agricultural policy as a redistributive policy is formed by 
an iron triangle consisting of the Council of Agriculture Ministers, the Commissioner and special 
committees on agriculture. These actors are the main decision-actors and they have more or less 
similar interest in protecting EU agriculture. On the other hand development policy is formed 
with the individual member states as the central policy-actors and not from a central EU hold. 
 
In the light of these differences of institutional settings section 7.2 analysed the different policy 
orders that exist within the EU system. The analyses concluded that like different policy natures, 
different policy orders also cause different policy settings. Based on the institutional setting of 
the agricultural policy, which is formed by a supranational EU policy organ that focuses on a 
broad EU consensus agricultural policy can be considered to be of first policy order. This means 
that agriculture has high priority and that EU policies and legislation on this area reside over 
national policies. Development policy, however, is considered to be of second policy order since 
the policy making process is based on intergovernmentalism, giving the individual member 
states the role as central policy making actor. In terms of priority, development policy has low 
priority in EU, due to the fact that member states wish to maintain national autonomy on issues 
relating to foreign matters here among development policy. 
 
The reasons behind these differences in policy orders were analysed in section 7.3. Here we 
found that the main reason for EU agricultural policy to be of first policy order was based on a 
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historic importance of political integration in EU. At the time of the establishment of EU, farm-
ers were considered an important factor for the future political integration of EU. Farming was 
an important industry in a socio-economic sense and therefore EU focused on creating a strong 
coherent agricultural policy that farmers would support and thereby also support the political 
integration of EU; meaning the transfer of political power from the member states to EU. Thus 
one of the main reasons for agriculture to be of first policy order is the farmers’ historic status in 
Europe and the mutual beneficial arrangement between EU and the farmers. EU provided a pol-
icy that maintained the economic and political status of the farmers and in return the farmers 
secured political support for EU. Since there have been no similar arrangements between EU and 
development stakeholders, development policy has not gained the same importance in the politi-
cal integration in EU and therefore remains a second order policy. Furthermore, the different 
policy orders also result in different policy instruments for achieving the policies. Where agricul-
tural policy instruments can literally be described as all means possible, EU does not define de-
velopment policy instruments. The same goes for the general aims and values behind the two 
policies: in the case of agricultural policy these are clearly defined in the treaty, whereas those of 
development policy are more vaguely defined. These differences in priority between the two 
policies can be considered to be some of the main reasons for policy contradictions. The actual 
policy processes also point to some crucial differences that in the end result in policy contradic-
tions. 
 
Section 7.4 directed focus to the political processes of the European Union and to the actors that 
influence the processes of initiating, negotiating and deciding on the political areas of agriculture 
and development. At the supranational level the processes concerning agriculture policy are 
overall influenced by the Commission, but also the Council wields its power on this area. Farm-
ing interests at the national levels are channelled through the national governments and their role 
in the Council of Agriculture Ministers or in the Council, and seen in relation to the fact that na-
tional political interests follow the same pattern supports the notion of agricultural policy proc-
esses as a mainly supranational matter. 
 
In sum it can be said of the political processes concerning agriculture that it is a matter of power 
balance between EU institutions and the farming lobby. In spite of attempts to minimise the 
chances of the farming industry to secure their interests through influence of the political proc-
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esses, representatives of the farming interests are still secured an almost traditional access to the 
formal political sphere in form of the consultative role they enjoy in both the Commission and 
the Council. For the interest actors in agricultural policy, the Dominant Economic Class perspec-
tive is the reigning because of the strongly organised pan-European farming lobby representing 
actors that are interested in maintaining status quo of agricultural support. 
 
Regarding the area of interest actors in development policy the pluralist perspective supports the 
mixed picture of actors that wield influence on the policy process. The development interests 
mainly seek influence at the national level and the fact that the actors are likely to have different 
goals for development projects further contributes to the multifaceted impression of this area. 
 
Overall it can be said that the different policy processes, interests and priorities cause a contra-
dicting effect between the agricultural and the development policy areas. 
 
10.3 Conclusion on theoretical consequences of EU policy contradic-
tions 
In section 8 the theoretical consequences of the EU policy contradictions were analysed with a 
focus on the impact these have on the developing countries. The analyses in section 8 were based 
on the theoretical classifications of EU agricultural and development policies made in section 6. 
 
The analyses of the consequences of EU agricultural policy showed that the protectionist meas-
ures of the policy eliminate the free market mechanisms by means of conquering the agricultural 
markets in the developing countries and at the same time protecting EU’s own agricultural mar-
ket from cheap foreign products. Thereby EU eliminates the developing countries’ possibilities 
to compete against EU farmers. This enforces the developing countries to change means of pro-
ductions to even less competitive areas. The fact that the developing countries are forced to give 
up productions where they actually have a chance of possessing production advantages results in 
a situation where the developing countries become more and more dependent on EU as a food 
supplier but also economically dependent on development aid due to lack of competitive produc-
tions. This dependency leads to a scenario of unemployment and poverty, which again leads to 
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heavy emigration. Since the successful EU farmers are the reason that farmers in developing 
countries are out competed many will immigrate to EU in order to set down as farmers here. 
 
In terms of EU development policy the Modernisation and neo-Liberal approach generates de-
velopment in the higher social levels among capital actors, landowners and owners of production 
means. Since these are often rich locals or foreign investors, the capital generated from this de-
velopment will be transferred out of the developing countries and into the developed world, leav-
ing the developing countries with no means for development. Furthermore the neo-Liberal no-
tions of open economies and free trade will destroy the fragile economies in the developing 
world since these would become subjects to international competition from stronger economies 
in the developed world. This will generate more dependency for the developing countries, since 
capital investments in development would need to come from the capital actors in the developed 
countries.  
 
At the other end of the development theory spectre post-Imperialism and neo-Marxism can be 
considered to provide the developing countries with a minimum of standard of living. Employ-
ment and capital flow can be generated on a micro economic level. On this level sustainable de-
velopment in form of small productions can generate development that can reduce poverty. Nev-
ertheless the scale of this development is only on a micro level and thus cannot affect the general 
development situation of the developing countries. The fact that development on a macro eco-
nomic level generated by the Modernisation and neo-Liberal approach results in capital drain out 
of the developing countries can be considered to neutralise the positive effects of the develop-
ment progress on the micro economic level. The contradictions lie within the inconsistencies 
between protectionism on the one side and sustainable development on the other. Agricultural 
productions that reach a macro economic level cannot be sustainable due to the competition of 
EU and the closed EU agricultural market.  
 
In addition the contradictions between a wish for a liberal economic integration of the develop-
ing countries into the world economy and EU’s protectionist agricultural policy have conse-
quences for the developing countries. If the developing countries were able to enter a free com-
petition concerning agriculture, the chances of a smooth economic integration into the world 
economy would be significant higher. However, since EU applies protectionism on the agricul-
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tural market, the developing countries cannot compete, and will therefore only suffer from being 
integrated in the liberal world economy. 
 
In conclusion the consequences for the developing countries are that EU through its agricultural 
policy and lack of coherent development strategy is undermining the means of existence for the 
developing countries and thereby creates more dependency. This vicious circle of no means of 
production combined with unemployment, poverty and general underdevelopment results in 
emigration from the developing countries and pressure on the EU borders. 
 
10.4 Conclusion on empirical consequences of EU policy contradic-
tions 
In order to shed light on the practical consequences of EU policies on the developing countries 
section 9 presented an analysis of three cases with different structures and donor organisations. 
The cases serve a purpose to illustrate the impacts of different types of development actions de-
rived from within the overall EU development frame. 
 
Based on the case of the EU initiated and executed development project PROLINO for dairy 
farmers in the Dominican Republic, it is illustrated how the development programme reach the 
objectives of improving living standards and facilitating sustainable basis for living for the farm-
ers involved. It also shows how the superior political status of one political area causes problems 
in another. The fact that the agricultural policy area is attained higher political and economical 
status within EU leads to a clash of policy results in non-EU countries.  
 
The second case introduced the situation of a South African producer of sugar cane. In spite of 
an effective and viable sugar production the sugar industry is under heavy competition from 
sugar exported from EU with substantial economic support. The subsidised exports cause distor-
tion of the comparative advantages that the South African farmers posses.  
 
The third case introduced the MEDA programme which covers several countries on the Mediter-
ranean South coast and in the Middle East. The overall frame of the programme is set by the EU 
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Development DG but is carried out in corporation with a range of national as well as non-
governmental development organisations.  
 
Even though development actions fall under the overall frame of EU external policy legislation, 
the majority of projects are coordinated by actors at intergovernmental, national, and sub-
national levels. Further, there is none or only poor coordination between donor countries, organi-
sations and the EU development authorities, and this leads to counteracting, and in the worst case 
ineffective projects. The multiplicity of project coordinators further blurs the picture of objec-
tives for development projects. National actors show greater interest in projects in countries that 
are historically connected to the donor country, and it is furthermore seen that project coordina-
tors choose projects with objectives that are mutual beneficial to the donor as well as to the re-
ceiving parts. 
 
In sum, this thesis concludes that policy contradictions exist between and within EU policies on 
agriculture and development in terms of counteracting theoretical views in the two policy areas. 
The contradictions in policies derive from differences in policy processes existing in EU agricul-
tural and development policies. Inconsistencies between the two policy areas obstruct the long 
term successful results of the development policy. In addition inconsistencies within the EU de-
velopment policy reinforce the lack of success of the EU development policy. 
 
In terms of the developing countries this means that generating development for the poorest peo-
ple in the world becomes less than a second priority to EU. In EU policy the developing coun-
tries are neglected to a such extent that EU in principle could be held responsible for contributing 
to the unchanged situation in the developing world. EU does not live up to its defined responsi-
bilities as an international political and economic power when it keeps the development countries 
in a vicious circle of no major economic development and only provides a minimum of living 
standard through humanitarian aid and more or less failing development programmes. The fact 
that EU policy processes allow the interest of a few thousand European farmers to be prioritised 
over the survival of millions of people in the developing countries points to a lack of interna-
tional responsibility of EU. As a result the developing countries are left in a situation from where 





Since the enlargement of EU from 15 to 25 member states EU has been in a transition phase 
where different intuitional structures and setting are being revised and negotiated. One of the 
issues that are of high priority is the restructuring of the EU agricultural policy and especially the 
agricultural subsidisation. With the enlargement of the 10 new member states EU’s agricultural 
farming area was increased with 45%, however, the respective increase in GDP was only 4% due 
to low productivity and lack of technology in the new member states.334 Therefore the enlarge-
ment has set the EU agricultural policy under pressure, since the budget cannot uphold the same 
level of support to the new member states. Thus the enlargement calls for a revision of the agri-
cultural policy in order to ensure that EU does not become a two-level organisation with A and B 
members.  
 
Also the Constitutional Treaty of EU in its original form opens up for drastic changes of EU. At 
this moment, EU is in vacuum regarding the implementation of the Treaty. Since France and the 
Netherlands rejected the Treaty, EU is considering whether to revise the Treaty or to continue 
the implementation process of its present form. If the Treaty is ratified in its present form it en-
tails a revision of the decision processes by introducing the co-decision procedure as the applied 
procedure in matters regarding the common agricultural market organisation.335 This means that 
the EU Parliament will gain more influence on the agricultural policy and thereby possibly be 
able to break the iron triangle and the traditional status quo of the agricultural policy. However, 
the Council still remains the sole decision maker on issues relating to price levels, taxes, subsidi-
sation and quantitative restrictions.336  
 
Another aspect of the Constitutional Treaty that might be able to change policy processes is the 
suggestion of a common EU foreign secretary. The Constitutional Treaty prescribes that a com-
mon EU foreign secretary should replace the functions of the present commissioner on foreign 
matters and the special EU foreign policy coordinator.337 The EU foreign secretary would be 
responsible for forming and executing the EU foreign policy and thereby secure more coherence 
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335 König & Bräuninger: 2004 
336 Ibid 
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on foreign policy matters here among also development policy.338 This might lead to a more con-
sistent EU development policy that could benefit the developing countries. 
 
A third aspect that could change the situation for the developing countries is the UN Millennium 
Development Goals. In the year 2000 the worlds’ leaders, including the leaders of the EU mem-
ber states, committed to the UN Millennium Development Goals by signing the Millennium 
Declaration at the UN Millennium Conference. The eight goals were defined to provide the de-
veloping countries around the world a framework for development and sustainability, and they 
are targeted to be fulfilled by 2015.339 The EU is considered to play a leading role in securing a 
successful outcome of the UN development policies. EU has committed to a closer cooperation 
with the UN in the development area in order to support the implementation of the goals.  
 
Today, almost half-way through the 15 years, some progress has been made but there is still a 
long way to go before the commitments will be met and the promises to current and future gen-
erations in the developing countries can be fulfilled.340 If the progress continues at the present 
speed the goals will not be reached until the year 2117,341 and according to the Secretary-General 
of UN it is necessary to more than double the level of global development assistance over the 
next few years if the goals should be reached within the time frame.342 Therefore in order to 
reach these goals EU would need to refocus on the consequences of its policies which might ne-
cessitate a revision of EU policy processes. 
 
                                                 
338 Ibid  
339 Millennium Project: 2005 
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13. Annex  
Excerpts on agriculture and development from the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Union.343 










1. The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. ‘Agricul-
tural products’ means the products of the soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of 
first-stage processing directly related to these products. 
 
2. Save as otherwise provided in Articles 33 to 38, the rules laid down for the establishment of 
the common market shall apply to agricultural products. 
 
3. The products subject to the provisions of Articles 33 to 38 are listed in Annex I to this Treaty. 
 
4. The operation and development of the common market for agricultural products must be ac-
companied by the establishment of a common agricultural policy. 
 
Article 33 
1. The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: 
 
                                                 
343 A complete version of the treaty can be found at www.eu-oplysningen.dk 
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(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by en-
suring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisa-
tion of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in par-
ticular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
 
(c) to stabilise markets; 
 
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
 
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
2. In working out the common agricultural policy and the special methods for its application, 
account shall be taken of: 
 
(a) the particular nature of agricultural activity, which results from the social struc-
ture of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities between the various 
agricultural regions; 
 
(b) the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees; 
 
(c) the fact that in the Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked 
with the economy as a whole. 
 
Article 34 
1. In order to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, a common organisation of agricultural 
markets shall be established. This organisation shall take one of the following forms, depending 
on the product concerned: 
 




(b) compulsory coordination of the various national market organisations; 
 
(c) a European market organisation. 
 
2. The common organisation established in accordance with paragraph 1 may include all meas-
ures required to attain the objectives set out in Article 33, in particular regulation of prices, aids 
for the production and marketing of the various products, storage and carryover arrangements 
and common machinery for stabilising imports or exports. The common organisation shall be 
limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 33 and shall exclude any discrimination be-
tween producers or consumers within the Community. Any common price policy shall be based 
on common criteria and uniform methods of calculation.  
 
3. In order to enable the common organisation referred to in paragraph 1 to attain its objectives, 
one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee funds may be set up. 
 
Article 35 
To enable the objectives set out in Article 33 to be attained, provision may be made within the 
framework of the common agricultural policy for measures such as: 
 
(a) an effective coordination of efforts in the spheres of vocational training, of re-
search and of the dissemination of agricultural knowledge; this may include joint 
financing of projects or institutions; 
 
(b) joint measures to promote consumption of certain products. 
 
Article 36 
The provisions of the chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply to production of and 
trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council within the framework 
of Article 37(2) and (3) and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein, account being 
taken of the objectives set out in Article 33.The Council may, in particular, authorise the grant-




(a) for the protection of enterprises handicapped by structural or natural conditions; 
 
(b) within the framework of economic development programmes. 
 
Article 37 
1. In order to evolve the broad lines of a common agricultural policy, the Commission shall, 
immediately this Treaty enters into force, convene a conference of the Member States with a 
view to making a comparison of their agricultural policies, in particular by producing a statement 
of their resources and needs. 
 
2. Having taken into account the work of the Conference provided for in paragraph 1, after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and within two years of the entry into force of 
this Treaty, the Commission shall submit proposals for working out and implementing the com-
mon agricultural policy, including the replacement of the national organisations by one of the 
forms of common organisation provided for in Article 34(1), and for implementing the measures 
specified in this title. These proposals shall take account of the interdependence of the agricul-
tural matters mentioned in this title. The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, acting by a qualified majority, make regulations, issue 
directives, or take decisions, without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make. 
 
3. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority and in accordance with paragraph 2, replace 
the national market organisations by the common organisation provided for in Article 34(1) if: 
 
(a) the common organisation offers Member States which are opposed to this 
measure and which have an organisation of their own for the production in question 
equivalent safeguards for the employment and standard of living of the producers 
concerned, account being taken of the adjustments that will be possible and the 
specialisation that will be needed with the passage of time; 
 
(b) such an organisation ensures conditions for trade within the Community similar 




4. If a common organisation for certain raw materials is established before a common organisa-
tion exists for the corresponding processed products, such raw materials as are used for proc-




Where in a Member State a product is subject to a national market organisation or to internal 
rules having equivalent effect which affect the competitive position of similar production in an-
other Member State, a countervailing charge shall be applied by Member States to imports of 
this product coming from the Member State where such organisation or rules exist, unless that 
State applies a countervailing charge on export. The Commission shall fix the amount of these 
charges at the level required to redress the balance; it may also authorise other measures, the 




13.2 Title XX of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing 






1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary 
to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: 
 
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, 
and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them, 
 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world 
economy, 
 
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
 
2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. 
 
3. The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account 




The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that 







1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall adopt the measures necessary to further the 
objectives referred to in Article 177. Such measures may take the form of multiannual pro-
grammes. 
 
2. The European Investment Bank shall contribute, under the terms laid down in its Statute, to 
the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1. 
 
3. The provisions of this Article shall not affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EC Convention. 
 
Article 180 
1. The Community and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development coop-
eration and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisa-
tions and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States 
shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programmes. 
 




Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall co-
operate with third countries and with the competent international organisations. The arrange-
ments for Community cooperation may be the subject of agreements between the Community 
and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with Ar-
ticle 300. The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to 
negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agreements. 
 
